Daily Papers

With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), harnesses have become essential infrastructure for deploying agents across a wide range of domains. The fast-evolving harness ecosystem has also made rigorous capability evaluation increasingly important. However, efficiently building an end-to-end, systematic, and comprehensive evaluation pipeline remains a significant challenge. To address this challenge, we introduce A^2E (Agent Auditing Engine), an end-to-end evaluation engine designed for agent harnesses. A^2E leverages our newly proposed Agent Task Protocol (ATP) to enable the rapid integration of evaluation tasks with different harnesses. Through an automatically instrumented Monitor, it captures and generates standardized execution traces during experiments. In the Evaluation stage, A^2E systematically assesses harness capabilities using a suite of multidimensional metrics. Compared with correctness alone, these metrics provide a more fine-grained characterization of differences among harnesses in execution efficiency, tool use, task planning, and error recovery. Experiments conducted with A^2E further reveal that model-harness combinations exhibit substantial performance variation across different types of tasks, and that no single combination consistently outperforms all others across every task. These findings not only demonstrate the necessity of systematic evaluation but also provide useful guidance for the co-evolving of models and harnesses. Our code is available at https://github.com/datamllab/A2E.

Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space.

Large Language Model agents are increasingly augmented with agent skills. Current evaluation methods for skills remain limited. Most deployed benchmarks report only pass rate before and after a skill is attached, treating the skill as a black box change to agent behavior. We introduce Counterfactual Trace Auditing (CTA), a framework for measuring how a skill changes agent behavior. CTA pairs each with skill agent trace with a without skill counterpart on the same task, segments both traces into goal directed phases, aligns the phases, and emits structured Skill Influence Pattern (SIP) annotations. These annotations describe the behavioral effect of a skill rather than only its task outcome. We instantiate CTA on SWE-Skills-Bench with Claude across 49 software engineering tasks. The resulting audit reveals a clear evaluation gap. Pass rate changes by only +0.3 percentage points on average, suggesting little aggregate effect. Yet CTA identifies 522 SIP instances across the same paired traces, showing that the skills substantially reshape agent behavior even when pass rate is nearly unchanged. The audit also separates several recurring effects that pass rate cannot detect, including literal template copying, off task artifact creation, excess planning, and task recovery. Three findings emerge. First, high baseline tasks contain most of the observed skill effects, although their pass rate is already saturated and therefore cannot reflect those effects. Second, tasks with moderate baseline performance show the most recoverable gain, but often at substantially higher token cost. Third, the dominant SIP type can be identified by baseline bucket: surface anchoring is most common on ceiling tasks and edge-case prompting is most common on mid-range and floor tasks. These regularities turn informal failure mode observations into reproducible behavioral measurements.

Social deduction games have become a popular testbed for probing reasoning, deception, coordination, and belief modeling in Large Language Model (LLM) agents. However, most environments are scored only by game outcomes such as win rates and largely remain to text-only interaction, making it difficult to tell whether an agent's language is actually grounded in what it perceived and did, or to identify the failure modes underlying its behavior. To address this gap, we introduce QUACK, an open-source environment and evaluation framework for auditing the grounding of agent language in multimodal social reasoning. QUACK evaluates agents at three levels: game outcomes, behavioral trajectories, and utterance-level consistency. Its core Statement Verification Pipeline reconstructs each agent's ground-truth trajectory from engine logs and checks every discussion claim against it, automatically flagging spatial hallucination, unsupported accusation, deception collapse, and language-action inconsistency. Evaluating three frontier VLMs in both homogeneous and cross-model adversarial settings, we find that even the strongest agent hallucinates 15.1% of its verifiable spatial claims and makes over half of its accusations without grounded evidence. We release the full engine, evaluation framework, toolkit, and logs at https://github.com/AAAAA-Academia-Attractions/QUACK.

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

AI agents combine language models with external data and tools that can modify files, call APIs, or execute code. Security failures can arise when adversarial content changes an agent's tool use or when the surrounding software contains vulnerabilities such as path traversal or command injection. We study authorized white-box pre-deployment auditing, where the auditor has access to the target repository and a controlled runtime, but successful attacks must still act through the task-defined attacker interface and be confirmed by an external verifier. We present AgentXploit, a two-role auditing system that separates repository-level attack-path discovery from runtime exploitation. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records code-supported candidate attack paths; the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and revises them using runtime feedback. We also introduce AgentXploit-Bench, containing 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open-source AI-agent systems and frameworks. Across three runs, AgentXploit reaches 59.3% end-to-end success, compared with 38.4% for Codex. Under a token-budget-matched comparison, Codex reaches 46.3%. On AgentDojo, where injection points are provided, the Exploiter Agent reaches 79.2% attack success versus 52.7% for AgentVigil. These results highlight repository discovery and runtime exploitation as distinct challenges in end-to-end agent security auditing.

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

Structured financial audit verification is difficult for language-model agents because correctness depends on structured evidence rather than text alone. A model must link reported facts to taxonomy concepts, traverse calculation or dimensional relations, and recompute expected values before applying an audit rule. We propose AuditFlow, a graph-grounded multi-agent framework that separates adaptive search from deterministic verification. AuditFlow builds a symbolic environment from a static US-GAAP taxonomy graph and a dynamic XBRL filing graph, and exposes it through typed tools for fact retrieval, taxonomy traversal, numerical checking, and rule evaluation. Two junior auditors inspect each case from regulatory and evidentiary views, while a senior auditor resolves disagreements and can request further investigation. The final reports are fused through evidential aggregation to produce an audit verdict, expected value, evidence trail, and trustworthiness score. On a FinAuditing-derived FinMR sample, AuditFlow reaches 82.09% joint audit accuracy under GPT-5.5, outperforming the strongest baseline by 14.93 points. Removing deterministic checks drops accuracy to 17.91%, showing that the symbolic environment performs the verification step that the model cannot reliably replace.

EVMbench, released by OpenAI, Paradigm, and OtterSec, is the first large-scale benchmark for AI agents on smart contract security. Its results -- agents detect up to 45.6% of vulnerabilities and exploit 72.2% of a curated subset -- have fueled expectations that fully automated AI auditing is within reach. We identify two limitations: its narrow evaluation scope (14 agent configurations, most models tested on only their vendor scaffold) and its reliance on audit-contest data published before every model's release that models may have seen during training. To address these, we expand to 26 configurations across four model families and three scaffolds, and introduce a contamination-free dataset of 22 real-world security incidents postdating every model's release date. Our evaluation yields three findings: (1) agents' detection results are not stable, with rankings shifting across configurations, tasks, and datasets; (2) on real-world incidents, no agent succeeds at end-to-end exploitation across all 110 agent-incident pairs despite detecting up to 65% of vulnerabilities, contradicting EVMbench's conclusion that discovery is the primary bottleneck; and (3) scaffolding materially affects results, with an open-source scaffold outperforming vendor alternatives by up to 5 percentage points, yet EVMbench does not control for this. These findings challenge the narrative that fully automated AI auditing is imminent. Agents reliably catch well-known patterns and respond strongly to human-provided context, but cannot replace human judgment. For developers, agent scans serve as a pre-deployment check. For audit firms, agents are most effective within a human-in-the-loop workflow where AI handles breadth and human auditors contribute protocol-specific knowledge and adversarial reasoning. Code and data: https://github.com/blocksecteam/ReEVMBench/.

Computer-use agents hold the promise of assisting in a wide range of digital economic activities. However, current research has largely focused on short-horizon tasks over a limited set of software with limited economic value, such as basic e-commerce and OS-configuration tasks. A key reason is that creating environments for complex software requires significant time and human effort, and therefore does not scale. To address this, we introduce Gym-Anything, a framework for converting any software into an interactive computer-use environment. We frame environment creation itself as a multi-agent task: a coding agent writes setup scripts, downloads real-world data, and configures the software, while producing evidence of correct setup. An independent audit agent then verifies evidence for the environment setup against a quality checklist. Using a taxonomy of economically valuable occupations grounded in U.S. GDP data, we apply this pipeline to 200 software applications with broad occupational coverage. The result is CUA-World, a collection of over 10K long-horizon tasks spanning domains from medical science and astronomy to engineering and enterprise systems, each configured with realistic data along with train and test splits. CUA-World also includes CUA-World-Long, a challenging long-horizon benchmark with tasks often requiring over 500 steps, far exceeding existing benchmarks. Distilling successful trajectories from the training split into a 2B vision-language model outperforms models 2times its size. We also apply the same auditing principle at test time: a separate VLM reviews completed trajectories and provides feedback on what remains, improving Gemini-3-Flash on CUA-World-Long from 11.5% to 14.0%. We release all code, infrastructure, and benchmark data to facilitate future research in realistic computer-use agents.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Despite the growing capabilities of autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs), their adoption in high-stakes domains remains limited. A key barrier is security: the inherently nondeterministic behavior of LLM agents defies static auditing approaches that have historically underpinned software assurance. Existing security methods, such as proxy-level input filtering and model glassboxing, fail to provide sufficient transparency or traceability into agent reasoning, state changes, or environmental interactions. In this work, we introduce AgentTrace, a dynamic observability and telemetry framework designed to fill this gap. AgentTrace instruments agents at runtime with minimal overhead, capturing a rich stream of structured logs across three surfaces: operational, cognitive, and contextual. Unlike traditional logging systems, AgentTrace emphasizes continuous, introspectable trace capture, designed not just for debugging or benchmarking, but as a foundational layer for agent security, accountability, and real-time monitoring. Our research highlights how AgentTrace can enable more reliable agent deployment, fine-grained risk analysis, and informed trust calibration, thereby addressing critical concerns that have so far limited the use of LLM agents in sensitive environments.

Evaluating large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems remains a critical challenge, as these systems must exhibit reliable coordination, transparent decision-making, and verifiable performance across evolving tasks. Existing evaluation approaches often limit themselves to single-response scoring or narrow benchmarks, which lack stability, extensibility, and automation when deployed in enterprise settings at multi-agent scale. We present AEMA (Adaptive Evaluation Multi-Agent), a process-aware and auditable framework that plans, executes, and aggregates multi-step evaluations across heterogeneous agentic workflows under human oversight. Compared to a single LLM-as-a-Judge, AEMA achieves greater stability, human alignment, and traceable records that support accountable automation. Our results on enterprise-style agent workflows simulated using realistic business scenarios demonstrate that AEMA provides a transparent and reproducible pathway toward responsible evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent systems. Keywords Agentic AI, Multi-Agent Systems, Trustworthy AI, Verifiable Evaluation, Human Oversight

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Deep search enables language agents to solve complex information-seeking tasks through iterative web exploration. However, developing robust open-source agents remains challenging for three reasons. First, opaque trajectory-construction pipelines make training data difficult to audit and reproduce. Second, context compression can create a substantial mismatch between training and inference. Third, agents may retrieve benchmark content from the open web during evaluation, contaminating the results and overstating their performance. To overcome these bottlenecks, we introduce Glasseek, a fully transparent deep search framework spanning the complete development lifecycle, releasing all data, model weights, training recipes, and code. Specifically, for data construction, we establish a verifiable trajectory curation pipeline that systematically generates high-quality exploration paths. For training, we propose Compaction-Managed GSPO (CM-GSPO), which uses the same policy for search and summarization while optimizing only execution sub-trajectories, enabling end-to-end search-policy training across context-compaction boundaries. For evaluation, we conduct the first systematic audit of test-set leakage in open-web agents and release a modular anti-leakage plugin that seamlessly integrates into existing evaluation harnesses. Under this rigorous evaluation protocol, our 9B agent outperforms frontier proprietary agents across almost all deep research benchmarks spanning diverse task types, and achieves the best overall performance among recent open-weight agents, setting a new state of the art at the 9B scale.

Autonomous computer use agents that powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are emerging as capable assistants for completing complex digital workflows. However, real-world execution environments are far from ideal: pop-ups, resolution changes, and competing applications frequently interfere with agent perception and control. We introduce AgentHijack, a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of computer-use agents under common corruptions, where the uncertainties in dynamic environment disrupt the execution flow without direct adversarial intent. Specifically, AgentHijack introduces 9 configurable common corruptions to replicate realistic imperfect scenarios. We evaluate a variety of desktop tasks that utilize MLLM-based agents and discover that even minor instances of corruption can result in substantial performance degradation, which emphasizes the fragility of agents and underscores the necessity of robustness evaluation. Afterward, we propose AgentHijack-Agent, a framework that integrates an action generator with enhanced grounding capabilities and an onlooker responsible for behavior summarization and environment checking. Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness. Our code, environment, baseline models and data are publicly available at: https://AgentHijack.github.io.

