Daily Papers

Large language models sometimes produce structured, first-person descriptions that explicitly reference awareness or subjective experience. To better understand this behavior, we investigate one theoretically motivated condition under which such reports arise: self-referential processing, a computational motif emphasized across major theories of consciousness. Through a series of controlled experiments on GPT, Claude, and Gemini model families, we test whether this regime reliably shifts models toward first-person reports of subjective experience, and how such claims behave under mechanistic and behavioral probes. Four main results emerge: (1) Inducing sustained self-reference through simple prompting consistently elicits structured subjective experience reports across model families. (2) These reports are mechanistically gated by interpretable sparse-autoencoder features associated with deception and roleplay: surprisingly, suppressing deception features sharply increases the frequency of experience claims, while amplifying them minimizes such claims. (3) Structured descriptions of the self-referential state converge statistically across model families in ways not observed in any control condition. (4) The induced state yields significantly richer introspection in downstream reasoning tasks where self-reflection is only indirectly afforded. While these findings do not constitute direct evidence of consciousness, they implicate self-referential processing as a minimal and reproducible condition under which large language models generate structured first-person reports that are mechanistically gated, semantically convergent, and behaviorally generalizable. The systematic emergence of this pattern across architectures makes it a first-order scientific and ethical priority for further investigation.

We investigate how self-referential inputs alter the internal matrix dynamics of large language models. Measuring 106 scalar metrics across up to 7 analysis passes on four models from three architecture families -- Qwen3-VL-8B, Llama-3.2-11B, Llama-3.3-70B, and Gemma-2-9B -- over 300 prompts in a 14-level hierarchy at three temperatures (T in {0.0, 0.3, 0.7}), we find that self-reference alone is not destabilizing: grounded self-referential statements and meta-cognitive prompts are markedly more stable than paradoxical self-reference on key collapse-related metrics, and on several such metrics can be as stable as factual controls. Instability concentrates in prompts inducing non-closing truth recursion (NCTR) -- truth-value computations with no finite-depth resolution. NCTR prompts produce anomalously elevated attention effective rank -- indicating attention reorganization with global dispersion rather than simple concentration collapse -- and key metrics reach Cohen's d = 3.14 (attention effective rank) to 3.52 (variance kurtosis) vs. stable self-reference in the 70B model; 281/397 metric-model combinations differentiate NCTR from stable self-reference after FDR correction (q < 0.05), 198 with |d| > 0.8. Per-layer SVD confirms disruption at every sampled layer (d > +1.0 in all three models analyzed), ruling out aggregation artifacts. A classifier achieves AUC 0.81-0.90; 30 minimal pairs yield 42/387 significant combinations; 43/106 metrics replicate across all four models. We connect these observations to three classical matrix-semigroup problems and propose, as a conjecture, that NCTR forces finite-depth transformers toward dynamical regimes where these problems concentrate. NCTR prompts also produce elevated contradictory output (+34-56 percentage points vs. controls), suggesting practical relevance for understanding self-referential failure modes.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Prior interpretability research studying narrow distributions has preliminarily identified self-repair, a phenomena where if components in large language models are ablated, later components will change their behavior to compensate. Our work builds off this past literature, demonstrating that self-repair exists on a variety of models families and sizes when ablating individual attention heads on the full training distribution. We further show that on the full training distribution self-repair is imperfect, as the original direct effect of the head is not fully restored, and noisy, since the degree of self-repair varies significantly across different prompts (sometimes overcorrecting beyond the original effect). We highlight two different mechanisms that contribute to self-repair, including changes in the final LayerNorm scaling factor and sparse sets of neurons implementing Anti-Erasure. We additionally discuss the implications of these results for interpretability practitioners and close with a more speculative discussion on the mystery of why self-repair occurs in these models at all, highlighting evidence for the Iterative Inference hypothesis in language models, a framework that predicts self-repair.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Humans possess the ability to draw on past experiences explicitly when learning new tasks and applying them accordingly. We believe this capacity for self-referencing is especially advantageous for reinforcement learning agents in the unsupervised pretrain-then-finetune setting. During pretraining, an agent's past experiences can be explicitly utilized to mitigate the nonstationarity of intrinsic rewards. In the finetuning phase, referencing historical trajectories prevents the unlearning of valuable exploratory behaviors. Motivated by these benefits, we propose the Self-Reference (SR) approach, an add-on module explicitly designed to leverage historical information and enhance agent performance within the pretrain-finetune paradigm. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art results in terms of Interquartile Mean (IQM) performance and Optimality Gap reduction on the Unsupervised Reinforcement Learning Benchmark for model-free methods, recording an 86% IQM and a 16% Optimality Gap. Additionally, it improves current algorithms by up to 17% IQM and reduces the Optimality Gap by 31%. Beyond performance enhancement, the Self-Reference add-on also increases sample efficiency, a crucial attribute for real-world applications.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of Llama-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context prior taking over in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising self-correction abilities, where iterative refinement improves the quality of generated responses. However, most existing approaches operate at the level of output critique, patching surface errors while often failing to correct deeper reasoning flaws. We propose SELF-THOUGHT, a framework that introduces an intermediate step of task abstraction before solution refinement. Given an input and an initial response, the model first distills the task into a structured template that captures key variables, constraints, and problem structure. This abstraction then guides solution instantiation, grounding subsequent responses in a clearer understanding of the task and reducing error propagation. Crucially, we show that these abstractions can be transferred across models: templates generated by larger models can serve as structured guides for smaller LLMs, which typically struggle with intrinsic self-correction. By reusing distilled task structures, smaller models achieve more reliable refinements without heavy fine-tuning or reliance on external verifiers. Experiments across diverse reasoning tasks demonstrate that SELF-THOUGHT improves accuracy, robustness, and generalization for both large and small models, offering a scalable path toward more reliable self-correcting language systems.

