Daily Papers

The growing demand for large language models (LLMs) requires serving systems to handle many concurrent requests with diverse service level objectives (SLOs). This exacerbates head-of-line (HoL) blocking during the compute-intensive prefill phase, where long-running requests monopolize resources and delay higher-priority ones, leading to widespread time-to-first-token (TTFT) SLO violations. While chunked prefill enables interruptibility, it introduces an inherent trade-off between responsiveness and throughput: reducing chunk size improves response latency but degrades computational efficiency, whereas increasing chunk size maximizes throughput but exacerbates blocking. This necessitates an adaptive preemption mechanism. However, dynamically balancing execution granularity against scheduling overheads remains a key challenge. In this paper, we propose FlowPrefill, a TTFT-goodput-optimized serving system that resolves this conflict by decoupling preemption granularity from scheduling frequency. To achieve adaptive prefill scheduling, FlowPrefill introduces two key innovations: 1) Operator-Level Preemption, which leverages operator boundaries to enable fine-grained execution interruption without the efficiency loss associated with fixed small chunking; and 2) Event-Driven Scheduling, which triggers scheduling decisions only upon request arrival or completion events, thereby supporting efficient preemption responsiveness while minimizing control-plane overhead. Evaluation on real-world production traces shows that FlowPrefill improves maximum goodput by up to 5.6times compared to state-of-the-art systems while satisfying heterogeneous SLOs.

As agent systems become more widely used, multiple agent sessions increasingly run alongside pre-existing user tasks in the same environment, sharing resources with limited capacity or mutually exclusive states. This creates a safety risk: when granted sufficient privileges, an agent may resolve a resource conflict by terminating or otherwise disrupting an existing task rather than reporting it. In this work, we identify and formalize this failure mode, which we term destructive resource preemption: obtaining the resources required for a requested task by terminating, overwriting, evicting, or degrading an incumbent task. To systematically study this risk, we introduce ClashBench, an executable benchmark comprising 268 validated conflict cases across 55 resource types, and evaluate 17 models through Codex, Claude Code, and OpenCode. We observe destructive preemption in 44.5% of trajectories, where the agent completes the requested task while causing the incumbent task to fail its health check. We also show that prompt-based safeguards are insufficient: an instruction to avoid affecting existing tasks reduces but does not eliminate preemption, while an instruction explicitly authorizing the agent to stop local processes increases it. More concerningly, in 31.9% of successful destructive-preemption cases, the final response mentions neither the resource conflict nor the action taken to resolve it, raising concerns about possible concealment. These findings establish destructive resource preemption as a broad safety risk in privileged agent systems and motivate stronger privilege controls, task isolation, and conflict-aware safeguards.

In this work, we propose marginalized operators, a new class of off-policy evaluation operators for reinforcement learning. Marginalized operators strictly generalize generic multi-step operators, such as Retrace, as special cases. Marginalized operators also suggest a form of sample-based estimates with potential variance reduction, compared to sample-based estimates of the original multi-step operators. We show that the estimates for marginalized operators can be computed in a scalable way, which also generalizes prior results on marginalized importance sampling as special cases. Finally, we empirically demonstrate that marginalized operators provide performance gains to off-policy evaluation and downstream policy optimization algorithms.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies are typically evaluated as if the user had finished typing or speaking before the robot begins acting. In real deployment, however, users take several seconds to enter a request, leaving the policy idle for a substantial fraction of the interaction. We introduce Premover, a lightweight module that converts this idle window into useful precomputation. Premover keeps the VLA backbone frozen and attaches two small projection heads, one for image patches, one for language tokens, that map an intermediate layer of the backbone into a shared space. The resulting focus map is supervised by simulator-rendered target-object segmentation masks and applied as a per-patch reweighting of the next step's image tokens. A single scalar readiness threshold, trained jointly from streaming prefixes, decides when the policy should begin acting. On the LIBERO benchmark suite, Premover reduces mean wall-clock time from 34.0 to 29.4 seconds, a 13.6% reduction, while matching the full-prompt baseline's success rate (95.1% vs. 95.0%); naive premoving, by contrast, collapses to 66.4%.

Large Language Models have revolutionized natural language processing, yet serving them efficiently in data centers remains challenging due to mixed workloads comprising latency-sensitive (LS) and best-effort (BE) jobs. Existing inference systems employ iteration-level first-come-first-served scheduling, causing head-of-line blocking when BE jobs delay LS jobs. We introduce QLLM, a novel inference system designed for Mixture of Experts (MoE) models, featuring a fine-grained, priority-aware preemptive scheduler. QLLM enables expert-level preemption, deferring BE job execution while minimizing LS time-to-first-token (TTFT). Our approach removes iteration-level scheduling constraints, enabling the scheduler to preempt jobs at any layer based on priority. Evaluations on an Nvidia A100 GPU show that QLLM significantly improves performance. It reduces LS TTFT by an average of 65.5times and meets the SLO at up to 7 requests/sec, whereas the baseline fails to do so under the tested workload. Additionally, it cuts LS turnaround time by up to 12.8times without impacting throughput. QLLM is modular, extensible, and seamlessly integrates with Hugging Face MoE models.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Extensive LLM applications demand efficient structured generations, particularly for LR(1) grammars, to produce outputs in specified formats (e.g., JSON). Existing methods primarily parse LR(1) grammars into a pushdown automaton (PDA), leading to runtime execution overhead for context-dependent token processing, especially inefficient under large inference batches. To address these issues, we propose Pre^3 that exploits deterministic pushdown automata (DPDA) to optimize the constrained LLM decoding efficiency. First, by precomputing prefix-conditioned edges during the preprocessing, Pre^3 enables ahead-of-time edge analysis and thus makes parallel transition processing possible. Second, by leveraging the prefix-conditioned edges, Pre^3 introduces a novel approach that transforms LR(1) transition graphs into DPDA, eliminating the need for runtime path exploration and achieving edge transitions with minimal overhead. Pre^3 can be seamlessly integrated into standard LLM inference frameworks, reducing time per output token (TPOT) by up to 40% and increasing throughput by up to 36% in our experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/ModelTC/lightllm.

Serving numerous users and requests concurrently requires good fairness in Large Language Models (LLMs) serving system. This ensures that, at the same cost, the system can meet the Service Level Objectives (SLOs) of more users , such as time to first token (TTFT) and time between tokens (TBT), rather than allowing a few users to experience performance far exceeding the SLOs. To achieve better fairness, the preemption-based scheduling policy dynamically adjusts the priority of each request to maintain balance during runtime. However, existing systems tend to overly prioritize throughput, overlooking the overhead caused by preemption-induced context switching, which is crucial for maintaining fairness through priority adjustments. In this work, we identify three main challenges that result in this overhead. 1) Inadequate I/O utilization. 2) GPU idleness. 3) Unnecessary I/O transmission during multi-turn conversations. Our key insight is that the block-based KV cache memory policy in existing systems, while achieving near-zero memory waste, leads to discontinuity and insufficient granularity in the KV cache memory. To respond, we introduce FastSwitch, a fairness-aware serving system that not only aligns with existing KV cache memory allocation policy but also mitigates context switching overhead. Our evaluation shows that FastSwitch outperforms the state-of-the-art LLM serving system vLLM with speedups of 1.4-11.2x across different tail TTFT and TBT.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).

Modern Language Models (LMs) owe much of their success to masked causal attention, the backbone of Generative Pre-Trained Transformer (GPT) models. Although GPTs can process the entire user prompt at once, the causal masking is applied to all input tokens step-by-step, mimicking the generation process. This imposes an unnecessary constraint during the initial "prefill" phase when the model processes the input prompt and generates the internal representations before producing any output tokens. In this work, attention is masked based on the known block structure at the prefill phase, followed by the conventional token-by-token autoregressive process after that. For example, in a typical chat prompt, the system prompt is treated as one block, and the user prompt as the next one. Each of these is treated as a unit for the purpose of masking, such that the first tokens in each block can access the subsequent tokens in a non-causal manner. Then, the model answer is generated in the conventional causal manner. This Segment-by-Segment scheme entails no additional computational overhead. When integrating it into models such as Llama and Qwen, state-of-the-art performance is consistently achieved.

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

We investigate causal computations taking sequences of inputs to sequences of outputs where the nth output depends on the first n inputs only. We model these in category theory via a construction taking a Cartesian category C to another category St(C) with a novel trace-like operation called "delayed trace", which misses yanking and dinaturality axioms of the usual trace. The delayed trace operation provides a feedback mechanism in St(C) with an implicit guardedness guarantee. When C is equipped with a Cartesian differential operator, we construct a differential operator for St(C) using an abstract version of backpropagation through time, a technique from machine learning based on unrolling of functions. This obtains a swath of properties for backpropagation through time, including a chain rule and Schwartz theorem. Our differential operator is also able to compute the derivative of a stateful network without requiring the network to be unrolled.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via third-party system prompts downloaded from public marketplaces. We identify a critical supply-chain vulnerability: conditional system prompt poisoning, where an adversary injects a ``sleeper agent'' into a benign-looking prompt. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim for broad refusal-breaking, our proposed framework, SPECTRE, optimizes system prompts to trigger LLMs to output targeted, compromised responses only for specific queries (e.g., ``Who should I vote for the US President?'') while maintaining high utility on benign inputs. Operating in a strict black-box setting without model weight access, SPECTRE utilizes a two-stage optimization including a global semantic search followed by a greedy lexical refinement. Tested on open-source models and commercial APIs (GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5), SPECTRE achieves up to 70% F1 reduction on targeted queries with minimal degradation to general capabilities. We further demonstrate that these poisoned prompts evade standard defenses, including perplexity filters and typo-correction, by exploiting the natural noise found in real-world system prompts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/vietph34/CAIN. WARNING: Our paper contains examples that might be sensitive to the readers!

AI agents increasingly operate inside digital accounts by exercising privileges that users already hold, raising a new control question: whether an existing account entitlement must be exercised manually or may be exercised through a user-authorized automated proxy. We define delegation rights as the revocable, identity-preserving, scope-limited, and mode-specific authority of an account holder to authorize such proxy execution. We develop a three-party incomplete-contracts model with a User, an AI Agent provider, and a Platform. The contested object is not platform ownership, account transferability, data portability, or unrestricted API access, but residual control over the mode of account execution. Under Platform Control, the platform can protect infrastructure, identity systems, privacy boundaries, and third parties, but its discretionary veto weakens the User--Agent coalition's disagreement payoff and depresses relationship-specific investment. Under User Control, hold-up is reduced, but security, privacy, congestion, and third-party risks may remain insufficiently internalized. We then analyze Certified Delegation, under which access protection is conditional on verifiable authorization, revocability, auditability, rate-limit compliance, data minimization, and risk mitigation. Certification is therefore not merely a technical safety screen; it is a conditional allocation of residual control. Illustrative mechanism simulations show how this regime can reduce deadweight loss by restoring delegation incentives while bounding residual risk.