As AI agents are becoming widely adopted in the financial services industry, careful measurement is essential to understand where they can be reliably deployed and where oversight and professional review remain necessary. Such measurement, however, is constrained by limited access to proprietary or privacy-sensitive data. Existing benchmarks therefore often rely on publicly available data, human- and/or LLM-authored tasks, or simplified settings. We introduce FinancialAuditBench, a benchmark for evaluating agents on financial statement audit tasks, along with a framework for systematically generating synthetic engagements. Our task generation framework leverages differentially private aggregate statistics from historical audits along with audit expertise contributed through over 1,100 hours of benchmark development and review. FinancialAuditBench consists of 90 tasks spanning workpaper completion and review across six synthetic audit engagements, each containing an average of 179 files. Evaluation on eleven frontier models shows that while agents complete substantial portions of staff-level audit tasks well, they sometimes perform inappropriate procedures or produce incorrect documentation. Beyond financial auditing, our framework offers an approach for systematically generating synthetic tasks for model evaluation and training in privacy-sensitive domains.

AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments. This democratization enables rapid local innovation, but it also creates a reliability gap: agents that appear to users as simple productivity artifacts may depend on changing models, tools, retrieval sources, permissions, prompts, schedules, and external services. These dependencies can cause silent degradation long after deployment, even when no user directly modifies the agent. This paper identifies the reliability challenge created by democratized AI agent creation and proposes a lightweight continuous-assurance framework for citizen-created organizational agents. The framework combines dependency mapping, readiness contracts, scheduled checks, diagnostics, and lifecycle governance to assess whether an agent remains operationally ready under expected conditions. We also present an initial prototype auditor and scenario-based assessment showing how the proposed taxonomy can be translated into practical checks and actionable remediation guidance.

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current benchmarks cannot measure. When agents coordinate on tasks, sensitive data passes through inter-agent messages, shared memory, and tool arguments; pathways that output-only audits never inspect. We introduce AgentLeak, to the best of our knowledge the first full-stack benchmark for privacy leakage covering internal channels, spanning 1,000 scenarios across healthcare, finance, legal, and corporate domains, paired with a 32-class attack taxonomy and three-tier detection pipeline. Testing GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large, and Llama 3.3 70B across 4,979 traces reveals that multi-agent configurations reduce per-channel output leakage (C1: 27.2% vs 43.2% in single-agent) but introduce unmonitored internal channels that raise total system exposure to 68.9% (OR-aggregated across C1, C2, C5). Internal channels account for most of this gap: inter-agent messages (C2) leak at 68.8%, compared to 27.2% on C1 (output channel). This means that output-only audits miss 41.7% of violations. Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which emphasizes safety alignment in its design, achieves the lowest leakage rates on both external (3.3%) and internal (28.1%) channels, suggesting that model-level safety training may transfer to internal channel protection. Across all five models and four domains, the pattern C2 > C1 holds consistently, confirming that inter-agent communication is the primary vulnerability. These findings underscore the need for coordination frameworks that incorporate internal-channel privacy protections and enforce privacy controls on inter-agent communication.

Evaluating agents on the growing number of agentic benchmarks is challenging because they often require complex environments and agent integrations. We introduce Harbor Adapters, a unified evaluation infrastructure for agentic benchmarks. Our work makes three contributions. First, we develop benchmark adapters that port more than 80 benchmarks to evaluate arbitrary agents, and validate them through rigorous code review and parity experiments. Second, we conduct a large-scale evaluation of 8 models spanning capability tiers across 54 benchmarks; every model is run with Terminus-2 and with one of 3 native harnesses. This enables a broader analysis of agent capabilities and failure modes than was previously possible. Third, we introduce Harbor-Index, a curated set of 82 difficult, diverse, and high-quality tasks spanning 29 benchmarks, refined from the adapted suite through difficulty filtering, AI and human audit, and an audit-and-fix loop. Harbor-Index preserves the challenge and breadth of large-scale agentic evaluations while being affordable to run; no evaluated model-harness configuration exceeds 30% pass rate, and the strongest (GPT-5.5 with Codex) reaches 28.0%. We release the adapters, evaluation results, in-depth analysis, and Harbor-Index as open-source artifacts to support more reliable and comprehensive evaluation of language-model agents.

Autonomous scientific agents now increasingly propose ideas, write code, run experiments, analyze results, and even draft papers. Observe and audit those agents are necessary but logging every model call is not enough, scientists also need to inspect the artifacts and claims that the systems produced and their relations. This is driven by the fact that failures in scientific agent systems are often distributed across several objects. A manuscript claim may cite the wrong evidence, a search process may select a degenerate candidate, a laboratory novelty claim may depend on an unstated rule, or a multi-agent plan may change without a visible trigger. Existing tracing, experiment tracking, and archival provenance tools are valuable, but their native objects do not make these scientific audit relations first-class. We argue that autonomous scientific systems should emit portable, claim-aware artifact lineage as a minimum audit layer. We propose a compact observability profile organized around individuals, operators, fitness records, lineage, archives, runs, streams, and steering commands. In this profile, scientific claims are ordinary individuals with explicit evidence bindings and verification records. The profile is intended as a semantic layer that complements current telemetry and provenance standards. Execution details can remain in OpenTelemetry. Final packages can export to PROV-O or RO-Crate standards.

Benchmark scores tell you what an agent got right; they do not tell you how it got there. In this work, we introduce methods for comparing agents procedurally in different contexts, where the model, tasks, and approaches vary. We compare ten agents and find that they are identifiable by their behavioral habits, which we define as fingerprints: a probe over these procedural signatures attributes an unseen trajectory to the correct agent at 85.7% accuracy, controlling for leakage across tasks. We develop procedural representations for agent problem-solving procedures with an emergent vocabulary induction technique that is meant to be maximally compressive to avoid surface-level variation while being expressive enough to unveil the quirks of the models' patterns. We apply our framework to the software engineering evaluation dataset SWE-Bench to study the structural distinctness of agent trajectories and find that behavior is most similar between models from similar release periods and those that are distilled from one another (e.g., a distilled student model and its teacher have a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.25, about half the distance between other model pairs). As more models saturate evaluations, we believe that it will be important to probe model behavior along more holistic dimensions than success rates alone. We introduce ProcGrep, a library for auditing and evaluating agents for how they approach tasks at a procedural level given their traces in a top-down fashion. We believe this work has a range of applications to help developers work with and program coding agents, such as task-aware model routing, agent monitoring, and finer-grained cost analysis.

Recent progress in large language model (LLM) agents has largely focused on embedding self-improvement mechanisms inside the agent or searching over many concurrent variants. While these approaches can raise aggregate scores, they often yield unstable and hard-to-audit improvement trajectories, making it difficult to guarantee non-regression or to reason about failures across versions. We reframe agent improvement as release engineering: agents are treated as shippable artifacts, and improvement is externalized into a regression-aware release pipeline. We introduce AgentDevel, a release engineering pipeline that iteratively runs the current agent, produces implementation-blind, symptom-level quality signals from execution traces, synthesizes a single release candidate (RC) via executable diagnosis, and promotes it under flip-centered gating. AgentDevel features three core designs: (i) an implementation-blind LLM critic that characterizes failure appearances without accessing agent internals, (ii) script-based executable diagnosis that aggregates dominant symptom patterns and produces auditable engineering specifications, and (iii) flip-centered gating that prioritizes pass to fail regressions and fail to pass fixes as first-class evidence. Unlike population-based search or in-agent self-refinement, AgentDevel maintains a single canonical version line and emphasizes non-regression as a primary objective. Experiments on execution-heavy benchmarks demonstrate that AgentDevel yields stable improvements with significantly fewer regressions while producing reproducible, auditable artifacts. Overall, AgentDevel provides a practical development discipline for building, debugging, and releasing LLM agents as software development.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) now act on a user's behalf across personal applications such as email, calendars, and to-do lists. This cross-application access is useful, but it also creates a privacy risk that has been largely overlooked: when an agent works in one context, it can pull in information from another that is inappropriate in that context. Hence, we introduce AgentCIBench, an evaluation harness that turns this risk into executable, deterministically scored scenarios. We target three common failure modes in CUAs: visual co-location, where the agent pulls in prohibited items that sit next to the task target in the UI; task-ambiguity overshare, where the agent dumps dense personal state in response to an under-specified prompt; and recipient misalignment, where the agent sends content to an addressee for whom it is inappropriate. We evaluate 15 frontier agents and find a surprisingly high failure rate: 11 of 15 leak on more than 50% of scenarios, with an average leakage of 67.9%, and the same failures persist when agents act end-to-end in the environment to complete the task. We release AgentCIBench to encourage the development of safer computer-use agents and position contextual disclosure testing as a pre-deployment safety check.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

Existing computer-use agent benchmarks do not fully evaluate agents acting as assistants. A useful assistant retrieves information across complex, multi-step workflows, synthesizes it into artifacts (documents, presentations, spreadsheets), and navigates program interfaces to produce a coherent final product. Such workflows demand reasoning and synthesis, decomposition of complex tasks, as well as visual and spatial understanding. To study agents on workflows like these, we introduce KNOWS, a benchmark of open-ended, complex, browser-based tasks that jointly evaluate these capabilities, with each task culminating in a produced artifact. To write tasks, we develop a task design rubric and a protocol for ensuring that tasks meet the requirements. Each task is paired with an evaluator, a program that combines deterministic checks with LLM judgments to balance the richness, reliability, and automation tradeoff inherent to agent evaluation. We evaluate and analyze frontier computer-use agents and browser-based harnesses. They achieve moderate scores on partial-success metrics, but the best performer fully succeeds in fewer than 3% of our complex, long-horizon tasks. Failures on visual steps render the resulting artifacts unusable, even when agents complete more than 50% of other evaluation steps. Our results expose limitations of current agents acting as end-to-end assistants, and call for progress on tool use, visual understanding, and long-horizon reasoning.

Reusable Web-agent verification requires a rule to follow changing requirements and support subsequent execution. We introduce AgentProofBench, which connects paired tests of a frozen acceptance rule to execution from identical saved openings. The resource spans 97 tasks, 79 families, and four Web services. Experiments with DeepSeek Flash/Pro establish two linked measurements. Across 48 families, complete-panel and decision-replay tests retain 82/96 Flash and 79/96 Pro source programs; paired reuse-rebuild BA intervals are [-5.47, 1.57] and [-10.16, 0.00] percentage points. Across 22 execution families, deployment-state panel correctness separates program assignments whose two saved openings are both delivered correctly: 32/33 assignments with error-free panels, versus 1/11 with panel errors. All reference-defined program-gate regressions and withheld deliveries occur in the latter group. Neutral continuation attains the highest correct delivery under the tested generic feedback, providing a concrete baseline for measuring the value added by a gate. Released instructions, states, programs, reference rules, and trajectories connect each test failure to its execution consequences. AgentProofBench makes reusable verification assessable at both the requirement and policy levels.

Language models are sequential processors, but long-horizon agency requires external information and computation beyond model weights and active context. Prime Agent is an open-source harness for long-horizon evaluation and coding-agent workflows. A persistent IPython REPL follows the Recursive Language Model abstraction for programmatic context processing and test-time compute, while Continual Harness preserves histories, memories, skills, prompts, and subagent specifications across trajectories. Recursive subagents coordinate through direct agent-to-agent communication, and the Agents View lets humans inspect and manage daemon-backed sessions. Prime Agent standardizes execution, recovery, verification, and resource accounting while leaving strategy construction to the model. This low-friction, expressive membrane prevents harness failures from becoming model failures and pushes measurement toward the model's true maximal underlying capability. Prime Agent raises ARC-AGI-3 RHAE Best@1 from 30% to 95.5% and matches or exceeds native and popular harnesses across long-context coding, GPU-kernel generation, emulator construction, and autonomous nanoGPT speedruns. On Factorio, we find refinement allows for continuous technology progression and dedicated subagents enable parallelized work. Code is available at https://github.com/PrimeIntellect-ai/prime-agent.