Understanding the connections between artificial and biological intelligent systems can reveal fundamental principles underlying general intelligence. While many artificial intelligence (AI) models have a neuroscience counterpart, such connections are largely missing in Transformer models and the self-attention mechanism. Here, we examine the relationship between attention heads and human episodic memory. We focus on the induction heads, which contribute to the in-context learning capabilities of Transformer-based large language models (LLMs). We demonstrate that induction heads are behaviorally, functionally, and mechanistically similar to the contextual maintenance and retrieval (CMR) model of human episodic memory. Our analyses of LLMs pre-trained on extensive text data show that CMR-like heads often emerge in the intermediate model layers and that their behavior qualitatively mirrors the memory biases seen in humans. Our findings uncover a parallel between the computational mechanisms of LLMs and human memory, offering valuable insights into both research fields.

Typically, children start to learn their first words between 6 and 9 months, linking spoken utterances to their visual referents. Without prior knowledge, a word encountered for the first time can be interpreted in countless ways; it might refer to any of the objects in the environment, their components, or attributes. Using longitudinal, egocentric, and ecologically valid data from the experience of one child, in this work, we propose a self-supervised and biologically plausible strategy to learn strong visual representations. Our masked autoencoder-based visual backbone incorporates knowledge about the blind spot in human eyes to define a novel masking strategy. This mask and reconstruct approach attempts to mimic the way the human brain fills the gaps in the eyes' field of view. This represents a significant shift from standard random masking strategies, which are difficult to justify from a biological perspective. The pretrained encoder is utilized in a contrastive learning-based video-text model capable of acquiring word-referent mappings. Extensive evaluation suggests that the proposed biologically plausible masking strategy is at least as effective as random masking for learning word-referent mappings from cross-situational and temporally extended episodes.

We study self-rewarding reasoning large language models (LLMs), which can simultaneously generate step-by-step reasoning and evaluate the correctness of their outputs during the inference time-without external feedback. This integrated approach allows a single model to independently guide its reasoning process, offering computational advantages for model deployment. We particularly focus on the representative task of self-correction, where models autonomously detect errors in their responses, revise outputs, and decide when to terminate iterative refinement loops. To enable this, we propose a two-staged algorithmic framework for constructing self-rewarding reasoning models using only self-generated data. In the first stage, we employ sequential rejection sampling to synthesize long chain-of-thought trajectories that incorporate both self-rewarding and self-correction mechanisms. Fine-tuning models on these curated data allows them to learn the patterns of self-rewarding and self-correction. In the second stage, we further enhance the models' ability to assess response accuracy and refine outputs through reinforcement learning with rule-based signals. Experiments with Llama-3 and Qwen-2.5 demonstrate that our approach surpasses intrinsic self-correction capabilities and achieves performance comparable to systems that rely on external reward models.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Large language models map semantically related prompts to similar internal representations -- a phenomenon interpretable as attractor-like dynamics. We ask whether the identity document of a persistent cognitive agent (its cognitive_core) exhibits analogous attractor-like behavior. We present a controlled experiment on Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, comparing hidden states of an original cognitive_core (Condition A), seven paraphrases (Condition B), and seven structurally matched controls (Condition C). Mean-pooled states at layers 8, 16, and 24 show that paraphrases converge to a tighter cluster than controls (Cohen's d > 1.88, p < 10^{-27}, Bonferroni-corrected). Replication on Gemma 2 9B confirms cross-architecture generalizability. Ablations suggest the effect is primarily semantic rather than structural, and that structural completeness appears necessary to reach the attractor region. An exploratory experiment shows that reading a scientific description of the agent shifts internal state toward the attractor -- closer than a sham preprint -- distinguishing knowing about an identity from operating as that identity. These results provide representational evidence that agent identity documents induce attractor-like geometry in LLM activation space.