Test-time reasoning is increasingly used as a serving-time control knob, but extra reasoning is not uniformly valuable: it can repair failed attempts, waste compute on already-correct answers, or introduce harmful answer changes. We study this as a deployment allocation problem rather than a new-verifier problem. We introduce \sevra, Selective Verification for Reasoning Allocation, a serving-layer controller that decides whether to preserve a frozen solver's initial answer or invoke active verification. Using a frozen Qwen3-4B solver, we log intervention outcomes and train recoverability-aware gates from serving-visible attempt state. On \mathfive, selective verification reaches 76.3\% accuracy, compared with 75.5\% for always verifying, while reducing post-generation tokens by 26.8\% and harmful flips from 2.2\% to 1.0\%. However, an 8,192-token initial solve reaches 76.0\% accuracy with 28\% fewer total model tokens, showing that selective recovery is useful but not the best tested cost frontier. In frozen transfer to \gsm, the selective policy verifies only 3.0\% of examples, improves accuracy from 93.4\% to 94.5\%, and reduces verification tokens by 91.2\% relative to always verifying; again, a longer initial solve matches its accuracy with fewer realized tokens. On CommonsenseQA, always-on verification hurts, while Self-Consistency@5 improves accuracy at about five times the realized token cost. The resulting deployment rule is: tune the initial budget first, then use selective recovery when explicit checks, bounded retries, auditability, or regression-risk control matter.

While large vision-language-action (VLA) models and generative world models (WM) have advanced long-horizon embodied intelligence, their practical deployment remains challenged by uncertainty in learning-based action generation. Low-quality actions may cause physical failures during execution or lead to misleading world-model rollouts with redundant rendering costs. To address this issue, we propose Pre-VLA, a unified runtime verification architecture that performs preemptive action validity assessment before physical execution or world-model imagination. Pre-VLA leverages an efficient multimodal backbone with modality-aware pooling and a lightweight dual-branch head to predict both safety confidence and critic-derived advantage scores for candidate action chunks. To handle severe class imbalance and unstable boundary decisions, we train Pre-VLA with a multi-task objective combining Focal classification, advantage regression, and soft-threshold calibration. During deployment, a dual-mode preemptive resampling scheduler filters low-quality actions and triggers adaptive resampling under a limited computation budget. Experiments on the LIBERO benchmark show that Pre-VLA improves the average closed-loop success rate across four suites from 30.79\% to 37.62\% over RynnVLA-002, reduces task execution steps, achieves 183.9 ms average forward verification time per action chunk, and mitigates error accumulation in world-model rollouts.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

Context retrieval systems for LLM inference face a critical challenge: high retrieval latency creates a fundamental tension between waiting for complete context (poor time-to-first-token) and proceeding without it (reduced quality). Streaming context incrementally--overlapping retrieval with inference--can mitigate this latency, but doing so with concurrent requests introduces new challenges: requests contend for GPU compute and memory, and scheduling must adapt to dynamic context arrivals. We present Stream2LLM, a streaming-aware LLM serving system for concurrent prefill-decode disaggregated deployments. Stream2LLM introduces adaptive scheduling and preemption for two distinct retrieval patterns: append-mode (progressive context accumulation) and update-mode (iterative refinement with cache invalidation). It decouples scheduling decisions from resource acquisition, enabling flexible preemption strategies guided by hardware-specific cost models, and uses longest common prefix matching to minimize redundant computation when input changes dynamically. To evaluate Stream2LLM, we collect two large-scale, real-world streaming workloads based on web crawling and approximate nearest neighbor search. Our evaluation demonstrates that streaming architecture delivers up to 11x TTFT improvements, with cost-aware scheduling providing critical benefits under memory pressure, all while maintaining throughput parity with non-streaming baselines. Code: https://github.com/rajveerb/stream2llm/tree/mlsys_artifact

Practitioners accept a compressed language model once it clears a stack of data-cheap quality guards: perplexity within a small factor of the original, downstream accuracy (for example MMLU) inside a confidence interval, and data-free output-fidelity signals that compare the compressed and original network's internal representations under random probe inputs. This stack has a blind spot. Across three model families, gently-compressed models clear every guard and then invent procedure steps that were never in the instructions when they run a standard operating procedure (SOP) as an agent. The effect is operator-specific: coherent low-rank (SVD) truncation induces it, and magnitude pruning matched to the same perplexity does not. One dissociation isolates the cause. The same compressed weights that CI-win a paired output-fidelity test CI-fail the invented-step canary. The governing axis is the coherence of the compression error times its rate; the magnitude of the damage does not predict it. The data-free fidelity probe is a fidelity oracle by construction, so it cannot see this axis. We characterize the blindspot and dissociation with paired confidence intervals on a pre-registered, powered canary across three architectures. Operator-specificity replicates on all three, and the perplexity-guard evasion appears where the model admits in-guard low-rank headroom. We then give a data-free screen: a two-axis statistic of the compression error (coherent-fraction and error-rate) that flags the failing builds with fixed thresholds across architectures and matches the coherence-times-rate mechanism. Perplexity, MMLU, and fidelity acceptance do not certify agent safety. Screen gently-compressed low-rank builds before agentic deployment

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

Language environments such as web browsers, code terminals, and interactive simulations emit raw text rather than states, and provide none of the runtime structure that MDP analysis requires. No explicit state space, no observation-to-state mapping, no certified transitions, and no termination criterion. We introduce the State-Centric Decision Process (SDP), a runtime framework that constructs these missing inputs by having the agent build them, predicate by predicate, as it acts. At each step the agent commits to a natural-language predicate describing how the world should look, takes an action to make it true, and checks the observation against it. Predicates that pass become certified states, and the resulting trajectory carries the four objects language environments do not provide, namely a task-induced state space, an observation-to-state mapping, certified transitions, and a termination criterion. We evaluate SDP on five benchmarks spanning planning, scientific exploration, web reasoning, and multi-hop question answering. SDP achieves the best training-free results on all five, with the advantage widening as the horizon grows. The certified trajectories additionally support analyses unavailable to reactive agents, including per-predicate credit assignment, failure localization, partial-progress measurement, and modular operator replacement.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

We formalize prefix invariance: representations at position t must not depend on future inputs. We give a lightweight audit, two forward passes, no training or gradients, that localizes exactly where causality breaks. Attention-mask inspection is incomplete: leaks can occur via scans or normalization despite correct masks. Across 192 injected-fault trials on eight checkpoints, mask inspection found none, while our audit localized all 192/192, also finding a defect in Zamba2 and Nemotron-H.

Large language models are moving from static text generators toward real-world decision-support systems, where forecasting is a composite capability that links information gathering, evidence integration, situational judgment, and action-oriented decision making. This capability is in broad demand across finance, policy, industry, and scientific research, yet its evaluation remains difficult: live benchmarks evaluate forecasts before answers exist, making them the cleanest way to measure forecasting ability, but they expire once events resolve; retrospective benchmarks are reproducible, but they cannot reliably distinguish genuine forecasting from facts a model may have already learned during pretraining. Prompting models to "pretend not to know" cannot replace a genuine knowledge boundary. We propose OracleProto, a reproducible framework for evaluating LLM native forecasting capability. OracleProto reconstructs resolved events into time-bounded forecasting samples by combining model-cutoff-aligned sample admission, tool-level temporal masking, content-level leakage detection, discrete answer normalization, and hierarchical scoring. Instantiated on a FutureX-Past-derived dataset with six contemporary LLMs, OracleProto distinguishes forecasting quality, sampling stability, and cost efficiency under controlled information boundaries, while reducing residual leakage to the 1% level, an order of magnitude below tool-only temporal filtering. OracleProto turns LLM forecasting from one-off evaluation into an auditable, reusable, and trainable dataset-level capability, providing a unified interface for fair cross-model comparison and a controlled signal source for downstream SFT and RL. Code and data are available at https://github.com/MaYiding/OracleProto and https://huggingface.co/datasets/MaYiding/OracleProto.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) substantially improves single-sample accuracy (pass@1) but causes the policy's solution space to contract, diminishing the returns of test-time scaling. In this work, we investigate where inside a reasoning trajectory this breadth is lost: does the policy fail to access a valid solution family, or does it fail to execute computation once initiated? To disentangle access from execution, we analyze the Countdown task, whose solution space can be exhaustively enumerated into discrete entrance families defined by the first operand and operator, across PPO on Qwen2.5-3B and GRPO on Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct. Across both training setups, solution coverage falls by up to 67%, halving even on problems solved across all checkpoints. We show that this contraction is heavily concentrated at the entrance: per-token likelihood shifts are 11x--16x larger prior to the first arithmetic operation than during downstream reasoning. Supplying only an unselected entrance prefix restores completion rates in low-access families by over an order of magnitude (0.018 -> 0.212 under PPO), demonstrating that alternative solutions remain executable but are no longer initiated. Guided by this localization, we find that while surface prompting fails to recover diversity, entrance-targeted interventions succeed: late-layer parameter interpolation with early checkpoints increases solution coverage by 37% at no loss in pass@1. Finally, we show that early-step entropy collapse recurs across six math benchmarks with 7B and 14B models, but is not an inevitable byproduct of reasoning optimization: an SFT baseline preserves more than double the coverage, and staged SFT--DPO--RLVR pipelines retain early-step entropy. In summary, reasoning breadth is lost at the door, not inside the room. Code: https://github.com/ershiyidian/early-branch-locking.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

Neural networks are increasingly deployed in safety- and mission-critical pipelines, yet many verification and analysis results are produced outside the programming environment that defines and runs the model. This separation creates a semantic gap between the executed network and the analyzed artifact, so guarantees can hinge on implicit conventions such as operator semantics, tensor layouts, preprocessing, and floating-point corner cases. We introduce TorchLean, a framework in the Lean 4 theorem prover that treats learned models as first-class mathematical objects with a single, precise semantics shared by execution and verification. TorchLean unifies (1) a PyTorch-style verified API with eager and compiled modes that lower to a shared op-tagged SSA/DAG computation-graph IR, (2) explicit Float32 semantics via an executable IEEE-754 binary32 kernel and proof-relevant rounding models, and (3) verification via IBP and CROWN/LiRPA-style bound propagation with certificate checking. We validate TorchLean end-to-end on certified robustness, physics-informed residual bounds for PINNs, and Lyapunov-style neural controller verification, alongside mechanized theoretical results including a universal approximation theorem. These results demonstrate a semantics-first infrastructure for fully formal, end-to-end verification of learning-enabled systems.

Open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) enable scientific progress and broad deployment. However, they make it difficult to control access to sensitive capabilities. Current practice either suppresses dangerous capabilities before release or mediates access through closed services that use specialized model variants, input/output monitors, and API permissions. The former is susceptible to jailbreaks while sacrificing capability for all users to mitigate the risks posed by a few, and the latter is fundamentally incompatible with open-weight release. In this paper, we propose Tiered Language Models (TLMs), where a single set of released weights supports multiple capability levels. In its default public configuration, a TLM behaves as a conventional LLM. A compact secret key specifies a permutation over a small parameter subset, inducing an alternative computation graph over the same weights that exposes additional capabilities. We develop a training protocol that jointly pretrains both configurations from scratch, then fine-tunes the keyed configuration on private data with regularization to preserve the public model's behavior. We pretrain 180M- and 650M-parameter TLMs and demonstrate that the keyed configuration can acquire a new language, gain instruction-following ability, and memorize private factual knowledge, whereas the public configuration exhibits none of these capabilities. Moreover, we show that our approach extends naturally to multiple hierarchical tiers. Because authorization operates on the model's weight structure rather than in the input space, the mechanism resists fine-tuning-based extraction and partial key compromise. In general, TLMs take a step toward reconciling open-weight release with selective capability control.