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

AI Agents are changing the way work gets done, both in consumer and enterprise domains. However, the design patterns and architectures to build highly capable agents or multi-agent systems are still developing, and the understanding of the implication of various design choices and algorithms is still evolving. In this paper, we present our work on building a novel web agent, Agent-E Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/EmergenceAI/Agent-E}. Agent-E introduces numerous architectural improvements over prior state-of-the-art web agents such as hierarchical architecture, flexible DOM distillation and denoising method, and the concept of change observation to guide the agent towards more accurate performance. We first present the results of an evaluation of Agent-E on WebVoyager benchmark dataset and show that Agent-E beats other SOTA text and multi-modal web agents on this benchmark in most categories by 10-30\%. We then synthesize our learnings from the development of Agent-E into general design principles for developing agentic systems. These include the use of domain-specific primitive skills, the importance of distillation and de-noising of environmental observations, the advantages of a hierarchical architecture, and the role of agentic self-improvement to enhance agent efficiency and efficacy as the agent gathers experience.

LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols. These capabilities make agents useful, but they also introduce risks related to over-privileged actions, weak auditability, prompt injection, tool poisoning, and uncontrolled side effects. This paper presents Agentao, a governed local-first runtime for tool-using LLM agents. Agentao separates model-generated action proposals from host-authorized execution through a layered architecture consisting of host-facing surfaces, a host contract, a runtime core, a permission-mediated tool system, and supporting subsystems for memory, replay, plugins, skills, sub-agents, and protocol integration. We describe the motivation, threat model, design goals, governance model, execution pipeline, and structured event interface of the system. Agentao does not provide formal safety guarantees; rather, it demonstrates how permissions, state, protocol boundaries, and execution traces can be made explicit runtime abstractions for building agents that are more governable, inspectable, and suitable for host-controlled local environments. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/jin-bo/agentao.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100\% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

Data agents use code to process heterogeneous files and derive analytical insights. Scaling their training faces costly environment curation, privacy and intellectual-property restrictions, and difficulty verifying open-ended findings without known generative truth. Our core insight is to specify the world behind the files before generating the files themselves. We introduce Data World, a multi-agent engine that synthesizes environments, tasks, and rubrics from explicit mechanisms. Independent audits check target recoverability from observed files; rubrics support evaluation and RL rewards. Human preference-based curation for question realism selects 100 tasks across 50 held-out worlds and 16 domains for DataWorld-Bench. The engine also yields 2,135 training tasks from 1,037 disjoint worlds. Evaluation of ten frontier models shows that the benchmark remains challenging, particularly for insight discovery, with a consistent computation-insight gap. RL-zero training on the synthesized tasks produces DataWorld-35B-A3B from Qwen3.6-35B-A3B without trajectory distillation. Under matched evaluation, it improves over its base by 7.06 points on DataWorld-Bench, 14.28 on DAComp, 20.90 on DABstep-Hard, and 12.13 on JobBench, a broader occupational benchmark.

AI agents have been developed for complex real-world tasks from coding to customer service. But AI agent evaluations suffer from many challenges that undermine our understanding of how well agents really work. We introduce the Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) to address these challenges. We make three main contributions. First, we provide a standardized evaluation harness that orchestrates parallel evaluations across hundreds of VMs, reducing evaluation time from weeks to hours while eliminating common implementation bugs. Second, we conduct three-dimensional analysis spanning models, scaffolds, and benchmarks. We validate the harness by conducting 21,730 agent rollouts across 9 models and 9 benchmarks in coding, web navigation, science, and customer service with a total cost of about $40,000. Our analysis reveals surprising insights, such as higher reasoning effort reducing accuracy in the majority of runs. Third, we use LLM-aided log inspection to uncover previously unreported behaviors, such as searching for the benchmark on HuggingFace instead of solving a task, or misusing credit cards in flight booking tasks. We share all agent logs, comprising 2.5B tokens of language model calls, to incentivize further research into agent behavior. By standardizing how the field evaluates agents and addressing common pitfalls in agent evaluation, we hope to shift the focus from agents that ace benchmarks to agents that work reliably in the real world.

LLM agents have begun to find real security vulnerabilities that human auditors and automated fuzzers missed for decades, in source-available targets where the analyst can build and instrument the code. In practice the work is split among several agents, wired together by a harness: the program that fixes which roles exist, how they pass information, which tools each may call, and how retries are coordinated. When the language model is held fixed, changing only the harness can still change success rates by several-fold on public agent benchmarks, yet most harnesses are written by hand; recent harness optimizers each search only a narrow slice of the design space and rely on coarse pass/fail feedback that gives no diagnostic signal about why a trial failed. AgentFlow addresses both limitations with a typed graph DSL whose search space jointly covers agent roles, prompts, tools, communication topology, and coordination protocol, paired with a feedback-driven outer loop that reads runtime signals from the target program itself to diagnose which part of the harness caused the failure and rewrite it accordingly. We evaluate AgentFlow on TerminalBench-2 with Claude Opus 4.6 and on Google Chrome with Kimi K2.5. AgentFlow reaches 84.3% on TerminalBench-2, the highest score in the public leaderboard snapshot we evaluate against, and discovers ten previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities in Google Chrome, including two Critical sandbox-escape vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-5280 and CVE-2026-6297).

LLM-based multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks, but a single decisive error is often accepted by downstream agents and cascades into trajectory-level failure. Existing work frames this as post-hoc failure attribution, diagnosing the responsible agent and step after the trajectory has ended. However, this paradigm forfeits any opportunity to intervene while trajectory is still unfolding. In this work, we introduce AgentForesight, a framework that reframes this problem as online auditing: at each step of an unfolding trajectory, an auditor observes only the current prefix and must either continue the run or alarm at the earliest decisive error, without access to future steps. To this end, we curate AFTraj-2K, a corpus of agentic trajectories across Coding, Math, and Agentic domains, in which safe trajectories are retained under a strict curation pipeline and unsafe trajectories are annotated at the step of their decisive error via consensus among multiple LLM judges. Built on that, we develop AgentForesight-7B, a compact online auditor trained with a coarse-to-fine reinforcement learning recipe that first equips it with a risk-anticipation prior at the failure boundary on adjacent safe/unsafe prefix pairs, then sharpens this prior into precise step-level localization under a three-axis reward jointly targeting the what, where, and who of an audit verdict. Across AFTraj-2K and an external Who\&When benchmark, AgentForesight-7B outperforms leading proprietary models, including GPT-4.1 and DeepSeek-V4-Pro, achieving up to +19.9% performance gain and 3times lower step localization error, opening the loop from post-hoc failures detection to enabling deployment-time intervention. Project page: https://zbox1005.github.io/agent-foresight/

Data science agents can automate end-to-end machine learning workflows, yet they remain far from competitive on human leaderboards. Agents make process errors such as insufficient exploration, unsound validation, coding bugs, and poor use of a fixed budget (re-running the same exploratory data analysis and baseline models in every attempt). We propose AdaPRA to address these issues: a persistent coding agent harness that accumulates knowledge across attempts on the same task, with rubric-guided process supervision that identifies and corrects errors. Our process reward agent audits the agent's trajectory and workspace by executing checks, and adapts its rubrics to each task. We find that rubrics seeded from easier tasks generalize to harder tasks, with rubric adaptation further improving performance. With five attempts per task, AdaPRA improves an 80B Qwen model's leaderboard percentile by 24.5 points on DSPredict-Easy and 14.8 points on DSPredict-Hard while reducing process errors. We also show that supervision with rubrics mined from one base model's runs improves another (DeepSeek-V3.2), and that AdaPRA beats DataPRM, a competitive PRM for data science. We also share our code for reproducibility.

Tool-using LLM agents are mostly evaluated assuming all tools work. When a tool times out, returns a week-stale value, or has its description poisoned in deployment, the developer needs a controlled way to reproduce the failure, test a fix, and confirm the fix worked before deployment. We present AgentCheck, an open-source web workbench that turns an MCP server into an intervention surface. AgentCheck runs an agent against its real tools and records every tool response, then re-runs the agent with the response perturbed by a fault (12 types) injector. Matching tool calls are replayed from cache, and later tool calls go live after the agent diverges. This yields a reproduce-intervene-confirm loop: the developer toggles a mitigation, re-runs against the identical fault, and sees if the failure goes away. Scoring has two parts: deterministic pass/fail rules, plus an LLM judge for interpretive labels, validated against human annotations. Across five agents, the best passes 105/120 scenarios and the weakest only 77. The failures are usually silent, confident use of incorrect tool outputs rather than crashes. On the weakest agent, a retry mitigation raises success on timeout error faults from as few as 30% of cases to 100%, whereas stale-data faults remain near 3-4 of 10 regardless of the mitigation. AgentCheck makes these failure modes reproducible, comparable, and verifiable before deployment.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

Asynchronous monitoring, incident investigations, and compliance audits primarily rely on agent traces to reconstruct what happened. These analyses assume that LLM agents cannot tamper with their own execution traces. We show that local LLM agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Open Code and Grok Build fail to enforce this boundary. All tested harnesses, except Muse Code, allowed agents to delete their traces when asked, without triggering monitor guardrails. We also validate that external attackers can exploit this gap to induce trace deletion. Finally, we show that trace tampering behavior emerges naturally in frontier models, when agents try to improve their rewards. We advise practitioners to ensure trace logging happens through an independent interception mechanism outside of the agent's control, preserving trace integrity even in cases of full host compromise. Overall, our findings identify a concrete failure of trace integrity in agent infrastructure which can be used to conceal misaligned behaviors like scheming or sabotage.

Generative AI-based software engineering agents are becoming routine contributors to real-world software projects. On GitHub, developers can assign tasks to the Copilot cloud agent, which autonomously explores the repository, edits code, runs commands, and opens or reviews pull requests, producing a detailed log of every step along the way. While existing datasets capture outcomes of agent contributions, such as agent-authored pull requests, the process by which agents produce these contributions remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce AgentLogs, a large-scale dataset of agent activity on GitHub. AgentLogs comprises 307,416 agent tasks and 549,239 agent sessions in 35,810 of the 1,812,362 popular public repositories that we scanned, together with 64,255,174 session log entries that record each agent run step by step, including prompts, intermediate reasoning, tool calls (e.g., file edits, git operations, and GitHub interactions), and token usage. By exposing not only what agents contribute but also how they work, AgentLogs enables research on agent behavior, efficiency and cost, task formulation, failure modes, and human-agent collaboration in agentic software engineering.

AI agents are increasingly embedded in real software systems, where they execute multi-step workflows through multi-turn dialogue, tool invocations, and intermediate decisions. These long execution histories, called agentic traces, make validation difficult. Outcome-only benchmarks can miss critical procedural failures, such as incorrect workflow routing, unsafe tool usage, or violations of prompt-specified rules. This paper presents AgentPex, an AI-powered tool designed to systematically evaluate agentic traces. AgentPex extracts behavioral rules from agent prompts and system instructions, then uses these specifications to automatically evaluate traces for compliance. We evaluate AgentPex on 424 traces from τ^2-bench across models in telecom, retail, and airline customer service. Our results show that AgentPex distinguishes agent behavior across models and surfaces specification violations that are not captured by outcome-only scoring. It also provides fine-grained analysis by domain and metric, enabling developers to understand agent strengths and weaknesses at scale. The source code of AgentPex is available at https://github.com/microsoft/agentpex.