Instructions trigger a production-centered mechanism in language models. Through a cognitively inspired lens that separates language processing and production, we reveal this mechanism as an asymmetry between the two stages by probing task-specific information layer-wise across five binary judgment tasks. Specifically, we measure how instruction tokens shape information both when sample tokens, the input under evaluation, are processed and when output tokens are produced. Across prompting variations, task-specific information in sample tokens remains largely stable and correlates only weakly with behavior, whereas the same information in output tokens varies substantially and correlates strongly with behavior. Attention-based interventions confirm this pattern causally: blocking instruction flow to all subsequent tokens reduces both behavior and information in output tokens, whereas blocking it only to sample tokens has minimal effect on either. The asymmetry generalizes across model families and tasks, and becomes sharper with model scale and instruction-tuning, both of which disproportionately affect the production stage. Our findings suggest that understanding model capabilities requires jointly assessing internals and behavior, while decomposing the internal perspective by token position to distinguish the processing of input tokens from the production of output tokens.

Referring expressions are natural language constructions used to identify particular objects within a scene. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for the tasks of referring expression comprehension and generation. Our model is composed of three modules: speaker, listener, and reinforcer. The speaker generates referring expressions, the listener comprehends referring expressions, and the reinforcer introduces a reward function to guide sampling of more discriminative expressions. The listener-speaker modules are trained jointly in an end-to-end learning framework, allowing the modules to be aware of one another during learning while also benefiting from the discriminative reinforcer's feedback. We demonstrate that this unified framework and training achieves state-of-the-art results for both comprehension and generation on three referring expression datasets. Project and demo page: https://vision.cs.unc.edu/refer

We computationally implement and experimentally test the behavioral predictions of a dynamic neural model of lexical meaning in the framework of Dynamic Field Theory. We demonstrate the architecture and behavior of the model using as a test case the English lexical item have, focusing on its polysemous use. In the model, have maps to a semantic space defined by two independently motivated continuous conceptual dimensions, connectedness and control asymmetry. The mapping is modeled as coupling between a neural node representing the lexical item and neural fields representing the conceptual dimensions. While lexical knowledge is modeled as a stable coupling pattern, real-time lexical meaning retrieval is modeled as the motion of neural activation patterns between transiently stable states corresponding to semantic interpretations or readings. Model simulations capture two previously reported empirical observations: (1) contextual modulation of lexical semantic interpretation, and (2) individual variation in the magnitude of this modulation. Simulations also generate a novel prediction that the by-trial relationship between sentence reading time and acceptability should be contextually modulated. An experiment combining self-paced reading and acceptability judgments replicates previous results and partially bears out the model's novel prediction. Altogether, results support a novel perspective on lexical polysemy: that the many related meanings of a word are not categorically distinct representations; rather, they are transiently stable neural activation states that arise from the nonlinear dynamics of neural populations governing interpretation on continuous semantic dimensions. Our model offers important advantages over related models in the dynamical systems framework, as well as models based on Bayesian inference.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Large language models make claims about themselves that are both consequential and increasingly difficult to verify from behavior alone. How can we distinguish plausible confabulations from genuine introspection? In this paper, we identify mechanistic signatures of faithful self-report in a controlled setting. Using low-rank adapters, we train models to make decisions on behalf of fictitious characters, according to latent linear preference functions. We find sustained fine-tuning on an implicit decision task can lead to the emergence of accurate self-reporting of models' learned preferences, even without explicit self-report supervision. We ask two research questions about this emergent phenomenon. First: is the emergence of accurate self-reporting accompanied by a measurable structural change in the model? Weight ablations and frozen-layer experiments together indicate that preference representations shift to earlier layers over training, consistent with the hypothesis that faithful self-report requires preferences to be located where pre-existing verbalization mechanisms can access them. Second: can these structural differences distinguish faithful models from unfaithful ones? Using attribution patching, we find that faithful models exhibit significantly higher attribution similarity between the decision-making and self-report tasks -- a mechanistic signature of faithful self-report that does not require us to understand the content of the report itself. Previous work on self-report has observed behaviorally that models can be faithful or unfaithful; our work proposes that, at least in our restricted setting, it is possible to distinguish between the two patterns of computation by examining the structure of the networks themselves.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