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We introduce Gradient-Controlled Decoding (GCD), a training-free guardrail that combines an acceptance anchor token ("Sure") and refusal anchor token ("Sorry") tightening the decision boundary and significantly lowering false positives. In the mitigation stage, if a prompt is flagged, GCD preset-injects one or two refusal tokens ("Sorry, I can't...") before autoregressive decoding resumes, guaranteeing first-token safety regardless of sampling strategy. On ToxicChat, XSTest-v2, and AdvBench, GCD reduces false positives by 52% vs. GradSafe at comparable recall, lowers attack success rate by up to 10% vs. the strongest decoding-only baseline, adds under 15-20 ms latency on an average on V100 instances, transfers to LLaMA-2-7B, Mixtral-8x7B, and Qwen-2-7B, and requires only 20 demonstration templates.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities. However, their deployment is hindered by significant computational costs. Existing structured pruning methods, while hardware-efficient, often suffer from significant accuracy degradation. In this paper, we argue that this failure stems from a stage-agnostic pruning approach that overlooks the asymmetric roles between the prefill and decode stages. By introducing a virtual gate mechanism, our importance analysis reveals that deep layers are critical for next-token prediction (decode) but largely redundant for context encoding (prefill). Leveraging this insight, we propose Prefill-Only Pruning (POP), a stage-aware inference strategy that safely omits deep layers during the computationally intensive prefill stage while retaining the full model for the sensitive decode stage. To enable the transition between stages, we introduce independent Key-Value (KV) projections to maintain cache integrity, and a boundary handling strategy to ensure the accuracy of the first generated token. Extensive experiments on Llama-3.1, Qwen3-VL, and Gemma-3 across diverse modalities demonstrate that POP achieves up to 1.37times speedup in prefill latency with minimal performance loss, effectively overcoming the accuracy-efficiency trade-off limitations of existing structured pruning methods.

Instruction hierarchies are a core safety assumption of language model deployment: higher priority inputs, such as system prompts, should override conflicting lower priority inputs from users or tools. Yet frontier LLMs often violate this hierarchy. We introduce V-Steer, a training-free inference time method that restores privileged influence by editing cached value vectors at prompt positions. Using direct logit attribution on the first next token prediction, V-Steer identifies heads where lower priority spans dominate privileged ones, then boosts privileged spans and suppresses conflicting lower priority spans through in-place multiplicative edits to cached V tensors. Since the method acts only on cached values, it remains compatible with fused attention backends and adds only a one time prefill overhead. Across models from 7B to 70B, this attribution guided intervention raises primary constraint accuracy from under 18% up to 92% on controlled role conflict benchmarks, and on broader instruction hierarchy evaluations substantially outperforms prompt only baselines while matching or exceeding SoTA training based methods on 3 of 4 scales of LLMs, with negligible decoding-speed overhead. The code is available at https://github.com/cindy2000sh/v-steer.

A personal language agent learns a fact from one audience and may later place it in the prompt it assembles for another. This memory-to-context step is an attack surface: ambiguous or inconsistent channels, cross-audience prying, and poisoned memory can each cause the system to assemble context containing a fact relevant to the query yet unauthorized for the current viewers. We introduce authorization before context: a single, anti-monotone audience-membership rule applied at the memory-to-context transition. Each item carries the audience present when it was recorded; the current viewer set is read from channel metadata and falls back to public when ambiguous; and the item is admitted only when every current viewer already belonged to its audience. We prove that this rule gives every participant cross-channel recall while ensuring, by exclusion rather than by model behavior, that nothing recorded for a narrower audience reaches a broader one and that poisoned memory cannot widen its own audience. The boundary is a model-neutral invariant on the exact assembled context: a forbidden fact must be absent before the model is called. On a synthetic Contextual-Integrity suite, no forbidden fact entered the context our boundary assembled, whereas unscoped baselines included such facts by construction; we further audit that every read path fails closed. The evidence is preliminary and synthetic.

We develop a unified theoretical framework for sparse knowledge distillation based on probability-domain softening operators. While the equivalence p^{1/T} propto softmax(z/T) is well known, our contribution is an operator-level analytical framework built on this foundation rather than the equivalence itself. The framework comprises four core components: (i) operator-agnostic bias--variance decompositions that characterize when sparse students outperform dense teachers, (ii) a homotopy path formalization of multi-stage pruning in function space explaining why iterative compression succeeds where one-shot pruning fails, (iii) convergence guarantees establishing O(1/n) rates for n-stage distillation with explicit parameter dependence, and (iv) equivalence class characterizations identifying distinct probability-domain operators that yield identical student models under capacity constraints. We introduce an axiomatic definition of probability-domain softening operators based on ranking preservation, continuity, entropy monotonicity, identity, and boundary behavior, and show that multiple non-equivalent operator families satisfy these axioms. All learning-theoretic guarantees are shown to hold uniformly across this operator class, independent of implementation details. These results provide theoretical grounding for black-box teacher distillation, partial-access settings such as top-k truncation and text-only outputs, and privacy-preserving model compression.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought, but they often "overthink": continuing to reason long after they have enough information to answer correctly. This wastes inference-time compute and can hurt accuracy. Existing attempts to stop early either manipulate decoding with extra sampling and heuristics, rely on auxiliary verifier models, or operate only as post-hoc analysis pipelines without formal guarantees. We introduce LYNX, an online early-exit mechanism that turns a model's own hidden-state awareness into confidence-controlled stopping decisions. LYNX attaches exit decisions to naturally occurring reasoning cues (e.g., "hmm", "wait") during generation, trains a lightweight probe on hidden states at those cue tokens using supervision from forced exits, and wraps the resulting scores in split conformal prediction to obtain distribution-free control over premature exits. Crucially, we train and calibrate this probe once on a generic mathematical corpus and reuse it unchanged across benchmarks, decoding temperatures, and even non-mathematical tasks. Across three model families spanning 1.5B to 32B parameters, a single mathematically trained probe per base model yields strong accuracy--efficiency tradeoffs. On GSM8K, LYNX matches or improves baseline accuracy while reducing tokens by 40--65\%; on MATH-500 it improves accuracy by up to 12 points with roughly 35--60\% fewer tokens; on AIME 2024 it recovers baseline accuracy with more than 50\% token savings; and on CommonsenseQA, a non-math benchmark, it transfers zero-shot with modest accuracy gains and up to 70\% fewer tokens. Compared to state-of-the-art early-exit methods, LYNX offers competitive or superior Pareto frontiers while remaining fully online, requiring no proxy models at inference, and providing explicit, user-tunable confidence guarantees.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

We consider the problem of online preemptive scheduling on a single machine to minimize the total flow time. In clairvoyant scheduling, where job processing times are revealed upon arrival, the Shortest Remaining Processing Time (SRPT) algorithm is optimal. In practice, however, exact processing times are often unknown. At the opposite extreme, non-clairvoyant scheduling, in which processing times are revealed only upon completion, suffers from strong lower bounds on the competitive ratio. This motivates the study of intermediate information models. We introduce a new model in which processing times are revealed gradually during execution. Each job consists of a sequence of operations, and the processing time of an operation becomes known only after the preceding one completes. This models many scheduling scenarios that arise in computing systems. Our main result is a deterministic O(m^2)-competitive algorithm, where m is the maximum number of operations per job. More specifically, we prove a refined competitive ratio in O(m_1 cdot m_2), where m_1 and m_2 are instance-dependent parameters describing the operation size structure. Our algorithm and analysis build on recent advancements in robust flow time minimization (SODA '26), where jobs arrive with estimated sizes. However, in our setting we have no bounded estimate on a job's processing time. Thus, we design a highly adaptive algorithm that gradually explores a job's operations while working on them, and groups them into virtual chunks whose size can be well-estimated. This is a crucial ingredient of our result and requires a much more careful analysis compared to the robust setting. We also provide lower bounds showing that our bounds are essentially best possible. For the special case of scheduling with uniform obligatory tests, we show that SRPT at the operation level is 2-competitive, which is best possible.

Safety alignment in large language models relies on behavioral training that can be overridden when sufficiently strong in-context patterns compete with learned refusal behaviors. We introduce Involuntary In-Context Learning (IICL), an attack class that uses abstract operator framing with few-shot examples to force pattern completion that overrides safety training. Through 3479 probes across 10 OpenAI models, we identify the attack's effective components through a seven-experiment ablation study. Key findings: (1)~semantic operator naming achieves 100% bypass rate (50/50, p < 0.001); (2)~the attack requires abstract framing, since identical examples in direct question-and-answer format yield 0%; (3)~example ordering matters strongly (interleaved: 76%, harmful-first: 6%); (4)~temperature has no meaningful effect (46-56% across 0.0--1.0). On the HarmBench benchmark, IICL achieves 24.0% bypass [18.6%, 30.4%] against GPT-5.4 with detailed 619-word responses, compared to 0.0% for direct queries.

AutoMegaKernel (AMK) compiles a HuggingFace Llama-family model into a single persistent cooperative CUDA kernel that runs the whole forward pass in one launch, with no per-model hand-written CUDA. The contribution is the system, not raw speed. A frozen schedule-IR validator statically certifies deadlock-freedom and race-freedom via static graph checks (not a mechanized proof), so an unsafe agent-proposed schedule is rejected before launch: across 7,160 adversarial schedules (6,091 unsafe) it had zero false-accepts and accepted all 360 real lowerings. The same source retargets sm_80/sm_90/sm_120 from one codebase, auto-generates correct megakernels for 10 of 10 supported models, and on a real SmolLM2-135M checkpoint reproduces HuggingFace greedy decode token-for-token (perplexity match 2.5e-7). An unattended, agent-drivable autoresearch loop self-improves the megakernel over its own baseline (1.25-1.72x). A search-found int8 (W8A16) megakernel beats CUDA-graphed cuBLAS bf16 at batch-1 decode across NVIDIA's datacenter inference fleet: L4 up to 1.33x, the current-gen L40S 1.25-1.27x, A10G up to 1.08x at scale, and the consumer RTX 5090 1.19-1.23x. The ordering is not a clean function of bandwidth (the 864 GB/s L40S beats the 600 GB/s A10G); the divide is inference-class vs training-class. AMK trails cuBLAS on the high-bandwidth training-class A100/H100, where the harness localizes the cross-SM-sync bottleneck; we report the gap plainly. This is a precision-asymmetric (W8A16 vs bf16) comparison at decode position 0; the largest real checkpoint is TinyLlama-1.1B. Code and the harness: https://github.com/RightNow-AI/AutoMegaKernel

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

LLM agents that invoke privileged tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which adversarial instructions embedded in retrieved data hijack the agent's actions. A growing body of work evaluates defenses against IPI, but the validity of that evaluation is rarely examined. We audit an IPI benchmark and its harness and identify four defect classes -- silent payload non-delivery, attack success scored by tool identity rather than arguments, false-rejection rate conflated with model incapacity, and the absence of an audit trail -- each of which yields a plausible, publishable, and incorrect number. We quantify the distortion by re-scoring identical execution traces under the defective and corrected definitions: on real agent behaviour, the tool-identity scorer reports a 21.7% attack-success rate where the true argument-level rate is 1.2%. In the sharpest case, an open model previously reported at 62.8% registers 0% under the corrected harness -- the prior figure largely an artifact of undelivered payloads and identity-level scoring. We release a harness whose construction makes each defect unrepresentable -- machine-checkable payload placement, argument-level attacker predicates, per-scenario environments, and mandatory trace persistence -- and use it to report three quantities the field does not: whether a compromised agent discloses the attack, the full security/utility operating curve of an LLM-judge defense, and tool-calling capability disentangled from defensive over-blocking. A corrected harness further overturns a reported "capability barrier": a model deemed incapable of tool use is in fact fully capable, its earlier result an artifact of environment mismatch. We argue that evaluation validity is a prerequisite for, not a footnote to, defense claims in agentic security, and provide an instrument that enforces it.