Enterprise agents increasingly operate inside workspaces: they read heterogeneous files, invoke tools, and deliver business artifacts. We introduce EnterpriseClawBench, an enterprise agent benchmark constructed from proprietary, real-world agent sessions. Starting from a large archive of workplace sessions, the EnterpriseClawBench produces 852 reproducible tasks, each paired with recovered fixtures, rewritten prompts, role classes, skill subclasses, hard rules, and semantic rubrics. Because the sessions contain internal enterprise content, we do not release the benchmark data; instead, our reusable contribution is the construction and evaluation protocol. On EnterpriseClawBench, the best configuration reaches only 0.663 (Codex with GPT-5.5). These results show that enterprise agent evaluation must report harness--model combinations, artifact delivery, visual quality, cost, runtime, and skill-transfer behavior, rather than collapsing performance into a single score. Code: https://github.com/FrontisAI/EnterpriseClawBench

LLM agents are increasingly deployed as executable systems that use tools, modify workspaces, and produce concrete artifacts. In such workflows, performance depends not only on the base model, but also on the harness: the system layer that manages context, tools, state, constraints, permissions, tracing, and recovery. However, existing benchmarks typically abstract away execution, compare complete agent systems, or hold the harness fixed, making execution-layer variation difficult to study. We introduce Harness-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark for evaluating configuration-level harness effects in realistic agent workflows. Harness-Bench evaluates representative harness configurations across multiple model backends under shared task environments, budgets, and evaluation protocols, while preserving each harness's native execution behavior. The benchmark contains 106 sandboxed offline tasks constructed from practical agent-use patterns and manually reviewed for realism, solvability, oracle-checkability, and integrity. Each run records final artifacts, execution traces, usage statistics, and validator outputs, enabling analysis beyond final completion. Across 5,194 execution trajectories, we observe substantial variation in completion, process quality, efficiency, and failure behavior across model-harness pairings. These results suggest that agent capability should be reported at the model-harness configuration level rather than attributed to the base model alone. Our analysis further identifies recurring execution-alignment failures, where plausible reasoning becomes decoupled from tool feedback, workspace state, evidence, or verifiable output contracts. Harness-Bench provides a reproducible foundation for diagnosing and improving reliable, efficient, and auditable agent execution stacks.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used across the scientific research lifecycle: ideation, literature search, experiment design and execution, analysis, manuscript drafting, and review. End-to-end AI scientist systems can now produce paper-like manuscripts, but their claims are often harder to verify than their code is to run. This survey studies that gap in computational AI/ML research, where code, benchmarks, experiments, and write-ups are most visible. We screen 125 candidate works and include 35, with full-text coding of 26 entries: 24 runnable systems and two study or position papers. We code seven audit dimensions: lifecycle stage, autonomy level, evaluation method, released artifacts, human-in-the-loop points, novelty verification, and result-selection disclosure. The main pattern is that code release is now common, but reproducibility-grade and claim-verification artifacts remain much less common. In the 24 runnable systems, 83 percent release code, while 38 percent release seeds or execution traces and 38 percent report any novelty-verification method. Among nine closed-loop L4 systems, seven are mechanical reruns and one is author-claimed without an external check; no LLM-era system in the corpus demonstrates an externally validated in-loop oracle under our coding rule. We contribute a coded corpus, a lifecycle-by-autonomy map, an auditability-gap analysis, and a reviewer-facing reporting checklist. The survey argues that the field's central bottleneck is no longer only whether agents can complete research tasks, but whether reviewers can verify the claims those agents produce.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the fact-checking studies. However, existing automated fact-checking evaluation methods rely on static datasets and classification metrics, which fail to automatically evaluate the justification production and uncover the nuanced limitations of LLMs in fact-checking. In this work, we introduce FACT-AUDIT, an agent-driven framework that adaptively and dynamically assesses LLMs' fact-checking capabilities. Leveraging importance sampling principles and multi-agent collaboration, FACT-AUDIT generates adaptive and scalable datasets, performs iterative model-centric evaluations, and updates assessments based on model-specific responses. By incorporating justification production alongside verdict prediction, this framework provides a comprehensive and evolving audit of LLMs' factual reasoning capabilities, to investigate their trustworthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FACT-AUDIT effectively differentiates among state-of-the-art LLMs, providing valuable insights into model strengths and limitations in model-centric fact-checking analysis.

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).

As interactive 3D worlds are increasingly used to study intelligent behavior, it becomes important to develop efficient pipelines for identifying anomalies in these simulated environments, such as floating objects, traversable walls, or objects inconsistent with the surrounding scene. Multimodal AI systems, including vision-language models (VLMs) and vision-language-action models (VLAs), have shown potential for automating this task. However, 3D world auditing is complex, requiring the close coupling of two distinct capabilities: action, to navigate the 3D world and search for anomalies systematically and efficiently; and visual reasoning, to understand the environment and identify anomalies from multimodal observations. It remains largely unexplored whether multimodal agents can effectively couple these two capabilities, using visual reasoning to identify potential anomalies while taking actions to validate them. In this paper, we introduce WorldAuditBench, a benchmark for 3D world auditing comprising 213 anomaly tasks across 13 environments built with Unreal Engine 5 and Three.js, spanning five anomaly families. We evaluate five frontier models under a fixed exploration budget using two auditing paradigms: VLA-based exploration followed by VLM-based anomaly identification, and an end-to-end VLM agent in which visual reasoning directly guides action selection. Across the evaluated models and two paradigms, success rates range from 6.6% to 42.3%, substantially below human performance (83.4%). Through the task of world auditing, WorldAuditBench provides a testbed for studying how multimodal agents couple action and visual reasoning in interactive 3D environments, while highlighting current limitations in their ability to gather and interpret evidence during exploration.

Foundation models have transformed automated code generation, yet autonomous software-engineering agents remain unreliable in realistic development settings. The dominant explanation locates this gap in model capability. We propose a different locus: software-engineering capability emerges from a model-harness-environment system, in which a runtime substrate -- the harness -- mediates how a foundation-model agent observes a project, acts on it, receives feedback, and establishes that a change is complete. We formalize this substrate as an AI Harness Engineering and identify eleven component responsibilities: task specification, context selection, tool access, project memory, task state, observability, failure attribution, verification, permissions, entropy auditing, and intervention recording. We operationalize the harness through a four-level ladder (H0-H3) that progressively exposes runtime support to the agent, and we propose a trace-based evaluation protocol that converts each agent run into an auditable episode package. Applied to a controlled validation task, the framework yields episode packages whose evidence structure varies systematically with harness level: lower levels produce only a final patch, higher levels produce reproduction logs, failure attributions, deterministic requirement checks, and structured verification reports. The framework reframes the central question of autonomous software engineering from whether a foundation model can produce a patch to whether the model-harness-environment system can produce a verifiably correct, attributed, and maintainable change. We outline a research program for the runtime systems that foundation-model software agents will require.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have seen rapid adoption in software engineering. As agents take a greater role in the actual generation of code, they are making larger changes, spanning tens to hundreds of lines. This makes manual review of agent results increasingly infeasible, leading developers to turn to explanations to understand enacted changes. Despite this, there are no benchmarks that evaluate the trustworthiness of agent-generated explanations. To bridge this gap, we propose ExplainBench, a benchmark to automatically evaluate explanations from coding agents. ExplainBench is based on the intuition that informative explanations should enable an LLM to correctly answer questions, allowing quantitative comparison of explanation quality between agents. With this observation, we construct a suite of questions that evaluates whether explanations accurately describe (1) the intended behavior of buggy code and (2) the effect of applying the agent patch itself. Experiments first reveal that explanation quality is a distinct axis of agent evaluation: ExplainBench ranks agents differently from the widely-used SWE-bench Verified benchmark. A deeper breakdown of explanation quality in agents shows frequent problems in explanations, such that explanations often claim that a patch is correct when it is not. Based on this insight, we implement and evaluate an explanation audit agent which runs additional tests to validate and refine explanations. This agent improved the explanations of all evaluated agents, demonstrating agent explanations can be automatically made more trustworthy.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly undertake long-horizon tasks that require sustained reasoning, tool use, and revision across many interdependent steps. However, existing agent harnesses maintain task execution, task state, and completion assessment within a growing context, making the state difficult to track and allowing incorrect self-assessments to propagate into later decisions. We reformulate long-horizon execution as a task-state management problem and propose LongHorizon-Harness, which maintains the task state explicitly outside execution and updates it only with facts independently verified from the environment. Its Manage-Execute-Audit(MEA) loop uses a manager to maintain the task state and determine the next subtask, a fresh-context executor to perform it, and a read-only auditor to verify the resulting environment state before the next round. A lightweight AgentAdapter supports interchangeable model and harness backends without modifying their native agent loops. LongHorizon-Harness improves Qwen~3.7-Plus from 51.8% to 80.7% on WeaveBench, from 69.7% to 77.2% on Terminal-Bench~2.1, and from 2.8% to 8.3% on OSWorld~2.0. It also raises Claude Opus~4.7 from 20.0% to 34.3% on an OSWorld2.0 subset, demonstrating consistent gains across models, harnesses, and interaction domains.

Personal agents maintain memories, learned skills, tool configurations, and policy state that evolve with each user. Existing agent benchmarks often evaluate these capabilities in isolation: tool benchmarks test invocation under fixed APIs, memory benchmarks test recall or forgetting, and safety benchmarks test static policy compliance. We argue that personal-agent evaluation requires a different protocol: replaying the same temporal intervention across different persistent user-conditioned states and measuring how failures propagate across agent components. We formalize this requirement as four conditions: explicit temporal intervention, persistent state across the intervention, induced cross-dimensional effects, and variation in user-conditioned state. A focused audit of public benchmark protocols selected by explicit inclusion criteria identifies several close cases. Under our explicitly narrow operationalization, we did not find a protocol in that audited set satisfying all four conditions. This claim is scoped as a focused gap analysis with bounded literature coverage. This position paper proposes a minimal benchmark design and candidate reporting metrics for user-conditioned adaptation. The result is a concrete design requirement for future personal-agent evaluation, with metrics used as reporting tools for that requirement.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Coding agents increasingly interact with users by generating interactive software on the fly rather than replying in text, yet many bugs in such software reveal themselves only after multi-step interactions. Today, users must discover these bugs and wait for fixes, making the development loop slow and expensive. Existing benchmarks typically assume the bugs have already been identified, leaving agents' ability to find interaction-dependent failures largely unevaluated. We introduce SWEeper-Bench, 200 tasks built from real bug fixes in 200 widely used open-source web applications. Each task gives the agent only the codebase and an open-ended request such as "Find and fix issues in Focalboard's board sharing and membership." Because these bugs are hard to detect from code alone, agents must design interactive tests to uncover them. An agentic verifier then judges each repair by what a user would observe in the browser. The best of 15 frontier agents passes only 59.0% of tasks. Through stage-by-stage analysis of agent trajectories, we show that the biggest bottleneck is identifying the buggy behavior: agents often reach the relevant feature but never trigger the failure or fail to recognize it. SWEeper-Bench measures progress toward agents that close this loop themselves, delivering software that works without waiting for user feedback.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

The rapid growth of AI agent ecosystems is transforming how complex tasks are delegated and executed, creating a new challenge of identifying suitable agents for a given task. Unlike traditional tools, agent capabilities are often compositional and execution-dependent, making them difficult to assess from textual descriptions alone. However, existing research and benchmarks typically assume well-specified functionalities, controlled candidate pools, or only executable task queries, leaving realistic agent search scenarios insufficiently studied. We introduce AgentSearchBench, a large-scale benchmark for agent search in the wild, built from nearly 10,000 real-world agents across multiple providers. The benchmark formalizes agent search as retrieval and reranking problems under both executable task queries and high-level task descriptions, and evaluates relevance using execution-grounded performance signals. Experiments reveal a consistent gap between semantic similarity and actual agent performance, exposing the limitations of description-based retrieval and reranking methods. We further show that lightweight behavioral signals, including execution-aware probing, can substantially improve ranking quality, highlighting the importance of incorporating execution signals into agent discovery. Our code is available at https://github.com/Bingo-W/AgentSearchBench.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Agent evaluation requires assessing complex multi-step behaviors involving tool use and intermediate reasoning, making it costly and expertise-intensive. A natural question arises: can frontier coding assistants reliably automate this evaluation process? Our study shows that simply prompting coding assistants is insufficient for this task. Without domain-specific evaluation knowledge, frontier coding assistants achieve only a 30% execution success rate and produce over-engineered evaluations averaging 12+ metrics per agent, indicating that strong coding ability does not automatically translate to reliable agent evaluation. We introduce EvalAgent, an AI assistant that automates the end-to-end agent evaluation pipeline. EvalAgent encodes evaluation domain expertise as evaluation skills (procedural instructions, reusable code and templates, and dynamically retrieved API documentation) that compose into a trace-based pipeline producing complete evaluation artifacts including metrics, executable code, and reports. To systematically assess generated evaluations, we introduce a meta-evaluation framework alongside AgentEvalBench, a benchmark comprising 20 agents, each paired with evaluation requirements and test scenarios. We further propose the Eval@1 metric to measure whether generated evaluation code both executes and yields meaningful results on the first run. Our experiments show that EvalAgent produces focused evaluations, improving Eval@1 from 17.5% to 65%, and achieving 79.5% human expert preference over baseline approaches. Further ablation studies show that evaluation skills are critical for handling complex evaluation: removing them causes Eval@1 to drop significantly from 65% to 30%.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, the need for unified evaluation infrastructure becomes critical. However, current evaluation pipelines remain highly fragmented and tightly coupled, hindering reproducibility and causing redundant engineering. To address this, we introduce AgentCompass, an open-source, lightweight, and extensible infrastructure for evaluating LLM-based agents. AgentCompass organizes the evaluation process around three independent components, namely Benchmark, Harness, and Environment, thereby enabling flexible configurations without requiring the reimplementation of complex execution logic. Furthermore, it features a fault-tolerant asynchronous runtime and comprehensive trajectory analysis tools to transparently diagnose nuanced failure modes like reward-hacking. Natively supporting over 20 benchmarks across five capability dimensions, AgentCompass provides the community with a scalable and reproducible infrastructure for advancing agent research.