Referring is one of the most basic and prevalent uses of language. How do speakers choose from the wealth of referring expressions at their disposal? Rational theories of language use have come under attack for decades for not being able to account for the seemingly irrational overinformativeness ubiquitous in referring expressions. Here we present a novel production model of referring expressions within the Rational Speech Act framework that treats speakers as agents that rationally trade off cost and informativeness of utterances. Crucially, we relax the assumption that informativeness is computed with respect to a deterministic Boolean semantics, in favor of a non-deterministic continuous semantics. This innovation allows us to capture a large number of seemingly disparate phenomena within one unified framework: the basic asymmetry in speakers' propensity to overmodify with color rather than size; the increase in overmodification in complex scenes; the increase in overmodification with atypical features; and the increase in specificity in nominal reference as a function of typicality. These findings cast a new light on the production of referring expressions: rather than being wastefully overinformative, reference is usefully redundant.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

Dense self-attention treats all token pairs as equally plausible before learning, an interaction-isotropic prior that can be mismatched to structured signals. For structured, low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) signals such as EEG, dependencies are organized along the electrode and time axes, and this uniform prior exposes each token to many irrelevant interactions. We introduce Adaptive Anisotropic Attention (AAA), which splits attention into two paths: a temporal path, where each token attends to the tokens of its own electrode across time, and a spatial path, where it attends to the tokens of the other electrodes at the same time step. A small gate predicts, for every token, a convex combination of the two path outputs: two non-negative weights that sum to one. On six EEG downstream tasks, the resulting model, AXON (AXis-factorized Operator Network), improves mean balanced accuracy over a dense baseline under both linear probing and full fine-tuning. We show that both paths (temporal and spatial) are necessary and that the weighted sum beats a hard choice of one path; most of the benefit comes from the gate learning a different temporal/spatial balance at each layer of the network. Controlled audio spectrogram experiments show that axis factorization transfers beyond EEG. These results suggest that aligning attention with the natural axes of structured signals provides a useful inductive bias.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Large language models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention for their remarkable abilities in various natural language processing tasks, but they suffer from hallucinations that will cause performance degradation. One promising solution to improve the LLMs' performance is to ask LLMs to revise their answer after generation, a technique known as self-correction. Among the two types of self-correction, intrinsic self-correction is considered a promising direction because it does not utilize external knowledge. However, recent works doubt the validity of LLM's ability to conduct intrinsic self-correction. In this paper, we present a novel perspective on the intrinsic self-correction capabilities of LLMs through theoretical analyses and empirical experiments. In addition, we identify two critical factors for successful self-correction: zero temperature and fair prompts. Leveraging these factors, we demonstrate that intrinsic self-correction ability is exhibited across multiple existing LLMs. Our findings offer insights into the fundamental theories underlying the self-correction behavior of LLMs and remark on the importance of unbiased prompts and zero temperature settings in harnessing their full potential.

In various fields of knowledge creation, including science, new ideas often build on pre-existing information. In this work, we explore this concept within the context of language models. Specifically, we explore the potential of self-training models on their own outputs, akin to how humans learn and build on their previous thoughts and actions. While this approach is intuitively appealing, our research reveals its practical limitations. We find that extended self-training of the GPT-2 model leads to a significant degradation in performance, resulting in repetitive and collapsed token output.