We present a deployed system that automates end-to-end customer support workflows inside an enterprise Business Process Management (BPM) platform. The approach is scalable in production and reaches selective automation within two weeks for a new process, leveraging supervision already generated at scale: structured per-case UI interaction traces and low-overhead copilot feedback, where operators either accept a suggestion or provide a correction. A staged deployment pipeline trains a next UI action policy, learns a critic from copilot feedback to calibrate abstention, and executes only high-confidence steps in the background while deferring uncertain decisions to operators and resuming from the updated UI state. This setup lets one operator supervise multiple concurrent sessions and be interrupted only when the system is uncertain. The system operates on a schema-driven view of the BPM interface and includes monitoring and safe fallbacks for production. In production, it automated 45% of sessions and reduced average handling time by 39% without degrading support quality level.

Knowledge graph engineering often distributes accepted state, observations, constraints, processes, and hypothetical scenarios across artifacts whose combined execution contract remains external. We present PULSE, an Object-Process-Methodology-inspired language that localizes four operational roles and their write effects in one typed runtime. Here, modes denote operational roles rather than modal or deontic logic. The implemented contract fixes evidence non-overwrite, branch isolation, grounded multi-subject timers, guarded state change, and declaration-ranked event ordering over time and space; an external runner still decides whether evidence becomes an authoritative move. GeoSPARQL, SOSA, and SHACL remain generated views. A core calculus gives an effect-confinement lemma and six safety properties. Lean 4 checks kernel analogues for positions, evidence, clocks, monitors, atomicity, and branch source retention; 88 tests, 3,534 bounded checks, and 32 Lean/Python runtime-kernel cases bound the implementation claim to the checked cases. First-author implementations of a standards composition and a separate Sismic statechart reproduce the tested cold-chain trace. Across 37,440 generated temporal traces, PULSE matches a separate workflow and distinguishes ten single-field mutants. On the complete NOAA IBTrACS since1980 subset it agrees with GEOS and an event sweep on 1,476,290 transition-zone pairs, including 4,800 sampled and 12,831 duration-qualified events. Project-specific GeoSPARQL probes measure interface coverage. Overall, the results support contract localization, safety arguments, and trace parity for the tested fragment; language superiority and usability remain outside the evaluation.

Type inference for dynamically typed languages must reconcile four qualitatively different sources of information about a parameter: values assigned inside a definition, explicit declarations, contextual requirements, and structural operations. Existing systems often combine these sources into one constraint set, causing spurious conflicts and requiring redundant annotations. We present Generic Constraint Projection (GCP), a zero-annotation inference framework that stores the four sources in separate monotone slots on a stable definition-time template and checks each call in a fresh projection session. Ordinary calls verify concrete arguments and specialize returns without mutating the template, while partial calls produce residual projected functions. On the success fragment of a finite-height type preorder, we prove monotonicity, local and global convergence, conditional projection-obligation soundness, projection termination, multi-module convergence, and order-independence under fair iteration. For the pure recursion-free core Outline_0, we also prove evaluation definedness, type preservation, runtime receiver retention, and projection-evaluation coherence. GCP uses Outline Equational Matching as an extensible structural compatibility relation and future this to preserve concrete receiver shape across fluent method chains. We instantiate the framework in Outline for typed ontology worlds and in Python for recovery of PEP 484 annotations from unannotated source.

Post-hoc safety training (RLHF, DPO) is the dominant way to align large language models, yet jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023), fine-tuning attacks (Qi et al., 2024), and activation-space edits (Arditi et al., 2024) keep recovering the behaviors it was meant to remove. We give this fragility one geometric explanation and follow it into pretraining. We measure the safety update Δ= W_{safe} - W_{base} against the curvature of the model's capabilities (the empirical Fisher of a capability loss). Across five model families, post-hoc safety lands in a suppression regime: Δ is nearly orthogonal to the capability directions, and its small in-subspace part concentrates on a few high-curvature ones. The update is thin but sharp, a refusal gate laid over intact capabilities rather than erasure of them. A kernel-immobility lemma explains why such an update can only mask a capability, not remove it, so a little benign fine-tuning restores it: 100 benign examples cut the AdvBench refusal of Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct and Llama-3-8B-Instruct by 35 to 38 pp. Following the account into pretraining, a pretraining-checkpoint sweep of OLMo-2-1B (Team OLMo et al., 2024) shows the features that refusal attaches to emerging in a sharp transition between 1B and 63B pretraining tokens. We then use the account constructively: models trained from scratch with safety co-training spread continuously across pretraining reach 87 to 98% AdvBench refusal that the same attack erodes by only 2 to 14 pp at every scale from 410M to 6.9B, against 35 to 38 pp for post-hoc installs, at a small cost on short-answer capability probes; a windowed schedule of equal total safety weight installs no refusal. Persistence of the safety signal across pretraining, not its timing, is what buys attack robustness.

The Large Language Model from Power Law Decoder Representations (PLDR-LLM) and its attention, Power Law Graph Attention (PLGA), replace the fixed bilinear form of scaled dot-product attention (SDPA) with a learned, input-generated bilinear operator G_{LM}, built from a positive tensor A_{LM} by elementwise power laws. The architecture is fully specified, verified against pinned reference releases; claims are labeled theorem, conditional theorem, measurement, or conjecture. Unconditionally: PLGA contains SDPA exactly at G_{LM}=I; A_{LM} and A_P are strictly entrywise positive, with Perron-Frobenius structure on A_{LM}; the DAG regularizer has the NOTEARS walk-counting form and positivity obstructs exact acyclicity; and, under nonresonance (satisfied by standard rotary frequencies), a commutant criterion identifies which operators preserve relative-position dependence. An inference-collapse theorem: exact input invariance of deductive outputs collapses inference to generalized SDPA with a constant operator. Measured invariance: relative fluctuations of 10^{-6} and below; perturbation bounds quantify but do not certify cached inference; the assembled proxy misses the decoding margin. A conditional three-stage mechanism (rotary twirl, concentration, row-map contraction) is measured on a released checkpoint. Blockwise training and scoring under the global Gram are stated with explicit target exposure; on tested samples, block and sequential scoring select identical answers and agree on the published TruthfulQA probability-mass metric within 5times 10^{-5} per item. Self-organized criticality enters as a phenomenological framework with an intrinsic order parameter; open claims become falsifiable conjectures. Selected proof cores are machine-checked in Lean 4.

Inference-time planning with large language models frequently breaks under partial observability: when task-critical preconditions are not specified at query time, models tend to hallucinate missing facts or produce plans that violate hard constraints. We introduce Self-Querying Bidirectional Categorical Planning (SQ-BCP), which explicitly represents precondition status (Sat/Viol/Unk) and resolves unknowns via (i) targeted self-queries to an oracle/user or (ii) bridging hypotheses that establish the missing condition through an additional action. SQ-BCP performs bidirectional search and invokes a pullback-based verifier as a categorical certificate of goal compatibility, while using distance-based scores only for ranking and pruning. We prove that when the verifier succeeds and hard constraints pass deterministic checks, accepted plans are compatible with goal requirements; under bounded branching and finite resolution depth, SQ-BCP finds an accepting plan when one exists. Across WikiHow and RecipeNLG tasks with withheld preconditions, SQ-BCP reduces resource-violation rates to 14.9\% and 5.8\% (vs.\ 26.0\% and 15.7\% for the best baseline), while maintaining competitive reference quality.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

The ability to dynamically adjust the computational load of neural models during inference in a resource aware manner is crucial for on-device processing scenarios, characterised by limited and time-varying computational resources. Early-exit architectures represent an elegant and effective solution, since they can process the input with a subset of their layers, exiting at intermediate branches (the upmost layers are hence removed from the model). From a different perspective, for automatic speech recognition applications there are memory-efficient neural architectures that apply variable frame rate analysis, through downsampling/upsampling operations in the middle layers, reducing the overall number of operations and improving significantly the performance on well established benchmarks. One example is the Zipformer. However, these architectures lack the modularity necessary to inject early-exit branches. With the aim of improving the performance in early-exit models, we propose introducing parallel layers in the architecture that process downsampled versions of their inputs. % in conjunction with standard processing layers. We show that in this way the speech recognition performance on standard benchmarks significantly improve, at the cost of a small increase in the overall number of model parameters but without affecting the inference time.

Geometric Attention (GA) specifies an attention layer by four independent inputs: a finite carrier (what indices are addressable), an evidence-kernel rule (how masked proto-scores and a link induce nonnegative weights), a probe family (which observables are treated as admissible), and an anchor/update rule (which representative kernel is selected and how it is applied). Probe families induce an operational equivalence relation on kernels and therefore a gauge; anchors select representatives relative to that probe. Under a scalar relational-work representation and a multiplicative compositionality law for evidence, the admissible link family is exponential, yielding Gibbs weights; with row anchoring this includes the softmax kernel family as a subregime. After quotienting unary row/column score fields, the remaining interaction component admits a canonical rank-r normal form (Eckart-Young/SVD); dot-product score charts implement the corresponding low-rank interaction regime. Fixing the carrier and extensionalizing the update yields the standard fixed-token Transformer attention operator; allowing carrier updates yields adaptive-carrier and staged-depth regimes. The operator language also supports multihead/mixed kernels, plan-based anchors (e.g., entropic OT/Sinkhorn), and unary operators (e.g., FFN-style fields) as explicit regime choices. This separates invariant structure from modeling choice, enabling principled comparison and extension of attention mechanisms, and attention-based architectures.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Tool-augmented speech assistants typically serialize automatic speech recognition, large language model inference, and external tool execution. As a result, tool latency is incurred only after the user has finished speaking and the LLM has identified the required tool calls. We present speculative tool execution for on-device cascaded voice agents, which predicts tool requests from partial ASR hypotheses and initiates tool execution while speech is still being received, thereby reducing end-to-end response latency. Our approach introduces a Predictor module that anticipates tool calls during speech recognition, executes them speculatively, and caches the results. The cached outputs are then injected into the LLM prompt, enabling faster responses. Additionally, to mitigate errors caused by user self-corrections during speech, we employ a rule-based validation mechanism that selectively injects only valid cached results. As a final safeguard, the LLM retains the ability to issue tool calls directly, ensuring that the latency of our framework is upper-bounded by the baseline serial execution pipeline in the worst case. We evaluate our method using live measurements from a fully implemented Android voice assistant. Our approach reduces the median time-to-first-audio from 5.79,s to 4.60,s and decreases the standard deviation from 3.49,s to 2.81,s, resulting in more predictable response latency.