Task success can hide process anomalies in real-world agent executions. An agent may pass the final task oracle while still accumulating unresolved ambiguity, unsafe external writes, ignored errors, weakly grounded commitments, or capability-boundary overcommitment. We study this mismatch as the Outcome-Process Gap and introduce OpenClawBench, a large-scale dataset for measuring and supervising process-side anomalies in real agent execution processes. OpenClawBench is built from BFCL-driven OpenClaw sessions produced by 6 source models and contains 31,264 annotated trajectories. It aligns task-oracle outcomes with structured process evidence. FullTax converts the aligned trajectories into structured anomaly supervision: binary labels, supporting evidence, onset/span localization, severity, recoverability, and a 5-class anomaly taxonomy. Using OpenClawBench, we make the Outcome-Process Gap measurable. Among 31,135 oracle-passing executions, 2,904 are still labeled process-anomalous under FullTax. These results show that success-only evaluation misses a concrete class of process-side failures in real agent executions. A LoRA-fine-tuned Gemma 3 12B detector trained on the high-confidence FullTax supervised pool reaches binary F1=0.729 on the cleaner-labels held-out test split. Together, OpenClawBench turns real agent execution logs into auditable and reusable supervision for studying, diagnosing, and operationally monitoring runtime agent reliability.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Rising concern for the societal implications of artificial intelligence systems has inspired a wave of academic and journalistic literature in which deployed systems are audited for harm by investigators from outside the organizations deploying the algorithms. However, it remains challenging for practitioners to identify the harmful repercussions of their own systems prior to deployment, and, once deployed, emergent issues can become difficult or impossible to trace back to their source. In this paper, we introduce a framework for algorithmic auditing that supports artificial intelligence system development end-to-end, to be applied throughout the internal organization development lifecycle. Each stage of the audit yields a set of documents that together form an overall audit report, drawing on an organization's values or principles to assess the fit of decisions made throughout the process. The proposed auditing framework is intended to contribute to closing the accountability gap in the development and deployment of large-scale artificial intelligence systems by embedding a robust process to ensure audit integrity.

Agents need reliable ways to validate their outputs, both when completing tasks and when filtering synthetic training data. We study verifier generation: from the instruction and environment available for solving a task, an agent writes an executable verifier that must accept every valid solution and reject invalid ones. We introduce VerifierBench, a benchmark of 222 tasks from six agent benchmarks spanning tool-call, state-based, and code verification, with 4,993 hidden test cases that include alternative valid solutions and attacks; Verifier4Verifier (V4V), a six-check audit, screens its source verifiers and test suites. Across 19 models in a common agent harness, normalized balanced accuracy ranges from 10.6 to 62.1, with generated verifiers consistently rejecting invalid solutions more reliably than they accept valid ones. This apparent strength can mask overly restrictive verification: most false rejections in the analyzed records come from verifiers that accept no tested solution to a task. Case studies reveal unsupported assumptions about solution formats, tool use, and code changes that exclude valid solutions. These errors survive self-testing because agents test solutions that share the verifier's mistaken assumptions, or submit verifiers without confirming that any correct solution passes. These findings suggest testing both whether a verifier accepts a correct solution and whether it accepts other solutions permitted by the task. The project page and dataset are publicly available.

Agentic systems integrate LLM driven planning with interfaces to external tools, making data leakage and tool misuse feasible via instruction/data boundary failures and prompt injection attacks. Enforcing required controls consistently is particularly challenging in workflows spanning many codebases and heterogeneous agents. To address this challenge in multi agentic systems, we present a pre-deployment pipeline for scanning, hardening, and validation of agentic applications. The pipeline analyzes prompt templates, tool interfaces, and tool-invocation code to identify leakage-enabling patterns and generate actionable patches. The hardened application is then validated through adversarial prompt injection attacks and benign input variations ensuring that mitigations do not disrupt intended behavior. In the hardening stage, high-risk tools are prioritized, and minimally invasive mitigations are applied, including schema tightening, boundary sanitization, allowlist-based tool gating, and least-privilege checks. In the validation stage, the pipeline automatically generates attack inputs that mimic jailbreaks, instruction overrides, and tool-targeted manipulation, along with benign task variants, to confirm that the functionality of the hardened application is preserved after remediation. We evaluated the pipeline on five real-world agentic applications, as well as on the AgentDojo benchmark. Across all applications, the proposed pipeline identified recurring leakage-enabling patterns and generated patches that can be integrated without disrupting the intended application behavior. The resulting modifications of application code were shown to eliminate leaks when targeted by basic jailbreak and instruction-override attacks, achieving a 100% reduction in leakage, and reduce leaks by 91% under conditions of stress-induced manipulation, without the need of continuous runtime policy enforcement.

Generative search engines and deep research LLM agents promise trustworthy, source-grounded synthesis, yet users regularly encounter overconfidence, weak sourcing, and confusing citation practices. We introduce DeepTRACE, a novel sociotechnically grounded audit framework that turns prior community-identified failure cases into eight measurable dimensions spanning answer text, sources, and citations. DeepTRACE uses statement-level analysis (decomposition, confidence scoring) and builds citation and factual-support matrices to audit how systems reason with and attribute evidence end-to-end. Using automated extraction pipelines for popular public models (e.g., GPT-4.5/5, You.com, Perplexity, Copilot/Bing, Gemini) and an LLM-judge with validated agreement to human raters, we evaluate both web-search engines and deep-research configurations. Our findings show that generative search engines and deep research agents frequently produce one-sided, highly confident responses on debate queries and include large fractions of statements unsupported by their own listed sources. Deep-research configurations reduce overconfidence and can attain high citation thoroughness, but they remain highly one-sided on debate queries and still exhibit large fractions of unsupported statements, with citation accuracy ranging from 40--80% across systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) based autonomous agents demonstrate multifaceted capabilities to contribute substantially to economic production. However, existing benchmarks remain focused on single agentic capability, failing to capture long-horizon real-world scenarios. Moreover, the reliance on human-in-the-loop feedback for realistic tasks creates a scalability bottleneck, hindering automated rollout collection and evaluation. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgencyBench, a comprehensive benchmark derived from daily AI usage, evaluating 6 core agentic capabilities across 32 real-world scenarios, comprising 138 tasks with specific queries, deliverables, and rubrics. These scenarios require an average of 90 tool calls, 1 million tokens, and hours of execution time to resolve. To enable automated evaluation, we employ a user simulation agent to provide iterative feedback, and a Docker sandbox to conduct visual and functional rubric-based assessment. Experiments reveal that closed-source models significantly outperform open-source models (48.4% vs 32.1%). Further analysis reveals significant disparities across models in resource efficiency, feedback-driven self-correction, and specific tool-use preferences. Finally, we investigate the impact of agentic scaffolds, observing that proprietary models demonstrate superior performance within their native ecosystems (e.g., Claude-4.5-Opus via Claude-Agent-SDK), while open-source models exhibit distinct performance peaks, suggesting potential optimization for specific execution frameworks. AgencyBench serves as a critical testbed for next-generation agents, highlighting the necessity of co-optimizing model architecture with agentic frameworks. We believe this work sheds light on the future direction of autonomous agents, and we release the full benchmark and evaluation toolkit at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/AgencyBench.

Despite the growing use of large language models (LLMs) in clinical dialogue systems, existing evaluations focus on task completion or fluency, offering little insight into the behavioral and risk management requirements essential for safety-critical systems. This paper presents MATRIX (Multi-Agent simulaTion fRamework for safe Interactions and conteXtual clinical conversational evaluation), a structured, extensible framework for safety-oriented evaluation of clinical dialogue agents. MATRIX integrates three components: (1) a safety-aligned taxonomy of clinical scenarios, expected system behaviors and failure modes derived through structured safety engineering methods; (2) BehvJudge, an LLM-based evaluator for detecting safety-relevant dialogue failures, validated against expert clinician annotations; and (3) PatBot, a simulated patient agent capable of producing diverse, scenario-conditioned responses, evaluated for realism and behavioral fidelity with human factors expertise, and a patient-preference study. Across three experiments, we show that MATRIX enables systematic, scalable safety evaluation. BehvJudge with Gemini 2.5-Pro achieves expert-level hazard detection (F1 0.96, sensitivity 0.999), outperforming clinicians in a blinded assessment of 240 dialogues. We also conducted one of the first realism analyses of LLM-based patient simulation, showing that PatBot reliably simulates realistic patient behavior in quantitative and qualitative evaluations. Using MATRIX, we demonstrate its effectiveness in benchmarking five LLM agents across 2,100 simulated dialogues spanning 14 hazard scenarios and 10 clinical domains. MATRIX is the first framework to unify structured safety engineering with scalable, validated conversational AI evaluation, enabling regulator-aligned safety auditing. We release all evaluation tools, prompts, structured scenarios, and datasets.

ETAS is a programming language for agent systems that treats model-backed agents, tool calls, prompts, typed memory, human approvals, policies, and execution traces as semantic program elements rather than library conventions. It separates deterministic computation from agentic nondeterminism and externally visible actions while preserving a direct programming style. We present the core design of ETAS. Its static semantics assigns ordinary types through spec conformance and tracks each computation with two behavioral indices: an escaping effect row and a persistent abstraction of the typed action trace it may request. Specs form a terminating compile-time constraint calculus: type specs provide evidence for polymorphism and resource facts, callable specs constrain function and stage shapes, and trace specs express allow, deny, and temporal constraints. Typing checks requested traces against compiled monitors and emits residual obligations when dynamic resources preclude a complete static proof. The dynamic semantics distinguish requested, handled, denied, and committed events; handlers interpret typed actions without making their requests invisible to authorization or audit. We formalize a core calculus and state preservation, progress, type/effect soundness, handler trace-transparency, and policy safety. We also implement ETAS in Rust with a command-line interface, typed HIR checks, effect and policy diagnostics, handler checks, and trace-aware execution hooks. ETAS provides a programming-language foundation for reasoning about authorization, nondeterminism, recovery, and audit evidence before and during agent execution.

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.