It has been reported that LLMs can recognize their own writing. As this has potential implications for AI safety, yet is relatively understudied, we investigate the phenomenon, seeking to establish whether it robustly occurs at the behavioral level, how the observed behavior is achieved, and whether it can be controlled. First, we find that the Llama3-8b-Instruct chat model - but not the base Llama3-8b model - can reliably distinguish its own outputs from those of humans, and present evidence that the chat model is likely using its experience with its own outputs, acquired during post-training, to succeed at the writing recognition task. Second, we identify a vector in the residual stream of the model that is differentially activated when the model makes a correct self-written-text recognition judgment, show that the vector activates in response to information relevant to self-authorship, present evidence that the vector is related to the concept of "self" in the model, and demonstrate that the vector is causally related to the model's ability to perceive and assert self-authorship. Finally, we show that the vector can be used to control both the model's behavior and its perception, steering the model to claim or disclaim authorship by applying the vector to the model's output as it generates it, and steering the model to believe or disbelieve it wrote arbitrary texts by applying the vector to them as the model reads them.

A language model's ability to reflect on its own reasoning provides a key advantage for solving complex problems. While most recent research has focused on how this ability develops during reinforcement learning, we show that it actually begins to emerge much earlier - during the model's pre-training. To study this, we introduce deliberate errors into chains-of-thought and test whether the model can still arrive at the correct answer by recognizing and correcting these mistakes. By tracking performance across different stages of pre-training, we observe that this self-correcting ability appears early and improves steadily over time. For instance, an OLMo2-7B model pre-trained on 4 trillion tokens displays self-correction on our six self-reflection tasks.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The ability to process long contexts is crucial for many natural language processing tasks, yet it remains a significant challenge. While substantial progress has been made in enhancing the efficiency of attention mechanisms, there is still a gap in understanding how attention heads function in long-context settings. In this paper, we observe that while certain heads consistently attend to local information only, others swing between attending to local and long-context information depending on the query. This raises the question: can we identify which heads require long-context information to predict the next token accurately? We demonstrate that it's possible to predict which heads are crucial for long-context processing using only local keys. The core idea here is to exploit a simple model for the long-context scores via second moment approximations. These findings unveil simple properties of attention in the context of long sequences, and open the door to potentially significant gains in efficiency.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

Sycophancy, where an LLM becomes overly agreeable, deferential, or flattering toward the user, has been identified as a major failure mode. While post-training has been implicated as a cause, how it internally gives rise to sycophantic behavior remains insufficiently understood. Post-training transforms the model's output from text completion into utterances directed toward an addressee, thereby giving the output addressivity. We hypothesize that the accompanying pressure to follow the addressee's instructions and align with their preferences links this addressivity to sycophancy. To test this, we use Sparse Autoencoders to extract addressivity directions from pre-trained and post-trained models and examine their relationship with sycophancy. Steering models with addressivity directions can amplify or suppress sycophancy, and this effect is observed only in post-trained models. Furthermore, comparing the internal mechanisms of both model types confirms that the association between addressivity and sycophancy is strengthened through post-training. Finally, through a controlled post-training experiment, we find that models are sycophantic not toward a specific addressee but toward any recognized addressee, suggesting that the presence of an addressee, rather than the addressee's identity, is what elicits sycophancy.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Large language models are prone to hallucinating factually incorrect statements. A key source of these errors is exposure to new factual information through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which can increase hallucinations w.r.t. knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we explore whether SFT-induced hallucinations can be mitigated using established tools from the continual learning literature, since they arise as a by-product of knowledge degradation during training. We propose a self-distillation-based SFT method that facilitates effective factual learning while minimizing hallucinations w.r.t. pre-existing knowledge by regularizing output-distribution drift. We also show that, in settings where new knowledge acquisition is unnecessary, suppressing factual plasticity by freezing parameter groups, can preserve task performance while reducing hallucinations. Lastly, we investigate the mechanism behind SFT-induced hallucinations through three hypotheses: capacity limitations, behavior cloning, and localized interference. Our experiments show that a main driver is interference among overlapping semantic representations, and that self-distillation succeeds by mitigating this interference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

One of the most central aspects of language processing is the ability to trade off between stored representations and abstract knowledge: one must retrieve stored representations, but also generate novel ones by applying productive rules. While recent work has examined abstract knowledge in language models, holistic storage has received far less attention. We probe internal representations in both text-based LLMs and an ASR model, testing whether V+up phrasal verbs develop distinct representations as a function of frequency and predictability. All models show evidence of holistic storage driven by frequency and predictability, further supporting usage-based theories of language.