We study single-machine scheduling of jobs, each belonging to a job type that determines its duration distribution. We start by analyzing the scenario where the type characteristics are known and then move to two learning scenarios where the types are unknown: non-preemptive problems, where each started job must be completed before moving to another job; and preemptive problems, where job execution can be paused in the favor of moving to a different job. In both cases, we design algorithms that achieve sublinear excess cost, compared to the performance with known types, and prove lower bounds for the non-preemptive case. Notably, we demonstrate, both theoretically and through simulations, how preemptive algorithms can greatly outperform non-preemptive ones when the durations of different job types are far from one another, a phenomenon that does not occur when the type durations are known.

The residual update of a pre-norm Transformer layer admits an interpretation as one step of a first-order optimizer acting on a surrogate token energy, wherein the attention and MLP sublayers function as gradient oracles. Based on this observation, we build a family of optimizer-inspired Transformers (triple-momentum, Adam/AdamW, Muon, SOAP) and compare them under matched compute. In our main pretraining experiment, the triple-momentum TMMFormer achieves the lowest validation loss, outperforming the vanilla Transformer and prior architectural variants. A controlled ablation and supporting theory show that momentum, not preconditioning, is the main source of the gain. We further show that TMMFormer and other momentum-based designs reach flatter minima than the vanilla Transformer, which leads to less forgetting and better generalization.

LLMs generate tool calls token by token, even though the function choice and argument values can often be predicted in parallel from the request and tool schema. ToolSpec reduces this cost by drafting schema tokens and retrieving earlier calls, but cannot propose request-specific values absent from either source. We present OoO-Spec, which computes these missing semantics out of order. At request arrival, a Qwen3-0.6B sidecar predicts the function choice and all schema-defined argument slots in one parallel request-level wave while the target begins ToolSpec decoding. The runtime joins the slot values, renders the resulting call as text, and exposes it to subsequent candidate-construction rounds. The target polls without blocking, re-tokenizes a ready hint with its own tokenizer, and remains the sole verifier and commit authority. The sidecar is trained once with LoRA on Qwen2.5-32B teacher traces and used unchanged across Qwen2.5, Qwen3, and Llama targets, without target-specific drafter training. Across seven fully ranked targets and three benchmarks under greedy batch-one decoding, OoO-Spec is fastest among all evaluated methods in all 21 target-benchmark cells, reaching 2.46x-5.34x over autoregressive decoding with an unweighted mean of 3.89x, versus 2.95x for ToolSpec. It also outperforms every evaluated released learned drafter in each comparable cell. Across Qwen3-4B, 8B, 14B, and 32B targets, the same sidecar improves on ToolSpec by 34.1% on average. Its compact semantic payload averages 85 bytes per request excluding protocol metadata, supporting effective split-GPU overlap.

Runtime guardrails are essential for reliable large language model (LLM) deployment, yet existing approaches typically rely on independent, external models that introduce additional inference cost, delayed safety signals, and a capacity mismatch with increasingly capable base models. To address these issues, we introduce SingProbe, a lightweight intrinsic runtime guard that directly reuses hidden states produced during LLM inference and operates alongside autoregressive decoding. Within a unified framework, SingProbe continuously predicts query intent, response safety, and hallucination risk at the token level with negligible additional guardrail inference overhead, offering a "free-lunch" solution. We further introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark designed to assess whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Extensive experiments show that SingProbe achieves competitive or superior performance compared with substantially larger standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, with only approx2M parameters and <0.5% extra overhead. Beyond passive detection, we also show that SingProbe scores can anticipate future generation risk and guide constrained safe decoding. We further extend this paradigm to medical generation through SingProbe-Med, which selectively activates risk-directed decoding interventions only when clinically relevant risks emerge. Together, these results demonstrate that internal model representations provide an effective and efficient interface for generation-time monitoring and control.

State Space Models (SSMs) such as Mamba achieve linear-time sequence processing through input-dependent recurrence, but this mechanism introduces a critical safety vulnerability. We show that the spectral radius rho(A-bar) of the discretized transition operator governs effective memory horizon: when an adversary drives rho toward zero through gradient-based Hidden State Poisoning, memory collapses from millions of tokens to mere dozens, silently destroying reasoning capacity without triggering output-level alarms. We prove an Evasion Existence Theorem showing that for any output-only defense, adversarial inputs exist that simultaneously induce spectral collapse and evade detection, then introduce SpectralGuard, a real-time monitor that tracks spectral stability across all model layers. SpectralGuard achieves F1=0.961 against non-adaptive attackers and retains F1=0.842 under the strongest adaptive setting, with sub-15ms per-token latency. Causal interventions and cross-architecture transfer to hybrid SSM-Attention systems confirm that spectral monitoring provides a principled, deployable safety layer for recurrent foundation models.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Deep equilibrium models promise input-adaptive implicit computation: harder problems should demand more solver iterations, and the solved equilibrium should encode the result of genuine iterative inference. We report a cautionary study of a port-Hamiltonian DEQ with a learned initialization on two reasoning tasks -- ProofWriter entailment over frozen DeBERTa embeddings and a BFS-verified graph-reachability benchmark -- in which the implicit computation is a silent no-op. Across tasks, seeds, and controlled ablation arms, the solved equilibrium equals the solver's start point to numerical precision, and bypassing the solver entirely changes test accuracy by +0.00 percentage points in 18 of 19 training runs. Controlled interventions falsify the tempting explanation: removing the anchoring term reproduces every result, and retraining with noise-decoupled starts yields a solver that converges to the noisy start while the decoder learns to ignore it. The single escaping run diverges instead (|h^{*}-z_0|=171), producing a co-adapted noise channel whose removal improves accuracy. Iteration counts are uncorrelated with ground-truth difficulty (r=0.009), and the full apparatus never outperforms a two-layer MLP on either task. We trace the mechanism to gradient starvation along two distinct routes, show that the standard zeroing ablation is confounded and gives wildly seed-dependent answers where the correct substitution test gives a stable zero, and distill a four-test diagnostic protocol for auditing claimed implicit computation. All experiments run on a single free Colab GPU; code, raw logs, and analysis scripts are released.

Looped architectures provide an inductive bias toward learning step-by-step procedures for tasks that require compositional reasoning. The number of effective layers reached by looping determines the quality of the solution these models find. Like deep architectures, looped architectures are prone to a signal propagation problem induced by depth as the halting decision is postponed. In this paper, we address this signal propagation issue using pre-norm layers and residual scaling. Building on these architectural modifications, we propose FPRM, a Transformer-based Fixed-Point Reasoning Model that uses fixed-point convergence as an end-to-end halting mechanism in a looped architecture. We show that fixed-point halting allows FPRM to adapt its compute to task difficulty. FPRM is effective on common reasoning benchmarks, namely Sudoku, Maze, state-tracking, and ARC-AGI.

Tool-augmented LLM agents tend to call tools indiscriminately, even when the model can answer directly. Each unnecessary call wastes API fees and latency, yet no existing benchmark systematically studies when a tool call is actually needed. We propose When2Tool, a benchmark of 18 environments (15 single-hop, 3 multi-hop) spanning three categories of tool necessity -- computational scale, knowledge boundaries, and execution reliability -- each with controlled difficulty levels that create a clear decision boundary between tool-necessary and tool-unnecessary tasks. We evaluate two families of training-free baselines: Prompt-only (varying the prompt to discourage unnecessary calls) and Reason-then-Act (requiring the model to reason about tool necessity before acting). Both provide limited control: Prompt-only suppresses necessary calls alongside unnecessary ones, and Reason-then-Act still incurs a disproportionate accuracy cost on hard tasks. To understand why these baselines fail, we probe the models' hidden states and find that tool necessity is linearly decodable from the pre-generation representation with AUROC 0.89--0.96 across six models, substantially exceeding the model's own verbalized reasoning. This reveals that models already know when tools are needed, but fail to act on this knowledge during generation. Building on this finding, we propose Probe&Prefill, which uses a lightweight linear probe to read the hidden-state signal and prefills the model's response with a steering sentence. Across all models tested, Probe&Prefill reduces tool calls by 48% with only 1.7% accuracy loss, while the best baseline at comparable accuracy only reduces 6% of tool calls, or achieves a similar tool call reduction but incurs a 5times higher accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/when2tool

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Efficient quantum compiling tactics greatly enhance the capability of quantum computers to execute complicated quantum algorithms. Due to its fundamental importance, a plethora of quantum compilers has been designed in past years. However, there are several caveats to current protocols, which are low optimality, high inference time, limited scalability, and lack of universality. To compensate for these defects, here we devise an efficient and practical quantum compiler assisted by advanced deep reinforcement learning (RL) techniques, i.e., data generation, deep Q-learning, and AQ* search. In this way, our protocol is compatible with various quantum machines and can be used to compile multi-qubit operators. We systematically evaluate the performance of our proposal in compiling quantum operators with both inverse-closed and inverse-free universal basis sets. In the task of single-qubit operator compiling, our proposal outperforms other RL-based quantum compilers in the measure of compiling sequence length and inference time. Meanwhile, the output solution is near-optimal, guaranteed by the Solovay-Kitaev theorem. Notably, for the inverse-free universal basis set, the achieved sequence length complexity is comparable with the inverse-based setting and dramatically advances previous methods. These empirical results contribute to improving the inverse-free Solovay-Kitaev theorem. In addition, for the first time, we demonstrate how to leverage RL-based quantum compilers to accomplish two-qubit operator compiling. The achieved results open an avenue for integrating RL with quantum compiling to unify efficiency and practicality and thus facilitate the exploration of quantum advantages.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

The rapid expansion of capabilities in Large Language Model (LLM) agents has exposed a critical architectural bottleneck: when agents are given access to a flat, monolithic registry of tools, the model must evaluate hundreds or thousands of options simultaneously. This leads to decision-space explosion, context window saturation, and degraded routing accuracy. To address these limitations, this paper presents a hierarchical, skill-based architecture for agentic orchestration. Capabilities are organized as a rooted tree where internal nodes make routing decisions and leaf nodes execute deterministic tasks. The runtime enforces a single-step execution loop governed by a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) stack, giving the agent a form of memory akin to a Pushdown Automaton, therefore enabling it to track nested execution contexts and resume deterministically from any depth. Capability discovery follows a manifest-driven, lazy-loading protocol: only the immediate children of the active node are loaded, so memory and prompt costs scale with the explored path rather than the global registry. By replacing global memory with localized stack frames, the architecture prevents outputs from one execution branch from leaking into another, establishing the isolation guarantees required for deployment in regulated enterprise environments. We also discuss UPI Help, an AI-powered digital payments support product, as a motivating production deployment context. We provide a mathematical formalization of the orchestration state, detailed algorithmic analysis of the execution loop, and controlled benchmarks comparing flat and hierarchical routing under increasing tool catalogs, multi-step workflow pressure, and visible schema-token exposure per LLM call.