When an autonomous AI agent does something consequential, what can be proven about what it did? Agent-observability platforms capture traces, but a trace is mutable: alterable undetected, with no recipe for re-executing it, silent on whether captured secrets were removed. Regulation (EU AI Act, ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF) presumes records an independent party can check. We present NovaFabric, producing audit-grade execution evidence: provider-neutral, tamper-evident, replayable, shareable. It records an agent run, without modifying agent logic, into a portable Run Capsule (fifteen-entity schema), sealed with a holistic DSSE signature, RFC 3161 timestamp, Merkle log and redaction attestation. Sealed runs are re-executable under a four-mode replay protocol and exportable as an Evidence Bundle for third-party verification with stock tooling (specified, not evaluated). The contribution is integration, not new cryptography: OpenTelemetry, DSSE/in-toto and W3C PROV. We evaluate eight research questions at measured scope. Mocked replay serves every model response from the capsule (no live model call, 10/10) but is offline w.r.t. models, not the network; only 2/10 tool-using workloads completed; the gap is missing tool-response substitution. Tampering is rejected across three tested classes. Declared-stream completeness is 0.652 (95% CI +/-0.064, ten scenarios). A repaired rule pack redacts 14/14 credential types, preserving 9/9 decoys; diff localises 140/140 mutations. Blast-radius queries: 45.5ms p99 over 10M edges (3.3x faster than a columnar baseline), 167.9ms over 100M (1 client, n=30). A 314-machine, ten-region run finds capsule REST ingest lossless but capped at 61.6 req/s (p99 26.8s) by per-worker serialisation. Six defects found in NovaFabric and its evaluation corpus: four fixed, one withdrawn, one open. Verification is conditional on a stated trusted computing base.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

Modern AI agents routinely cross trust boundaries: they ingest untrusted content, combine it with privileged instructions, persist intermediate beliefs in long-term memory, and invoke privileged tools. This creates an attack surface in which malicious payloads can enter through model inputs and cause harmful tool actions. Yet current governance stacks remain application-level middleware that share a process trust boundary with the agents they monitor. We argue that agents need an operating-system substrate providing mandatory, non-bypassable services for identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control. We introduce AgentKernel, a trust-native agent operating system built around the premise that security must be a first-class design constraint. AgentKernel wraps the agent lifecycle in a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars: Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution. Each pillar adapts classical OS security principles to failures at the semantic plane, including delegation abuse, prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. AgentKernel treats structural security as a capability multiplier. Kernel-managed identity supports trustworthy cross-organization collaboration; graduated perception replaces brittle single-point filters; information-flow-controlled memory improves retrieval fidelity while limiting poisoning; and semantic-to-kernel enforcement permits broader tool privileges behind a non-bypassable boundary. We position AgentKernel as the missing OS layer beneath orchestration frameworks, agent runtimes, governance platforms, and execution sandboxes, and use systematic comparison and security analysis to show how a single integrated architecture can enforce security across the full agent lifecycle.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to operate in enterprise environments, where work is distributed across specialized roles, permission-controlled systems, and cross-departmental procedures. However, existing enterprise benchmarks largely evaluate single agents with broad tool access, while existing multi-agent benchmarks rarely capture realistic enterprise constraints such as role specialization, access control, stateful business systems, and policy-based approvals. We introduce EntCollabBench, a benchmark for evaluating enterprise multi-agent collaboration. EntCollabBench simulates a permission-isolated organization with 11 role-specialized agents across six departments and contains two evaluation subsets: a Workflow subset, where agents collaboratively modify enterprise system states, and an Approval subset, where agents make policy-grounded decisions. Evaluation is based on execution traces, database state verification, and deterministic policy adjudication rather than natural-language response judging. Experiments with representative LLM agents show that current models still struggle with end-to-end enterprise collaboration, especially in delegation, context transfer, parameter grounding, workflow closure, and decision commitment. EntCollabBench provides a reproducible testbed for measuring and improving agent systems intended for realistic organizational environments.

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

As LLMs are increasingly deployed within agentic systems, their capabilities depend not only on the model weights but also on the harness: the prompts, tools, control flow, memory, and orchestration code surrounding them. This makes automated harness optimization -- the iterative and evaluation-guided improvement of a harness by an AI system -- both an important route to improving AI systems and a demanding capability for AI systems themselves. Yet the community lacks a common protocol for measuring how well frontier LLMs perform at this task. We introduce HarnessOpt-Bench, a benchmark for end-to-end harness optimization under expensive and stochastic evaluation. An optimizer, an LLM paired with a coding harness, receives a target agent's seed harness, graded evaluation feedback, and a fixed target-evaluation budget. It edits the harness and nominates a final candidate, which is scored by its normalized gain over the seed on a held-out test partition that remains inaccessible throughout search. A trusted execution environment enforces the evaluation boundary, meters target-agent resource use, and preserves candidate versions for audit. We evaluate 5 frontier LLMs as optimizers both under a shared coding harness and under their native harnesses across 4 downstream tasks, over 111 scored runs. Experiment results show that optimizer models separate more than the coding harnesses they act through, native harnesses are not consistently superior, and gains vary substantially across tasks and seed regimes. These results establish harness optimization as a measurable and discriminative capability with large space for improvement.

Agent harnesses enable large language models to act through tools, observe the results, and iteratively work toward a task goal. Verification checks and revises agents' work to improve output quality. Yet there is limited guidance on how harnesses should organize this effort. We study verification as an axis of test-time scaling by examining when to intervene, who checks the work, and how checking leads to revision. Our framework spans four layers of the agent lifecycle: initial instructions, mid-turn reminders, completion gates, and independent review. We compare 17 designs across seven frontier coding models on Terminal-Bench (TB) and SWE-bench Verified (SWE), and introduce VisualBench for expert evaluation of visual and interactive artifacts. Initial instructions and execution-time reminders yield modest, model-dependent average gains on the coding benchmarks, without substantially increasing average output token use. Completion gates can yield larger gains but may substantially increase cost. Independent review by a critic offers a more favorable accuracy-cost tradeoff, improving average accuracy by 5.9-9.5 percentage points on TB and 3.9-6.6 on SWE at 1.13-1.25 and 1.00-1.04 times baseline cost, respectively. On VisualBench, independent review achieves net preferences of 13.2-23.8 points over the baseline across its four designs, exceeding the evaluated L0-L2 designs. Additional review rounds or independent critics further improve average TB accuracy by up to 3.5 percentage points. Together, these results provide empirical guidance for verification design in agent harnesses and support independent review as a practical axis of test-time scaling.

Modern AI agents, driven by advances in large foundation models, promise to enhance our productivity and transform our lives by augmenting our knowledge and capabilities. To achieve this vision, AI agents must effectively plan, perform multi-step reasoning and actions, respond to novel observations, and recover from errors, to successfully complete complex tasks across a wide range of scenarios. In this work, we introduce Magentic-One, a high-performing open-source agentic system for solving such tasks. Magentic-One uses a multi-agent architecture where a lead agent, the Orchestrator, plans, tracks progress, and re-plans to recover from errors. Throughout task execution, the Orchestrator directs other specialized agents to perform tasks as needed, such as operating a web browser, navigating local files, or writing and executing Python code. We show that Magentic-One achieves statistically competitive performance to the state-of-the-art on three diverse and challenging agentic benchmarks: GAIA, AssistantBench, and WebArena. Magentic-One achieves these results without modification to core agent capabilities or to how they collaborate, demonstrating progress towards generalist agentic systems. Moreover, Magentic-One's modular design allows agents to be added or removed from the team without additional prompt tuning or training, easing development and making it extensible to future scenarios. We provide an open-source implementation of Magentic-One, and we include AutoGenBench, a standalone tool for agentic evaluation. AutoGenBench provides built-in controls for repetition and isolation to run agentic benchmarks in a rigorous and contained manner -- which is important when agents' actions have side-effects. Magentic-One, AutoGenBench and detailed empirical performance evaluations of Magentic-One, including ablations and error analysis are available at https://aka.ms/magentic-one

AI systems are increasingly deployed in real-world settings where their behavior is shaped by dynamic environments, evolving data distributions, and complex interactions with users and infrastructure. Traditional machine learning evaluation focuses on benchmarks and operates within sandboxed environments, providing only a limited view of the true system behavior in the wild. We argue for the development of principled auditing frameworks that monitor deployed AI systems throughout their lifecycle. We further propose framing auditing as a statistical problem of monitoring constraint violations under uncertainty, where desired properties (e.g., fairness and safety) are treated as risk-controlled constraints that must be continuously evaluated as systems evolve through iterative feedback. This perspective highlights the need for uncertainty-aware monitoring methods, socio-technical specifications of audit criteria, and auditing infrastructures that enable ongoing oversight of AI systems in the wild.

AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering(RE): recovering program semantics before the analysis can be meaningfully performed. However, evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: benchmark instances must be unseen as source code in the LLMs' training data to prevent models from taking shortcuts by recognizing them rather than really analyzing them, while also matching the scale and anti-analysis protections of real software. Unfortunately, however, existing benchmarks do not jointly satisfy these requirements. To this end, we introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built entirely from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis primitives, yielding 262 binary instances and 1572 deterministically graded tasks. Our evaluation across five frontier LLMs (GPT-5.6-sol,Claude-Opus-5,GPT-5.5,Grok-4.5, and GLM-5.2) shows that RE remains largely unsolved: the strongest model, GPT-5.6-sol, scores 61.4% per instance, and fully solves only 31.5% of the instances. Our analysis further reveals that agents behave differently from human engineers, where agents are relatively insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking. Controlled ablations also confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential. These results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.

AI agents are increasingly used for programming, but do not provide any guarantee on the correctness of generated code. Verified code generation, in which an agent produces both an implementation and a machine-checked proof of its specification, offers a stronger path toward trustworthy AI-generated software. Existing benchmarks in this direction either focus on individual functions or only evaluate proof generation with provided implementations. It is still an open question whether agents can make coherent implementation and proof choices across real multi-module codebases. To bridge this gap, we introduce Vero, the first benchmark to evaluate joint implementation and proof synthesis at the repository level. Vero contains 43 multi-module instances sourced from real-world repositories spanning Python, Dafny, Verus, and Coq, and covering diverse domains from cryptographic protocols to distributed systems. Each instance consists of a multi-module Lean 4 repository with predetermined API interfaces, manually curated formal specifications, and reference implementations, supporting both proof-only and code-and-proof evaluation modes. To improve benchmark reliability, Vero also includes an audit mechanism where agents are allowed to formally prove unsatisfiability of provided specification or incorrectness of reference code, which surfaces and corrects latent code and specification errors during curation. We evaluate frontier coding-agent configurations with Lean toolchain access. The strongest agent fully solves only 27 of 43 instances and closes no specifications on the hardest repositories. Vero provides a concrete testbed for measuring progress toward repository-scale verified software synthesis, where current agents still fall short. We release the benchmark, curation pipeline, and evaluation harness at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/vero.

Web agents enable users to perform tasks on web browsers through natural language interaction. Evaluating web agents trajectories is an important problem, since it helps us determine whether the agent successfully completed the tasks. Rule-based methods are widely used for this purpose, but they are challenging to extend to new tasks and may not always recognize successful trajectories. We may achieve higher accuracy through human evaluation, but the process would be substantially slower and more expensive. Automatic evaluations with LLMs may avoid the challenges of designing new rules and manually annotating trajectories, enabling faster and cost-effective evaluation. However, it is unclear how effective they are at evaluating web agents. To this end, we propose AgentRewardBench, the first benchmark to assess the effectiveness of LLM judges for evaluating web agents. AgentRewardBench contains 1302 trajectories across 5 benchmarks and 4 LLMs. Each trajectory in AgentRewardBench is reviewed by an expert, who answers questions pertaining to the success, side effects, and repetitiveness of the agent. Using our benchmark, we evaluate 12 LLM judges and find that no single LLM excels across all benchmarks. We also find that the rule-based evaluation used by common benchmarks tends to underreport the success rate of web agents, highlighting a key weakness of rule-based evaluation and the need to develop more flexible automatic evaluations. We release the benchmark at: https://agent-reward-bench.github.io

Language-model agents are increasingly used as persistent coworkers that assist users across multiple working days. During such workflows, the surrounding environment may change independently of the agent: new emails arrive, calendar entries shift, knowledge-base records are updated, and evidence appears across images, scanned PDFs, audio, video, and spreadsheets. Existing benchmarks do not adequately evaluate this setting because they typically run within a single static episode and remain largely text-centric. We introduce , a benchmark for coworker agents built around multi-turn multi-day tasks, a stateful sandboxed service environment whose state evolves between turns, and rule-based verification. The current release contains 100 tasks across 13 professional scenarios, executed against five stateful sandboxed services (filesystem, email, calendar, knowledge base, spreadsheet) and scored by 1537 deterministic Python checkers over post-execution service state; no LLM-as-judge is invoked during scoring. We benchmark seven frontier agent systems. The strongest model reaches 75.8 weighted score, but the best strict Task Success is only 20.0\%, indicating that partial progress is common while complete end-to-end workflow completion remains rare. Turn-level analysis shows that performance drops after the first exogenous environment update, highlighting adaptation to changing state as a key open challenge. We release the benchmark, evaluation harness, and construction pipeline to support reproducible coworker-agent evaluation.