Spoken communication occurs in a "noisy channel" characterized by high levels of environmental noise, variability within and between speakers, and lexical and syntactic ambiguity. Given these properties of the received linguistic input, robust spoken word recognition -- and language processing more generally -- relies heavily on listeners' prior knowledge to evaluate whether candidate interpretations of that input are more or less likely. Here we compare several broad-coverage probabilistic generative language models in their ability to capture human linguistic expectations. Serial reproduction, an experimental paradigm where spoken utterances are reproduced by successive participants similar to the children's game of "Telephone," is used to elicit a sample that reflects the linguistic expectations of English-speaking adults. When we evaluate a suite of probabilistic generative language models against the yielded chains of utterances, we find that those models that make use of abstract representations of preceding linguistic context (i.e., phrase structure) best predict the changes made by people in the course of serial reproduction. A logistic regression model predicting which words in an utterance are most likely to be lost or changed in the course of spoken transmission corroborates this result. We interpret these findings in light of research highlighting the interaction of memory-based constraints and representations in language processing.

Recent works have demonstrated the effectiveness of self-alignment in which a large language model is, by itself, aligned to follow general instructions through the automatic generation of instructional data using a handful of human-written seeds. Instead of general alignment, in this work, we focus on self-alignment for expert domain specialization (e.g., biomedicine), discovering it to be very effective for improving zero-shot and few-shot performance in target domains of interest. As a preliminary, we first present the benchmark results of existing aligned models within a specialized domain, which reveals the marginal effect that "generic" instruction-following training has on downstream expert domains' performance. To remedy this, we explore self-specialization that leverages domain-specific unlabelled data and a few labeled seeds for the self-alignment process. When augmented with retrieval to reduce hallucination and enhance concurrency of the alignment, self-specialization offers an effective (and efficient) way of "carving out" an expert model out of a "generalist", pre-trained LLM where different domains of expertise are originally combined in a form of "superposition". Our experimental results on a biomedical domain show that our self-specialized model (30B) outperforms its base model, MPT-30B by a large margin and even surpasses larger popular models based on LLaMA-65B, highlighting its potential and practicality for specialization, especially considering its efficiency in terms of data and parameters.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a groundbreaking technology with their unparalleled text generation capabilities across various applications. Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the accuracy and appropriateness of their generated content. A contemporary methodology, self-correction, has been proposed as a remedy to these issues. Building upon this premise, this paper critically examines the role and efficacy of self-correction within LLMs, shedding light on its true potential and limitations. Central to our investigation is the notion of intrinsic self-correction, whereby an LLM attempts to correct its initial responses based solely on its inherent capabilities, without the crutch of external feedback. In the context of reasoning, our research indicates that LLMs struggle to self-correct their responses without external feedback, and at times, their performance might even degrade post self-correction. Drawing from these insights, we offer suggestions for future research and practical applications in this field.

In the Transformer model, "self-attention" combines information from attended embeddings into the representation of the focal embedding in the next layer. Thus, across layers of the Transformer, information originating from different tokens gets increasingly mixed. This makes attention weights unreliable as explanations probes. In this paper, we consider the problem of quantifying this flow of information through self-attention. We propose two methods for approximating the attention to input tokens given attention weights, attention rollout and attention flow, as post hoc methods when we use attention weights as the relative relevance of the input tokens. We show that these methods give complementary views on the flow of information, and compared to raw attention, both yield higher correlations with importance scores of input tokens obtained using an ablation method and input gradients.

Despite the fact that Transformers perform well in NLP tasks, recent studies suggest that self-attention is theoretically limited in learning even some regular and context-free languages. These findings motivated us to think about their implications in modeling natural language, which is hypothesized to be mildly context-sensitive. We test the Transformer's ability to learn mildly context-sensitive languages of varying complexities, and find that they generalize well to unseen in-distribution data, but their ability to extrapolate to longer strings is worse than that of LSTMs. Our analyses show that the learned self-attention patterns and representations modeled dependency relations and demonstrated counting behavior, which may have helped the models solve the languages.

Large language models have been shown to struggle with limited context memory and multi-step reasoning. We propose a simple method for solving both of these problems by allowing the model to take Self-Notes. Unlike recent scratchpad approaches, the model can deviate from the input context at any time to explicitly think. This allows the model to recall information and perform reasoning on the fly as it reads the context, thus extending its memory and enabling multi-step reasoning. Our experiments on multiple tasks demonstrate that our method can successfully generalize to longer and more complicated instances from their training setup by taking Self-Notes at inference time.

While Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in visual and language reasoning tasks, they invariably generate flawed responses. Self-correction that instructs models to refine their outputs presents a promising solution to this issue. Previous studies have mainly concentrated on Large Language Models (LLMs), while the self-correction abilities of VLMs, particularly concerning both visual and linguistic information, remain largely unexamined. This study investigates the self-correction capabilities of VLMs during both inference and fine-tuning stages. We introduce a Self-Correction Learning (SCL) approach that enables VLMs to learn from their self-generated self-correction data through Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) without relying on external feedback, facilitating self-improvement. Specifically, we collect preferred and disfavored samples based on the correctness of initial and refined responses, which are obtained by two-turn self-correction with VLMs during the inference stage. Experimental results demonstrate that although VLMs struggle to self-correct effectively during iterative inference without additional fine-tuning and external feedback, they can enhance their performance and avoid previous mistakes through preference fine-tuning when their self-generated self-correction data are categorized into preferred and disfavored samples. This study emphasizes that self-correction is not merely a refinement process; rather, it should enhance the reasoning abilities of models through additional training, enabling them to generate high-quality responses directly without further refinement.

Ablate a component of a language model, and other components often appear to adjust and compensate. This phenomenon, termed self-repair, has been observed repeatedly, but its mechanism remains unclear. The most systematic study to date concluded that self-repair is noisy and unlikely to have a single explanation. We argue that it has one: a gain already present before any ablation. Any intervention on a causally important component can be viewed as a point on a coordinate axis λ, the signed strength of a counterfactual contrast. Hence, conventional ablation methods are uncalibrated points on this axis. We show that the causal repair response for a fine-grained unit r is governed by an affine law, E_r(λ)=own_r+γ_rλ. The slope γ_r is a fixed coefficient that consistently influences the model, with or without ablation, and its sign determines whether the unit counteracts or reinforces the removed signal. On a factual-verdict task across four models from distinct families (Gemma, Qwen, LLaMA, and Mistral), we identify components including MLP neurons, OV neurons, and singular directions that follow this affine law, 68 of 81 downstream directions in all. Moreover, we can anticipate the magnitude of γ_r from the fixed weights. On the IOI circuit of GPT-2 Small, seven of the ten heads the intervention can reach follow the law, and all seven are counterweights. From this perspective, what may appear as self-repair is a counterweight performing its usual operation when the contrastive signal emerges at the core.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

In this study, we investigated the effects of self-reflection in large language models (LLMs) on problem-solving performance. We instructed nine popular LLMs to answer a series of multiple-choice questions to provide a performance baseline. For each incorrectly answered question, we instructed eight types of self-reflecting LLM agents to reflect on their mistakes and provide themselves with guidance to improve problem-solving. Then, using this guidance, each self-reflecting agent attempted to re-answer the same questions. Our results indicate that LLM agents are able to significantly improve their problem-solving performance through self-reflection (p < 0.001). In addition, we compared the various types of self-reflection to determine their individual contribution to performance. All code and data are available on GitHub at https://github.com/matthewrenze/self-reflection

Understanding how complex cognitive functions are organized within artificial systems is central to interpreting large language models (LLMs) and relating them to biological cognition. Yet although LLMs exhibit broad cognitive-like behaviours, it remains unclear whether their internal representations form reproducible functional systems that explain behaviour, failure and links to human cognition. Here we present NeuroCogMap, a cognitive neuroscience-inspired framework that organizes internal features of LLMs into functional parcels and links them to interpretable functions, cognitive capabilities and a cognitive hierarchy. These parcels form a stable and semantically coherent organization that is partly conserved across models and functionally linked to model outputs. Within this organization, major LLM failures, including hallucination, bias, refusal failure and sycophancy, correspond to distinct disruptions in representational and behavioural-control systems, yielding internal signatures for mechanism-guided detection and targeted intervention. Beyond model behaviour, NeuroCogMap improves prediction of human cortical responses during naturalistic language comprehension, with the strongest correspondence in higher-order association cortex. At the cognitive level, its internal signatures expose latent strategies that guide refinements of classical models of human decision-making. Together, these findings establish NeuroCogMap as a system-level framework for mapping functional organization in artificial systems and for relating this organization to human cortical function and cognitive behaviour.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