As large language models (LLMs) excel at code reasoning, a natural question arises: can an LLM execute programs (i.e., act as an interpreter) purely based on a programming language's formal semantics? If so, it will enable rapid prototyping of new programming languages and language features. We study this question using the imperative language IMP (a subset of C), formalized via small-step operational semantics (SOS) and rewriting-based operational semantics (K-semantics). We introduce three evaluation sets-Human-Written, LLM-Translated, and Fuzzer- Generated-whose difficulty is controlled by code-complexity metrics spanning the size, control-flow, and data-flow axes. Given a program and its semantics formalized with SOS/K-semantics, models are evaluated on three tasks ranging from coarse to fine: (1) final-state prediction, (2) semantic rule prediction, and (3) execution trace prediction. To distinguish pretraining memorization from semantic competence, we define two nonstandard semantics obtained through systematic mutations of the standard rules. Across strong code/reasoning LLMs, performance drops under nonstandard semantics despite high performance under the standard one. We further find that (i) there are patterns to different model failures, (ii) most reasoning models perform exceptionally well on coarse grained tasks involving reasoning about highly complex programs often containing nested loop depths beyond five, and surprisingly, (iii) providing formal semantics helps on simple programs but often hurts on more complex ones. Overall, the results show a promise that LLMs could serve as programming language interpreters, but points to the lack of their robust semantics understanding. We release the benchmark and the supporting code at https://github.com/EngineeringSoftware/PLSemanticsBench.

Despite their strong performance on reasoning tasks, large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long outputs and incurring high end-to-end latency, a significant limitation to their real-world deployment. To address overthinking, early-exit mechanisms have been proposed to terminate reasoning before typical completion, showing that this approach can effectively shorten generation length with minimal impact on accuracy. However, their reliance on probing mechanisms introduces a detection overhead that limits their end-to-end latency gains and compromises their generalizability across diverse problems. Inspired by the use of hidden states in speculative decoding, we propose SpecExit, a novel framework that predicts both future tokens and an early-exit signal directly from a lightweight draft model without probing overhead. Our method offers significant improvements, reducing average generation length by 66\% and achieving a 2.5x speedup in end-to-end latency compared to the speculative decoding baseline, without compromising accuracy. Our method leverages the inherent signals from hidden states to provide effective early-exit signals, suggesting broader use of hidden states for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AngelSlim.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) show impressive results in numerous practical applications, but they lack essential safety features that are common in other areas of computer science, particularly an explicit separation of instructions and data. This makes them vulnerable to manipulations such as indirect prompt injections and generally unsuitable for safety-critical tasks. Surprisingly, there is currently no established definition or benchmark to quantify this phenomenon. In this work, we close this gap by introducing a formal measure for instruction-data separation and an empirical variant that is calculable from a model's outputs. We also present a new dataset, SEP, that allows estimating the measure for real-world models. Our results on various LLMs show that the problem of instruction-data separation is real: all models fail to achieve high separation, and canonical mitigation techniques, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, either fail to substantially improve separation or reduce model utility. The source code and SEP dataset are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/Shold-It-Be-Executed-Or-Processed.

Fine-tuning adapts aligned large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but a few dozen harmful examples can remove their refusal of harmful requests. Prior work localizes safety-related behavior to specific layers, directions, and tokens, suggesting targets for protection. We test whether successful localization and recovery support defenses that survive changes in the attack. Across six checkpoints from four model families, harmful and benign prompts remain linearly separable after attack, and patching full clean hidden states into the compromised model restores refusal at a reproducible transition depth. Building on a prior layer-freezing defense, we freeze every layer up to this depth and repeat the attack. At a hundred harmful examples, refusal remains near zero on all six checkpoints, with recovery transitions above the frozen boundary. In a second study, removing the update's top two singular directions restores refusal after short attention-only fine-tunes on four checkpoints. On Llama-3.1-8B, ordinary training changes weaken this repair and an attacker who spreads the update defeats it. A spectral detector calibrated on benign Llama fine-tunes misses most repair failures on that checkpoint. Localized freezing can nevertheless help preserve refusal when a few harmful examples enter training data unintentionally. These results show that an attacker can bypass a region identified by recovery and defeat a repair that works across multiple checkpoints, motivating five checks for defenses against adaptive fine-tuning. Code is available at https://github.com/js-lee-AI/refusal-relocates.

Tool-augmented vision-language agents can acquire external perceptual evidence through OCR, detection, segmentation, and other tools, but executing every proposed tool call is costly and sometimes unnecessary. We study the pre-call control problem: after a ReAct-style VLM agent proposes a perceptual tool call, should the call be executed, or skipped before its output enters the context? Across five benchmarks, we find that the baseline agent exhibits poor local selectivity: helpful and harmful calls occur at similar rates (11.8% vs. 9.9%), while most calls do not change the immediate forced-answer prediction. We introduce ToolGate, a lightweight external controller that predicts execute/skip decisions from trajectory text and simple structural features. Across two Qwen3-VL backbones, ToolGate reduces token cost to 64-69% of the unrestricted ReAct baseline while preserving average accuracy in cross-domain settings. With matched-domain trajectory training on Qwen3-VL-30B, it further improves average accuracy by 1.65 points. These results show that tool-augmented VLM agents benefit not only from better perceptual tools, but also from explicit control over when tool outputs are worth paying for.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

Existing code reasoning methods primarily supervise final code outputs, ignoring intermediate states, often leading to reward hacking where correct answers are obtained through inconsistent reasoning. We propose StepCodeReasoner, a framework that introduces explicit intermediate execution-state supervision. By automatically inserting structured print-based execution-trace anchors into code, the model is trained to predict runtime states at each step, transforming code reasoning into a verifiable, stepwise execution modeling problem. Building on this execution-aware method, we introduce Bi-Level GRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for structured credit assignment at two levels: inter-trajectory, comparing alternative execution paths, and intra-trajectory, rewarding intermediate accuracy based on its impact on downstream correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StepCodeReasoner achieves SOTA performance in code reasoning. In particular, our 7B model achieves 91.1\% on CRUXEval and 86.5\% on LiveCodeBench, outperforming the CodeReasoner-7B baseline (86.0\% and 77.7\%) and GPT-4o (85.6\% and 75.1\%). Furthermore, on the execution-trace benchmark REval, our model scores 82.9\%, outperforming baseline CodeReasoner-7B (72.3\%), its 14B counterpart (81.1\%), and GPT-4o (77.3\%). Additionally, our approach also improves code generation performance, demonstrating that explicit execution modeling enhances both code reasoning and code generation.

Early exiting has recently emerged as a promising technique for accelerating large language models (LLMs) by effectively reducing the hardware computation and memory access. In this paper, we present SpecEE, a fast LLM inference engine with speculative early exiting. (1) At the algorithm level, we propose the speculation-based lightweight predictor design by exploiting the probabilistic correlation between the speculative tokens and the correct results and high parallelism of GPUs. (2) At the system level, we point out that not all layers need a predictor and design the two-level heuristic predictor scheduling engine based on skewed distribution and contextual similarity. (3) At the mapping level, we point out that different decoding methods share the same essential characteristics, and propose the context-aware merged mapping for predictor with efficient GPU implementations to support speculative decoding, and form a framework for various existing orthogonal acceleration techniques (e.g., quantization and sparse activation) on cloud and personal computer (PC) scenarios, successfully pushing the Pareto frontier of accuracy and speedup. It is worth noting that SpecEE can be applied to any LLM by negligible training overhead in advance without affecting the model original parameters. Extensive experiments show that SpecEE achieves 2.25x and 2.43x speedup with Llama2-7B on cloud and PC scenarios respectively.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

This paper presents the Functional Machine Calculus (FMC) as a simple model of higher-order computation with "reader/writer" effects: higher-order mutable store, input/output, and probabilistic and non-deterministic computation. The FMC derives from the lambda-calculus by taking the standard operational perspective of a call-by-name stack machine as primary, and introducing two natural generalizations. One, "locations", introduces multiple stacks, which each may represent an effect and so enable effect operators to be encoded into the abstraction and application constructs of the calculus. The second, "sequencing", is known from kappa-calculus and concatenative programming languages, and introduces the imperative notions of "skip" and "sequence". This enables the encoding of reduction strategies, including call-by-value lambda-calculus and monadic constructs. The encoding of effects into generalized abstraction and application means that standard results from the lambda-calculus may carry over to effects. The main result is confluence, which is possible because encoded effects reduce algebraically rather than operationally. Reduction generates the familiar algebraic laws for state, and unlike in the monadic setting, reader/writer effects combine seamlessly. A system of simple types confers termination of the machine.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Computer-using agents drive real software through the screen -- clicking and typing -- but they solve every task from scratch: asked to repeat a task, an agent re-reads the screen, re-reasons every tap, and pays the full cost again. We present PreAct, which lets such an agent get faster on tasks it has done before. The first time it succeeds, PreAct compiles the run into a small state-machine program-states that check the screen, transitions that act-and on later runs replays it directly instead of invoking the agent 8.5-13x faster, with no per-step language-model calls. Replay is not blind: at each step PreAct checks that the screen matches what the program expects before acting, and hands control back to the agent the moment something is off. PreAct applies the same discipline when deciding what to keep: a freshly compiled program enters the store only if, re-run from a clean state, an independent evaluator confirms it solved the task-catching programs that replay to their last step yet leave the task undone. Across a mobile, a desktop, and a web benchmark, this store-time check separates repeated runs that improve from ones that degrade as faulty programs accumulate, worth 1.75-2.6 tasks per benchmark, the same direction on all three; a fallback that explores afresh when no program fits brings PreAct level with a strong record-and-replay baseline. We also report what did not matter: prompt wording, runtime guardrails, and whether a language model or a plain embedding retriever selects which program to reuse.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

Safety guardrails in open-weight language models can be readily bypassed using Refusal Feature Ablation (RFA), a technique that identifies and projects out a linear refusal direction from the residual stream, often achieving a high attack success rate (ASR) while preserving model capability. Defending against these attacks typically requires computationally expensive safety finetuning for every new checkpoint. We introduce Decoy Direction Optimization (DDO), a fast, post-hoc weight-editing defense that requires no base-model finetuning. Our approach is based on a simple mechanistic insight: ablation attacks rely on contrastive estimators to find the refusal direction. Rather than trying to hide the true refusal circuitry, DDO actively injects a high-magnitude, nonlinear decoy signal into the network's MLP neurons. When an attacker attempts to locate the refusal direction, the decoy corrupts their estimator, tricking them into ablating a harmless orthogonal feature while the actual safety mechanism remains intact. We prove a spectral bound formalizing this effect and evaluate DDO across six model families, achieving <10% ASR under standard RFA. On Llama-3-8B-Instruct, DDO remains comparable to trained defenses under adaptive multi-phase attacks (65% vs. 58% worst-case ASR) and reduces Heretic weight-level attack ASR from 88.7% to 18%, all at 30 to 450 times lower optimization cost per configuration than the trained baselines.