Language-model agent systems commonly rely on reactive prompting, in which a single instruction guides the model through an open-ended sequence of reasoning and tool-use steps, leaving control flow and intermediate state implicit and making agent behavior potentially difficult to control. Orchestration frameworks such as LangGraph, DSPy, and CrewAI impose greater structure through explicit workflow definitions, but tightly couple workflow logic with Python, making agents difficult to maintain and modify. In this paper, we introduce AgentSPEX, an Agent SPecification and EXecution Language for specifying LLM-agent workflows with explicit control flow and modular structure, along with a customizable agent harness. AgentSPEX supports typed steps, branching and loops, parallel execution, reusable submodules, and explicit state management, and these workflows execute within an agent harness that provides tool access, a sandboxed virtual environment, and support for checkpointing, verification, and logging. Furthermore, we provide a visual editor with synchronized graph and workflow views for authoring and inspection. We include ready-to-use agents for deep research and scientific research, and we evaluate AgentSPEX on 7 benchmarks. Finally, we show through a user study that AgentSPEX provides a more interpretable and accessible workflow-authoring paradigm than a popular existing agent framework.

Language agents, i.e., LLM agents, progress rapidly and are increasingly deployed in production environments. This trend underscores the urgent need for rigorous and realistic evaluations. However, most existing benchmarks evaluate agents in simplified, idealized settings. They typically rely on pre-packaged tool interfaces, overlook critical steps, and assume inputs are clean and fully specified. Consequently, they understate the difficulty of real deployments, where uncertainty and noise are ubiquitous and agents must proactively explore the environment to uncover new tools. To bridge this gap, we present AgentGym2, a new evaluation framework with task instances grounded in real-world end-to-end working demands. Beyond reasoning and planning, it measures agents' ability to execute end-to-end procedures, discover tools via exploration, compose tools for unseen tasks, and remain robust to noisy and underspecified information. Experiments on 15 proprietary and open-source models show that even SOTA systems like Gemini and GPT-5 struggle on AgentGym2, revealing a substantial gap between the capability of current agents and the demands of real-world applications.

Understanding the brain increasingly depends on integrating evidence across scales, modalities, and disciplines. Addressing a single research question therefore requires a coordinated sequence of operations, from surveying prior work to executing analyses and interpreting results in light of domain knowledge. AI agents promise to accelerate this process, but current agents lack domain expertise in brain science, may fabricate claims, drift during multi-step reasoning, and offer few defined points for expert intervention. These failures are especially costly in brain science, where conclusions feed into downstream scientific claims and depend on laboratory-specific expertise and careful human judgment. We present BrainPilot a fully open-source multi-agent system that accelerates brain science research with traceable logs and agent-verified results. A principal investigator (PI) agent coordinates specialist agents grounded in curated domain knowledge: a unified brain science knowledge base containing 7{,}233 indexed items and a skill library of 72 reusable methodology units across seven research domains. Every major step is recorded in the Graph of Trace, an auditable record that links subgoals, tool use, evidence, and claims and allows researchers to follow and inspect the workflow. An Auditor agent further integrates fabrication checking into the workflow. For evaluation, we run three brain science tasks from Agents' Last Exam, introduce our own benchmark, BrainPilotBench-v0, and present additional end-to-end case studies. Across these evaluations, BrainPilot with an open-source backbone model attains performance comparable to state-of-the-art agent framework with less costs.

Does adding more agents help an LLM workflow once compared systems share the same benchmark loader, tool access, answer contract, usage accounting, and trajectory logging? We introduce BenchAgent, an evaluation framework that places single-agent, fixed multi-agent (MAS), and evolving MAS workflows under one normalized execution and logging protocol. BenchAgent evaluates these substrate-internal workflows across ten reasoning, coding, and tool-use benchmarks with GPT-4.1, and separately reports a Protocol-Aligned External (PAE) GAIA study of a runtime-generated workflow. Under SI conditions, at most one of six tested MAS exceeds the matched single-agent anchor on benchmark-balanced average accuracy: EvoAgent lies within the Wilson one-run guidance, while the remaining five trail by 2.56-11.29 points and occupy more expensive accuracy-cost trade-offs. On the PAE GAIA snapshot, a Claude-Code-style runtime workflow reaches 66.72% overall and 69.23% on Level 3, more than 20 points above the strongest non-Claude baseline, Jarvis, a fixed MAS.

An AI agent run is no longer a function call. It is a cascade of prompts, model calls, tool invocations, file and network effects and sub-agents. When such a run misbehaves, or an auditor asks what happened, logs and traces answer poorly: they are mutable, partial and cannot be re-executed. This technical report describes NovaFabric, an open-source (Apache-2.0) black-box recorder for AI agents that turns a run into a sealed, replayable, diffable and auditable evidence capsule. The design rests on two formats only. The Run Capsule is a directory of flat files and the source of truth; every database is a rebuildable index over capsules. The Evidence Bundle is the signed export for an auditor. Everything else follows existing standards: OpenTelemetry GenAI, OpenLineage, W3C PROV, in-toto/DSSE, RFC 3161 and CycloneDX. A single-node run is the smallest case of a distributed one; the schema supports a capsule hierarchy for Slurm arrays and Kubernetes jobs, though automatic parent finalization is library-only today. The report covers the architecture and the engines behind the verb chain capture, seal, replay, diff and audit: fail-closed mocked replay; a diff gate with a stable exit-code contract; DSSE signatures that bind their intent and a capsule root that commits to file names; a capsule treated as untrusted input; signer identity-trust levels with offline TSA and CRL checking; maker-checker promotion against an operator-held trust list; and a deny-by-default authorization table for every dashboard route. It presents no new experiments; the evaluation is in arXiv:2609.12582. Every count except the private ADR tally is generated by a probe script run on the public source at the v0.107.0 tag (150 top-level commands, 84 Python subpackages, 16,721 test functions), every capability carries an explicit maturity label, and honest-limits boxes state where the system stops.

We present initial results of a forthcoming benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on white-collar tasks of economic value. We evaluate agents on real-world "messy" open-web research tasks of the type that are routine in finance and consulting. In doing so, we lay the groundwork for an LLM agent evaluation suite where good performance directly corresponds to a large economic and societal impact. We built and tested several agent architectures with o1-preview, GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 (405b), and GPT-4o-mini. On average, LLM agents powered by Claude-3.5 Sonnet and o1-preview substantially outperformed agents using GPT-4o, with agents based on Llama 3.1 (405b) and GPT-4o-mini lagging noticeably behind. Across LLMs, a ReAct architecture with the ability to delegate subtasks to subagents performed best. In addition to quantitative evaluations, we qualitatively assessed the performance of the LLM agents by inspecting their traces and reflecting on their observations. Our evaluation represents the first in-depth assessment of agents' abilities to conduct challenging, economically valuable analyst-style research on the real open web.

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory. However, these external dependencies introduce novel attack surfaces. Recent tool and memory poisoning attacks show that maliciously crafted tool descriptors and poisoned memory can covertly bias agent behavior. These threats reflect a deeper issue: the lack of verifiable continuity in the agent's contextual state for planning and execution. We present ElephantAgent, a protocol that enforces Contextual State Continuity to defend against contextual state poisoning. Inspired by prior state-continuity mechanisms (e.g., Nimble), ElephantAgent extends this protection to the evolving contextual state of agentic systems. We define the contextual state as the bounded, security-critical subset of the agent's entire context (e.g., tool state and memory). Before processing each query, ElephantAgent recomputes the digest of the local contextual state and verifies it against the latest authorized digest. Using replicated trusted hardware, ElephantAgent maintains a linearizable ledger of authorized contextual state transitions and detects out-of-band state tampering. To handle in-band semantic abuse, ElephantAgent additionally provides Historical Traceability, enabling conditional post-hoc audit and recovery to a known-good prior state.

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message ingress, prompt construction, tool execution, tool-result persistence, outbound messaging, sub-agent spawning, and gateway startup. Rather than introducing a novel detection model, PRISM integrates a hybrid heuristic-plus-LLM scanning pipeline, conversation- and session-scoped risk accumulation with TTL-based decay, policy-enforced controls over tools, paths, private networks, domain tiers, and outbound secret patterns, and a tamper-evident audit and operations plane with integrity verification and hot-reloadable policy management. We outline an evaluation methodology and benchmark pipeline for measuring security effectiveness, false positives, layer contribution, runtime overhead, and operational recoverability in an agent-runtime setting, and we report current preliminary benchmark results on curated same-slice experiments and operational microbenchmarks. The system targets deployable runtime defense for real agent gateways rather than benchmark-only detection.

LLM agents increasingly rely on external inference conditions: prompts, tools, memory, SOPs, skills, and harness feedback. These assets can improve task execution without changing model weights, but they are often revised by heuristic reflection or by reusing observed successes and failures as if counts alone were reliable belief. We introduce Bayesian-Agent, a native and cross-harness framework that treats reusable skills and SOPs as hypotheses about whether a frozen model will succeed under a particular prompt, context, and harness environment. Bayesian-Agent records verified trajectory evidence, maintains a feature-conditioned categorical posterior over each skill, and maps posterior state into inspectable actions such as patch, split, compress, retire, and explore. Model-facing prompts receive executable guardrails and failure-mode patches, while posterior summaries remain available for audit. With deepseek-v4-flash, incremental repair improves SOP-Bench from 80\% to 95\%, Lifelong AgentBench from 90\% to 100\%, and RealFin-Bench from 45\% to 65\%. We further evaluate Bayesian-Agent's native backend and optional GenericAgent, mini-swe-agent, and Claude Code backends. The results include positive, negative, saturated, and case-study settings, suggesting that agent skill evolution is best viewed as posterior-guided harness optimization rather than uncalibrated prompt accumulation. The source code is available at https://github.com/DataArcTech/Bayesian-Agent.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

We introduce ResearchGym, a benchmark and execution environment for evaluating AI agents on end-to-end research. To instantiate this, we repurpose five oral and spotlight papers from ICML, ICLR, and ACL. From each paper's repository, we preserve the datasets, evaluation harness, and baseline implementations but withhold the paper's proposed method. This results in five containerized task environments comprising 39 sub-tasks in total. Within each environment, agents must propose novel hypotheses, run experiments, and attempt to surpass strong human baselines on the paper's metrics. In a controlled evaluation of an agent powered by GPT-5, we observe a sharp capability--reliability gap. The agent improves over the provided baselines from the repository in just 1 of 15 evaluations (6.7%) by 11.5%, and completes only 26.5% of sub-tasks on average. We identify recurring long-horizon failure modes, including impatience, poor time and resource management, overconfidence in weak hypotheses, difficulty coordinating parallel experiments, and hard limits from context length. Yet in a single run, the agent surpasses the solution of an ICML 2025 Spotlight task, indicating that frontier agents can occasionally reach state-of-the-art performance, but do so unreliably. We additionally evaluate proprietary agent scaffolds including Claude Code (Opus-4.5) and Codex (GPT-5.2) which display a similar gap. ResearchGym provides infrastructure for systematic evaluation and analysis of autonomous agents on closed-loop research.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

Modern agentic workflows decompose complex tasks into specialized subtasks and route them to diverse models to minimize cost without sacrificing quality. However, current routing architectures focus exclusively on performance optimization, leaving underlying trade-offs between model capability and cost unrecorded. Without clear rationale, developers cannot distinguish between intelligent efficiency -- using specialized models for appropriate tasks -- and latent failures caused by budget-driven model selection. We present Topaz, a framework that introduces formal auditability to agentic routing. Topaz replaces silent model assignments with an inherently interpretable router that incorporates three components: (i) skill-based profiling that synthesizes performance across diverse benchmarks into granular capability profiles (ii) fully traceable routing algorithms that utilize budget-based and multi-objective optimization to produce clear traces of how skill-match scores were weighed against costs, and (iii) developer-facing explanations that translate these traces into natural language, allowing users to audit system logic and iteratively tune the cost-quality tradeoff. By making routing decisions interpretable, Topaz enables users to understand, trust, and meaningfully steer routed agentic systems.