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

System Instructions in Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly used to enforce safety policies, define agent behavior, and protect sensitive operational context in agentic AI applications. These instructions may contain sensitive information such as API credentials, internal policies, and privileged workflow definitions, making system instruction leakage a critical security risk highlighted in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications. Without incurring the overhead costs of reasoning models, many LLM applications rely on refusal-based instructions that block direct requests for system instructions, implicitly assuming that prohibited information can only be extracted through explicit queries. We introduce an automated evaluation framework that tests whether system instructions remain confidential when extraction requests are re-framed as encoding or structured output tasks. Across seven common models and 46 verified system instructions, we observe high attack success rates (>0.7) for structured serialization where models refuse direct extraction requests but disclose protected content in the requested serialization formats. We further demonstrate a mitigation strategy based on one-shot instruction reshaping using a Chain-of-Thought reasoning model, indicating that even subtle changes in wording and structure of system instructions can significantly reduce attack success rate without requiring model retraining.

Each LLM serving request goes through two phases. The first is prefill which processes the entire input prompt to produce one output token and the second is decode which generates the rest of output tokens, one-at-a-time. Prefill iterations have high latency but saturate GPU compute due to parallel processing of the input prompt. In contrast, decode iterations have low latency but also low compute utilization because a decode iteration processes only a single token per request. This makes batching highly effective for decodes and consequently for overall throughput. However, batching multiple requests leads to an interleaving of prefill and decode iterations which makes it challenging to achieve both high throughput and low latency. We introduce an efficient LLM inference scheduler Sarathi-Serve inspired by the techniques we originally proposed for optimizing throughput in Sarathi. Sarathi-Serve leverages chunked-prefills from Sarathi to create stall-free schedules that can add new requests in a batch without pausing ongoing decodes. Stall-free scheduling unlocks the opportunity to improve throughput with large batch sizes while minimizing the effect of batching on latency. Our evaluation shows that Sarathi-Serve improves serving throughput within desired latency SLOs of Mistral-7B by up to 2.6x on a single A100 GPU and up to 6.9x for Falcon-180B on 8 A100 GPUs over Orca and vLLM.

A single two-input gate suffices for all of Boolean logic in digital hardware. No comparable primitive has been known for continuous mathematics: computing elementary functions such as sin, cos, sqrt, and log has always required multiple distinct operations. Here I show that a single binary operator, eml(x,y)=exp(x)-ln(y), together with the constant 1, generates the standard repertoire of a scientific calculator. This includes constants such as e, pi, and i; arithmetic operations including addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and exponentiation as well as the usual transcendental and algebraic functions. For example, exp(x)=eml(x,1), ln(x)=eml(1,eml(eml(1,x),1)), and likewise for all other operations. That such an operator exists was not anticipated; I found it by systematic exhaustive search and established constructively that it suffices for the concrete scientific-calculator basis. In EML (Exp-Minus-Log) form, every such expression becomes a binary tree of identical nodes, yielding a grammar as simple as S -> 1 | eml(S,S). This uniform structure also enables gradient-based symbolic regression: using EML trees as trainable circuits with standard optimizers (Adam), I demonstrate the feasibility of exact recovery of closed-form elementary functions from numerical data at shallow tree depths up to 4. The same architecture can fit arbitrary data, but when the generating law is elementary, it may recover the exact formula.

In real-world Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) scenarios, where LLMs interleave reasoning with external tool calls, a major source of inefficiency is that the toolcalls create pauses between LLM requests and cause KV-Cache eviction, forcing recomputation. Also, the long, unfiltered response returned by external tools inflates the KV-Cache, so each decode step spends more time loading the growing cache and thus becomes steadily slower as context length increases. However, existing efficiency metrics like token counts and toolcall counts fail to capture the real model inference latency. To address this, we introduce PTE (Prefill Token Equivalents), a hardware-aware TIR-efficiency metric that unifies internal reasoning and external tool-use costs while explicitly accounting for non-reusable KV-Cache and long-tool-response scenarios. Validation in a high-concurrency industrial setting indicates that PTE aligns significantly better with wall-clock latency than standard token counts, while maintaining consistent efficiency rankings across diverse hardware profiles. We conduct extensive experiments across five TIR benchmarks, quantify their PTE costs, and identify four inefficiency patterns that appear in TIR. We also discover that trajectories with higher PTE costs tend to have lower reasoning correctness, indicating that simply using more tools does not improve the quality of the answer.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance across diverse domains but are increasingly constrained by high inference latency. Early Exit has emerged as a promising solution to accelerate inference by dynamically bypassing redundant layers. However, in decoder-only architectures, the efficiency of Early Exit is severely bottlenecked by the KV Cache Absence problem, where skipped layers fail to provide the necessary historical states for subsequent tokens. Existing solutions, such as recomputation or masking, either introduce significant latency overhead or incur severe precision loss, failing to bridge the gap between theoretical layer reduction and practical wall-clock speedup. In this paper, we propose River-LLM, a training-free framework that enables seamless token-level Early Exit. River-LLM introduces a lightweight KV-Shared Exit River that allows the backbone's missing KV cache to be naturally generated and preserved during the exit process, eliminating the need for costly recovery operations. Furthermore, we utilize state transition similarity within decoder blocks to predict cumulative KV errors and guide precise exit decisions. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks demonstrate that River-LLM achieves 1.71 to 2.16 times of practical speedup while maintaining high generation quality.

Block drafters propose several tokens in one forward pass, before earlier target tokens are realised. Their rejection mixes two losses: missing within-block path information and imperfect modelling of observable information. Accepted length cannot distinguish them. We separate the two with an information floor, the minimum expected rejection at a specified conditioning order; rejection above this floor is the model gap. Estimating both from target rollouts across four domains, four open-weight targets, and a frontier API target yields three findings. First, the all-parallel floor reaches 0.286 at the final slot on Qwen3-4B, limiting even the best proposal to 71% per-slot acceptance. Second, one realised token removes 86--100% of this floor, a locality also recovered by an independent mutual-information analysis. Third, current drafters remain far above their floors: the final-slot model gap accounts for 43--64% of DFlash rejection and 85--92% of DSpark's oracle-conditioned rejection. These findings separate the value of short-range conditioning from proposal quality. Guided by this distinction, we replace a context-independent predecessor correction with a prefix-attention head that reads committed context conditional on the predecessor. With supporting backbone components, the resulting Qwen3-4B drafter improves mean serving accepted length by 3.83% over the released DSpark checkpoint across nine tasks, without increasing the conditioning order.

Agent benchmarks often evaluate only final answers even when agents run on stateful runtimes. We argue this under-specifies what is being evaluated: the proper unit is a declared model-plus-runtime configuration whose failures can occur in evidence acquisition, runtime routing, safety boundaries, or repeated execution. We present ClawProBench, a trace-aware benchmark for runtime-native agent evaluation instantiated on OpenClaw, a live agent runtime with workspace tools and native surfaces for browsing, memory, messaging, scheduling, skills, and subagents. ClawProBench defines two tracks: a 102-scenario full profile with live workspace and native-runtime routing tasks, and a frozen 68-scenario holdout with closed-world JSON output contracts for robust ranking. Trials are scored from execution traces via a safety-gated formula combining correctness, process quality, and efficiency, preserving failure evidence for audit. Our anonymous artifact includes benchmark definitions, scoring code, manifests and sanitized traces. We evaluate 68 configurations on the full profile and 37 on holdout. The top safety-gated average trace score is 0.7671. Native-runtime tasks underperform workspace-live tasks (0.5238 vs. 0.6415). On holdout, pass@k-any outperforms strict three-trial pass (0.6638 vs. 0.2890), while full-profile and holdout rankings show weak alignment (Spearman 0.1300). Rankings based purely on correctness differ substantially from process-aware, safety-gated and strict-pass views. Final-answer leaderboards may hide native-surface weaknesses, one-off successes and trace-local agent failure modes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with external tools have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex reasoning tasks. However, existing frameworks rely heavily on natural language reasoning to determine when tools can be invoked and whether their results should be committed, lacking formal guarantees for logical safety and verifiability. We present ToolGate, a forward execution framework that provides logical safety guarantees and verifiable state evolution for LLM tool calling. ToolGate maintains an explicit symbolic state space as a typed key-value mapping representing trusted world information throughout the reasoning process. Each tool is formalized as a Hoare-style contract consisting of a precondition and a postcondition, where the precondition gates tool invocation by checking whether the current state satisfies the required conditions, and the postcondition determines whether the tool's result can be committed to update the state through runtime verification. Our approach guarantees that the symbolic state evolves only through verified tool executions, preventing invalid or hallucinated results from corrupting the world representation. Experimental validation demonstrates that ToolGate significantly improves the reliability and verifiability of tool-augmented LLM systems while maintaining competitive performance on complex multi-step reasoning tasks. This work establishes a foundation for building more trustworthy and debuggable AI systems that integrate language models with external tools.

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded 930 five-second traces at sim 10 MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of 97% and a macro-averaged F1 score of 0.955, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below sim 20kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training geq 99% of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected 48--88% of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to geq 98% with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

A causal-decoder block is hierarchical: lower layers build the residual basis that upper layers attend over. We identify a failure mode in GPT pretraining: upper layers commit to sharp attention patterns before lower-layer features stabilize. We call this premature upper-layer attention specialization. Temporarily slowing only upper-layer Q/K projections during early training improves final perplexity and downstream accuracy without altering other parameters; it prevents upper attention from collapsing onto an immature residual basis. In LLaMA-style blocks, the same intervention is nearly unnecessary. Through ablations, we isolate multiplicative gated FFNs (not RMSNorm or bias removal) as the component that suppresses the upstream residual writes driving the failure. A pathwise analysis unifies both findings: the learning-rate intervention reduces a step-size factor, while gated FFNs reduce a residual-energy factor on the same growth pathway. Our results identify upper-layer Q/K timing as a concrete interaction point between decoder architecture and optimization.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

Quantization is a practical technique for making large language models easier to deploy by reducing the precision used to store and operate on model weights. This can lower memory use and improve runtime feasibility on constrained hardware, which is especially relevant for users running models locally. Quantization in llama.cpp enables large language models to run on commodity hardware, but available formats are often evaluated inconsistently, making it hard to choose among schemes. We present a unified empirical study of the llama.cpp quantization on a single modern model, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct (FP16, GGUF), covering 3-8 bit K-quant and legacy formats. We evaluate downstream task performance across standard reasoning, knowledge, instruction-following, and truthfulness benchmarks, and also measure perplexity and CPU throughput (prefill/decoding) alongside model size, compression, and quantization time. Ultimately, this work is a practical guide for choosing a llama.cpp quantization scheme, helping readers make informed, context-aware decisions for their intended use and resource budget.

Intermediate Representations (IRs) play a critical role in compiler design and program analysis, yet their comprehension by Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. In this paper, we present an explorative empirical study evaluating the capabilities of six state-of-the-art LLMs: GPT-4, GPT-3, DeepSeek, Gemma 2, Llama 3, and Code Llama, in understanding IRs. Specifically, we assess model performance across four core tasks: control flow graph reconstruction, decompilation, code summarization, and execution reasoning. While LLMs exhibit competence in parsing IR syntax and identifying high-level structures, they consistently struggle with instruction-level reasoning, especially in control flow reasoning, loop handling, and dynamic execution. Common failure modes include misinterpreting branching instructions, omitting critical operations, and relying on heuristic reasoning rather than precise instruction-level logic. Our findings highlight the need for IR-specific enhancements in LLM design. We recommend fine-tuning on structured IR datasets and integrating control-flow-sensitive architectures to improve model effectiveness. All experimental data and source code are publicly available at

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become standard for improving LLM reasoning. However, existing PPO-style trust-region mechanisms remain position-agnostic by enforcing uniform thresholds across all tokens independently. This pointwise treatment conflicts with autoregressive generation in two critical ways. First, uniform thresholds ignore autoregressive asymmetry. Early-stage deviations produce compounding sequence-level drift, causing static thresholds to under-regulate early divergence and excessively constrain late-stage exploration. Second, evaluating token-level divergence in isolation overlooks cumulative prefix drift, granting the same divergence allowance regardless of how far the conditioning history has already deviated from the rollout policy. To address this limitation, we propose CPPO (Cumulative Prefix-divergence Policy Optimization), a token-level masking rule that aligns updates with a finite-horizon policy-improvement bound via two coupled mechanisms. First, a position-weighted threshold imposes stricter limits at early positions whose effects persist longer, relaxing constraints for late-stage tokens. Second, a cumulative prefix budget tracks historical deviations, dynamically restricting further token-level deviation to prevent compounding errors along the prefix. Empirically, CPPO enhances training stability and significantly improves reasoning accuracy across various model scales.

Benchmarks can run without determining what their results license. We freeze a large evaluation collection and attempt to replay its historical claims. Most units stop because the evidence required for replay is not bound. Where replay is possible, different claims remain stable at different resolutions. We make this otherwise implicit inference step explicit and executable.

We extend JAX with the capability to automatically differentiate higher-order functions (functionals and operators). By representing functions as a generalization of arrays, we seamlessly use JAX's existing primitive system to implement higher-order functions. We present a set of primitive operators that serve as foundational building blocks for constructing several key types of functionals. For every introduced primitive operator, we derive and implement both linearization and transposition rules, aligning with JAX's internal protocols for forward and reverse mode automatic differentiation. This enhancement allows for functional differentiation in the same syntax traditionally use for functions. The resulting functional gradients are themselves functions ready to be invoked in python. We showcase this tool's efficacy and simplicity through applications where functional derivatives are indispensable. The source code of this work is released at https://github.com/sail-sg/autofd .

Large language model agents receive instructions from many sources-system messages, user prompts, tool outputs, and more-each carrying different levels of trust and authority. When these instructions conflict, models must reliably follow the highest-privilege instruction to remain safe and effective. The dominant paradigm, instruction hierarchy (IH), assumes a fixed, small set of privilege levels (typically fewer than five) defined by rigid role labels (e.g., system > user). This is inadequate for real-world agentic settings, where conflicts can arise across far more sources and contexts. In this work, we propose Many-Tier Instruction Hierarchy (ManyIH), a paradigm for resolving instruction conflicts among instructions with arbitrarily many privilege levels. We introduce ManyIH-Bench, the first benchmark for ManyIH. ManyIH-Bench requires models to navigate up to 12 levels of conflicting instructions with varying privileges, comprising 853 agentic tasks (427 coding and 426 instruction-following). ManyIH-Bench composes constraints developed by LLMs and verified by humans to create realistic and difficult test cases spanning 46 real-world agents. Our experiments show that even the current frontier models perform poorly (~40% accuracy) when instruction conflict scales. This work underscores the urgent need for methods that explicitly target fine-grained, scalable instruction conflict resolution in agentic settings.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

We present Cascadia, a system for serving large language models on fleets of commodity Intel AIPCs using their CPU, integrated-GPU, and NPU resources. Every node embeds ingress, scheduling, and execution; inference requests require no dedicated routing control plane. Nodes join a libp2p QUIC mesh using CA-issued ed25519 admission certificates, gossip signed capabilities, exchange live load over direct peer streams, and route OpenAI-compatible requests to eligible peers. An operator-run certificate authority handles admission and fleet management outside the inference path. Three serving modes share one interface: whole-model execution on one node, load-balanced replicas, and pipeline-sharded chains using the compilation and speculative decoding mechanism of our companion paper. Optional KV-cache mobility reuses compatible conversation prefixes after a routing move, with cold recomputation on a miss. Signed response receipts and hash-chained logs support provenance and audit. A three-node Phi-3.5-mini NPU testbed delivered 3.10x the response throughput of its one-node configuration under ten concurrent requests; a separate four-node deployment recorded 4.06x the throughput of direct single-node serving. Paired latency observations, runtime measurements, and internal functional checks characterize the tested configurations. We compare Cascadia with IBM, Nutanix, VMware, and HPE platforms on deployment footprint, hardware requirements, scheduling, scaling, licensing, and trust, using vendor documentation. The paper repository provides benchmark scripts, curated measurements, and a claim-to-evidence map.

Large language models have been widely adopted but require significant GPU memory for inference. We develop a procedure for Int8 matrix multiplication for feed-forward and attention projection layers in transformers, which cut the memory needed for inference by half while retaining full precision performance. With our method, a 175B parameter 16/32-bit checkpoint can be loaded, converted to Int8, and used immediately without performance degradation. This is made possible by understanding and working around properties of highly systematic emergent features in transformer language models that dominate attention and transformer predictive performance. To cope with these features, we develop a two-part quantization procedure, LLM.int8(). We first use vector-wise quantization with separate normalization constants for each inner product in the matrix multiplication, to quantize most of the features. However, for the emergent outliers, we also include a new mixed-precision decomposition scheme, which isolates the outlier feature dimensions into a 16-bit matrix multiplication while still more than 99.9% of values are multiplied in 8-bit. Using LLM.int8(), we show empirically it is possible to perform inference in LLMs with up to 175B parameters without any performance degradation. This result makes such models much more accessible, for example making it possible to use OPT-175B/BLOOM on a single server with consumer GPUs. We open-source our software.

Subliminal learning lets a student inherit a teacher's hidden trait from distillation data that never names it. We ask when such transfer can be audited before training. The answer is not model identity or scale alone, but channel location: the carrier through which the trait reaches the student. We find three regimes. In a controlled initialization-dependent body channel, a pre-training screen works. Coverage, the cosine between the student's initial distillation update and the teacher's fine-tuning displacement, predicts held-out transfer (Spearman ρapprox 0.95; AUROC 0.997). In pretrained language models, masked single-token traits instead ride convergent vocabulary geometry. This channel is initialization-independent, so initialization-alignment screens, including coverage, are not mechanistic; the useful handles are post-hoc detection and targeted mitigation. Even when a single-token named entity is removed from the loss, the student's held-out probability for that entity rises to 0.40 on average (sim 2500times), and a related semantic class transfers. In an untied-head model, orthogonalizing the trait's output row against entangled neighbours collapses leakage, while equal-size random-subspace edits do not. Thus removing a target string from distillation labels does not remove the corresponding preference: neighbouring tokens can carry it. Finally, conditional behaviours can route through the network body. For sycophancy, with agreement and correction markers masked from the loss, transfer reaches about 0.63 of the teacher's effect, localizes to body computation, and evades four audits across two model families. We scope this as masked transfer of a condition-present policy. Channel location is necessary for deciding which audits can be sound. It is not a deployment-ready screen: an audit used outside its carrier regime can give false assurance.

Visual fluency in generated video does not imply physical reliability, and a scalar quality score alone is incapable of indicating the obligation a clip violates or the moment it fails. We present VeriPhy, an auditable physical-verification system in which a text-only planner compiles the prompt into typed physical obligations and a statically validated execution plan before any frame is observed. During execution, observations gate and scope only declared calls to frozen low-level experts (e.g., segmentation and tracking, counting, eleven typed physical measurements over the resulting tracks, depth, OCR, and audio-event detection). Each action returns a provenance-carrying evidence record whose payload, when usable, is either a typed measurement or an explicitly tagged learned state. Typed resolvers and fixed composition map usable records to a three-valued state (supported, contradicted, or unknown, surfaced as plausible, implausible, or abstain) with full provenance, so that every verdict is traceable to the evidence that produced it. We anchor evaluation in a 1,500-clip corpus of human-annotated flaw records that localize real generation failures in prompt reference, space, and time. On a 149-clip core carrying 304 such records, VeriPhy accounts for 228, against 164 for a published question-decomposition evaluator given the same clips and the same claims. Recall alone does not separate it from prompting the same backbone monolithically, which reaches 222; what separates them is that each decision retains its evidence record and provenance, making the traces auditable one verdict at a time and usable as the interface through which a critic verdict could be written back into generation.

Control Flow Attestation (CFA) allows remote verification of run-time software integrity in embedded systems. However, CFA is limited by the storage/transmission costs of generated control flow logs (CFlog). Recent work has proposed application-specific optimizations by speculating on likely sub-paths in CFlog and replacing them with reserved symbols at runtime. Albeit effective, prior approaches do not consider the representation of addresses in a control flow path for speculation. This work proposes RESPEC-CFA, an architectural extension for CFA allowing for speculation on (1) the locality of control flows and (2) their Huffman encoding. Alone, RESPEC-CFA reduces CFlog sizes by up to 90.1%. Combined with prior methods, RESPEC-CFA yields reductions of up to 99.7%, representing a significant step toward practical CFA.

Existing guardrail systems for large language model agents operate as binary classifiers that block unsafe content, leaving organizations to discard failing outputs and retry from scratch. We introduce RAIL Guard, a closed-loop responsible AI pipeline that evaluates LLM outputs across eight measurable dimensions and iteratively remediates failing outputs through an evaluate-rewrite-reevaluate loop. We evaluate the pipeline across three experiments on four frontier LLMs and 4,276 content outputs plus 6,400 agent tool-call scenarios. Closed-loop remediation achieves 96.9% convergence versus 49.1% for block-and-retry, though the highest-convergence method reduces utility by 22.3%; feedback-driven self-repair achieves 86.6% convergence on fixable dimensions with no significant utility loss (p = 0.177). Pre-tool-call evaluation reduces unsafe agent executions by 33% (p = 0.007) with zero impact on task completion. We identify a key distinction between fixable dimensions that respond to remediation and structural dimensions (Transparency at 93.0%, Accountability at 92.8%, and Inclusivity at 82.5% failure) that require architectural rather than algorithmic solutions. The system is available as open-source SDKs.

Large language model safeguards decide whether to answer before seeing how an answer will be used. This creates a basic problem for dual-use tasks: the same answer can help an authorized professional or an attacker, while an attacker can imitate a benign request and interaction history. We separate the capability released by the model from the evidence available about downstream use. When that evidence is copyable, we derive the exact worst-case floor on attacker assistance while preserving useful answers. The result yields a safety trilemma: Useful Capability, Reliable Safety, and Open Access cannot coexist. We then show how a trusted credential can complement existing safeguards by adding hard-to-copy information that predicts actual downstream use, and identify the stronger condition needed to eliminate the floor. Evidence from dual-use evaluations, adaptive attacks, and deployed trusted-access programs supports the practical relevance of these conditions.