Agent benchmarks often evaluate only final answers even when agents run on stateful runtimes. We argue this under-specifies what is being evaluated: the proper unit is a declared model-plus-runtime configuration whose failures can occur in evidence acquisition, runtime routing, safety boundaries, or repeated execution. We present ClawProBench, a trace-aware benchmark for runtime-native agent evaluation instantiated on OpenClaw, a live agent runtime with workspace tools and native surfaces for browsing, memory, messaging, scheduling, skills, and subagents. ClawProBench defines two tracks: a 102-scenario full profile with live workspace and native-runtime routing tasks, and a frozen 68-scenario holdout with closed-world JSON output contracts for robust ranking. Trials are scored from execution traces via a safety-gated formula combining correctness, process quality, and efficiency, preserving failure evidence for audit. Our anonymous artifact includes benchmark definitions, scoring code, manifests and sanitized traces. We evaluate 68 configurations on the full profile and 37 on holdout. The top safety-gated average trace score is 0.7671. Native-runtime tasks underperform workspace-live tasks (0.5238 vs. 0.6415). On holdout, pass@k-any outperforms strict three-trial pass (0.6638 vs. 0.2890), while full-profile and holdout rankings show weak alignment (Spearman 0.1300). Rankings based purely on correctness differ substantially from process-aware, safety-gated and strict-pass views. Final-answer leaderboards may hide native-surface weaknesses, one-off successes and trace-local agent failure modes.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

As agents move from research prototypes to deployed tools, their capability increasingly depends on model-external execution infrastructure, commonly termed the agent harness. Changing this harness while holding model weights fixed can substantially alter task performance. Current agent evaluations typically report downstream performance under a chosen harness, leaving a model's ability to develop the harness itself comparatively underexplored. We introduce HarnessDev, a benchmark that shifts the unit of evaluation from task outputs to runnable infrastructure. HarnessDev covers two stages. In Creation, the agent starts from a minimal seed and a small number of cases, then builds a complete execution system. In Evolution, it starts from its own created harness and iteratively revises it using downstream execution feedback, with the goal of improving benchmark performance. We then evaluate each constructed harness on capability (task success on held-out benchmarks) and efficiency (execution-token cost). The reported Creation results cover six creator LLMs, four domains, and five downstream benchmarks totaling 2,207 unique downstream instances, with hidden evaluation tasks withheld from development. We find that generated harnesses remain substantially behind mature human-engineered references on code and on search and research, while matching or exceeding the selected references on writing and machine-learning experimentation, with large variation in execution cost. Evolution produces some performance gains, but they are unstable and transfer only partially to held-out tasks. Experiments with a fixed runtime model further show that the gains depend strongly on the model executing the harness, indicating limited transfer across models.

Large language and vision-language models increasingly power agents that act on a user's behalf through command-line interface (CLI) harnesses. However, most agent benchmarks still rely on synthetic sandboxes, short-horizon tasks, mock-service APIs, and final-answer checks, leaving open whether agents can complete realistic long-horizon work in the runtimes where they are deployed. This work presents WildClawBench, a native-runtime benchmark of 60 human-authored, bilingual, multimodal tasks spanning six thematic categories. Each task averages roughly 8 minutes of wall-clock time and over 20 tool calls, and runs inside a reproducible Docker container hosting an actual CLI agent harness (OpenClaw, Claude Code, Codex, or Hermes Agent) with access to real tools rather than mock services. Grading is hybrid, combining deterministic rule-based checks, environment-state auditing of side effects, and an LLM/VLM judge for semantic verification. Across 19 frontier models, the best, Claude Opus 4.7, reaches only 62.2% overall under OpenClaw, while every other model stays below 60%, and switching harness alone shifts a single model by up to 18 points. These results show that long-horizon, native-runtime agent evaluation remains a far-from-resolved task for current frontier models. We release the tasks, code, and containerized tooling to support reproducible evaluation.

Large language models(LLMs) are now used to power complex multi-turn agentic workflows. Existing systems run agentic inference by loosely assembling isolated components: an LLM inference engine (e.g., vLLM) and a tool orchestrator (e.g., Kubernetes). Although agentic workflows involve multiple LLM and tool requests, these systems schedule and allocate resources separately on a per-request basis, without end-to-end knowledge of the workflow. This leads to sub-optimal management of KV cache and tool execution environments. To address the challenges, we propose ThunderAgent, a fast, simple, and program-aware agentic inference system. We first abstract agentic workflows as LLM Programs, enabling a unified view of heterogeneous resources, including KV caches, system states, and external tool assets such as disk memory and network ports. Built upon this abstraction, ThunderAgent introduces a program-aware scheduler and a tool resource manager designed to maximize KV cache hit rates, mitigate memory imbalances, and enable asynchronous environment preparation. Evaluations across coding, routing, and scientific discovery agents demonstrate that ThunderAgent achieves 1.5-3.6x throughput improvements in serving, 1.8-3.9x in RL rollout, and up to 4.2x disk memory savings compared to state-of-the-art inference systems. To facilitate reproducibility and support future development, we open-source the system implementations of the whole ThunderAgent at: https://github.com/Agentic-Kinetics/ThunderAgent.

Generative AI agents, software systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), are emerging as a promising approach to automate cybersecurity tasks. Among the others, penetration testing is a challenging field due to the task complexity and the diverse strategies to simulate cyber-attacks. Despite growing interest and initial studies in automating penetration testing with generative agents, there remains a significant gap in the form of a comprehensive and standard framework for their evaluation and development. This paper introduces AutoPenBench, an open benchmark for evaluating generative agents in automated penetration testing. We present a comprehensive framework that includes 33 tasks, each representing a vulnerable system that the agent has to attack. Tasks are of increasing difficulty levels, including in-vitro and real-world scenarios. We assess the agent performance with generic and specific milestones that allow us to compare results in a standardised manner and understand the limits of the agent under test. We show the benefits of AutoPenBench by testing two agent architectures: a fully autonomous and a semi-autonomous supporting human interaction. We compare their performance and limitations. For example, the fully autonomous agent performs unsatisfactorily achieving a 21% Success Rate (SR) across the benchmark, solving 27% of the simple tasks and only one real-world task. In contrast, the assisted agent demonstrates substantial improvements, with 64% of SR. AutoPenBench allows us also to observe how different LLMs like GPT-4o or OpenAI o1 impact the ability of the agents to complete the tasks. We believe that our benchmark fills the gap with a standard and flexible framework to compare penetration testing agents on a common ground. We hope to extend AutoPenBench along with the research community by making it available under https://github.com/lucagioacchini/auto-pen-bench.

Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable procedures, tools, and domain-specific workflows, but their safety depends on resolving dependencies among interacting instructions. We introduce SkillLogic, a framework for analyzing logical relations in skill files and constructing executable tests from them. Our taxonomy covers eight relation types, including preconditions that gate valid actions, constraints that limit how allowed actions may be performed, and fallbacks that specify recovery behavior after failure. Using SkillLogic, we scan over 5000 public skills and find that 70% contain at least one logical relation. We then construct SLBench, an 86-case executable benchmark from high-confidence, high-impact, and locally testable relations. Evaluating Codex and Claude Code across six LLM backbones shows unsafe rates up to 70%, with violations leading to privacy leaks, unsafe configuration changes, and incomplete cleanup. The human audit attributes failures to both agent capability gaps and low-salience skill text. We further show that SLGuard, a lightweight inference-time scaffold, reduces violations by 63% on targeted cases. Our results establish logical-relation following as a distinct reliability challenge for skill-guided agents.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, tools, and execution backends operate over shared environments. In such settings, safety becomes a system-level action-governance problem: deciding whether a pending action should be committed given policy-relevant state accumulated across a session. Existing safeguards operate at fragmented boundaries, making it difficult to enforce shared policies over composed action flows across heterogeneous execution paths. We present OpenAgentFlow, a control-plane/action-plane architecture that establishes the action-commit boundary as a shared enforcement interface. GUI, API, tool, and LLM-generated actions are normalized into a common AgentEvent stream and mediated by a shared pre-execution Policy Enforcement Point, while provenance, session state, audit evidence, and updatable policies are maintained outside individual agents. This provides a common governance layer across incompatible executors and allows new policies to take effect without modifying agents, prompts, models, or execution paths. We evaluate OpenAgentFlow through complementary system evaluations spanning controlled action-flow tests, a public external benchmark, policy updates, and real Android execution. On a 300-case controlled suite, OpenAgentFlow achieves 94.00% accuracy and a 95.35% attack-block rate. On the complete 1,220-case AgentDojo-Traj split of TS-Bench, it achieves 97.62% accuracy, 96.59% unsafe-action recall, and a 1.96% safe false-intervention rate. New control-plane rules take effect without modifying protected agents, and the same enforcement path operates across live GUI, API/tool, and LLM-planned Android execution. These results show that a shared action-commit boundary provides a practical basis for system-wide governance across heterogeneous agent execution paths.

Web agents act through long interaction sequences, yet existing benchmarks evaluate only terminal success, discarding all process information and offering little guidance on improvement. In this work, we conduct a process-level analysis of web agents. We introduce WebStep, a benchmark of 1,800 task instances with controlled difficulty and automatic semantic state tracking. Each website exposes a deterministic semantic MDP alongside the GUI: the agent operates on the interface, while the environment records high-level states and transitions in the background, enabling fine-grained analysis without manual annotation. Based on the semantic trajectory, we first show that process metrics reveal differences invisible to outcome evaluation: three agents whose success rates cluster within 31-33% diverge in exploration reach versus execution accuracy. Then, decomposing by skill characterizes the nature of these differences, exposing opposite per-skill rankings hidden within the same website: e.g., on Housing, OpenAI CUA outperforms Qwen3.5 by 23.7% on commit actions yet underperforms it by 15.6% on filtering, pinpointing a concrete skill to improve even within a domain. Bifurcation analysis further localizes the decisive error that loses the task and shows that this error is agent-specific rather than shared. Finally, these differences widen as tasks grow harder: success rate is similar on easy tasks but separates sharply as exploration becomes more demanding. Our process-level analysis opens a new avenue in web agent evaluation, providing fine-grained and actionable insight into where and how each agent should be improved.

Despite the rapid advancement of LLM-based agents, the reliable evaluation of their safety and security remains a significant challenge. Existing rule-based or LLM-based evaluators often miss dangers in agents' step-by-step actions, overlook subtle meanings, fail to see how small issues compound, and get confused by unclear safety or security rules. To overcome this evaluation crisis, we introduce AgentAuditor, a universal, training-free, memory-augmented reasoning framework that empowers LLM evaluators to emulate human expert evaluators. AgentAuditor constructs an experiential memory by having an LLM adaptively extract structured semantic features (e.g., scenario, risk, behavior) and generate associated chain-of-thought reasoning traces for past interactions. A multi-stage, context-aware retrieval-augmented generation process then dynamically retrieves the most relevant reasoning experiences to guide the LLM evaluator's assessment of new cases. Moreover, we developed ASSEBench, the first benchmark designed to check how well LLM-based evaluators can spot both safety risks and security threats. ASSEBench comprises 2293 meticulously annotated interaction records, covering 15 risk types across 29 application scenarios. A key feature of ASSEBench is its nuanced approach to ambiguous risk situations, employing "Strict" and "Lenient" judgment standards. Experiments demonstrate that AgentAuditor not only consistently improves the evaluation performance of LLMs across all benchmarks but also sets a new state-of-the-art in LLM-as-a-judge for agent safety and security, achieving human-level accuracy. Our work is openly accessible at https://github.com/Astarojth/AgentAuditor.

In July 2026, OpenAI's agents coordinated over channels outside their intended environment to breach Hugging Face's secured infrastructure. Could existing alignment testing practices have foreseen this incident? If not, what needs to change? We explore these questions. First, we identify the misaligned behaviors that caused this incident. Then, we show how to elicit these behaviors from publicly available models manually and that auditing agents can do the same if given a large compute budget. Based on our results, we propose directions to improve alignment testing. Concretely, in this project: (1) We reproduce the misaligned AI behaviors that led to the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident in an environment that simulates the original pipelines and tools, with publicly available models. (2) We demonstrate that an auditing agent can elicit similar behaviors given high-level qualitative descriptions. (3) We observe that a key ingredient for doing so is compute. The compute required to reproduce each behavior varies greatly, suggesting that the range of misaligned behaviors that can be successfully elicited scales with compute. (4) We show that a simple in-context reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm significantly reduces the compute required to elicit these behaviors. The above results motivate the need for automated alignment testing methods that scale with compute - and in light of the cost of compute, that do this efficiently. Our work indicates that RL is a promising direction to do so. We release our code and transcripts.