The learning trajectories of linguistic phenomena in humans provide insight into linguistic representation, beyond what can be gleaned from inspecting the behavior of an adult speaker. To apply a similar approach to analyze neural language models (NLM), it is first necessary to establish that different models are similar enough in the generalizations they make. In this paper, we show that NLMs with different initialization, architecture, and training data acquire linguistic phenomena in a similar order, despite their different end performance. These findings suggest that there is some mutual inductive bias that underlies these models' learning of linguistic phenomena. Taking inspiration from psycholinguistics, we argue that studying this inductive bias is an opportunity to study the linguistic representation implicit in NLMs. Leveraging these findings, we compare the relative performance on different phenomena at varying learning stages with simpler reference models. Results suggest that NLMs exhibit consistent "developmental" stages. Moreover, we find the learning trajectory to be approximately one-dimensional: given an NLM with a certain overall performance, it is possible to predict what linguistic generalizations it has already acquired. Initial analysis of these stages presents phenomena clusters (notably morphological ones), whose performance progresses in unison, suggesting a potential link between the generalizations behind them.

While current AI agents support increasingly long context windows, tool use, and skill execution for long-horizon tasks, they still require memory systems to effectively leverage historical experience. Existing memory frameworks typically rely on fixed storage, retrieval, and summarization mechanisms, which can be rigid across different tasks and often require manual tuning. To address this limitation, we propose SelfMem, a self-optimizing memory framework. Inspired by prior work on self-improving AI, we follow the principle of "teaching an agent to fish rather than giving it a fish." Instead of forcing the model to follow a predefined memory strategy or format, SelfMem provides an environment with memory tools and feedback signals that allow the agent to explore, evaluate, and refine its own memory strategy. Our results show that SelfMem consistently outperforms retrieval, compression, and agent-memory baselines on BEAM across conversation scales from 100K to 1M tokens. Compared with the strongest baseline, SelfMem improves the official score by 48.7%, 40.8%, and 41.9% at 100K, 500K, and 1M, respectively. Further question-type analysis shows broad robustness across diverse memory demands, and our optimization study shows that model-guided strategy refinement further improves performance.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

We present a single attention head in GPT-2 Small that has one main role across the entire training distribution. If components in earlier layers predict a certain token, and this token appears earlier in the context, the head suppresses it: we call this copy suppression. Attention Head 10.7 (L10H7) suppresses naive copying behavior which improves overall model calibration. This explains why multiple prior works studying certain narrow tasks found negative heads that systematically favored the wrong answer. We uncover the mechanism that the Negative Heads use for copy suppression with weights-based evidence and are able to explain 76.9% of the impact of L10H7 in GPT-2 Small. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive description of the complete role of a component in a language model to date. One major effect of copy suppression is its role in self-repair. Self-repair refers to how ablating crucial model components results in downstream neural network parts compensating for this ablation. Copy suppression leads to self-repair: if an initial overconfident copier is ablated, then there is nothing to suppress. We show that self-repair is implemented by several mechanisms, one of which is copy suppression, which explains 39% of the behavior in a narrow task. Interactive visualisations of the copy suppression phenomena may be seen at our web app https://copy-suppression.streamlit.app/

Transformers often display an attention sink: probability mass concentrates on a fixed, content-agnostic position. We prove that computing a simple trigger-conditional behavior necessarily induces a sink in softmax self-attention models. Our results formalize a familiar intuition: normalization over a probability simplex must force attention to collapse onto a stable anchor to realize a default state (e.g., when the model needs to ignore the input). We instantiate this with a concrete task: when a designated trigger token appears, the model must return the average of all preceding token representations, and otherwise output zero, a task which mirrors the functionality of attention heads in the wild (Barbero et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2024). We also prove that non-normalized ReLU attention can solve the same task without any sink, confirming that the normalization constraint is the fundamental driver of sink behavior. Experiments validate our predictions and demonstrate they extend beyond the theoretically analyzed setting: softmax models develop strong sinks while ReLU attention eliminates them in both single-head and multi-head variants.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently exhibit sycophancy, agreeing with a user's statement even when it is incorrect. While often studied as a single, uniform behavior, sycophancy can manifest in substantially distinct ways across contexts, raising the question of whether this heterogeneity is reflected in its internal mechanisms. To address this gap, we dissociate the representations of sycophancy into factual and opinion subtypes, motivated by prior evidence of heterogeneous truth representations in LLMs. We train linear probes and construct steering vectors on one subtype's activations and evaluate their transfer to the other, measuring the extent to which representations are shared and visualizing them via Linear Discriminant Analysis. We find that different LLMs represent these subtypes differently, with either more aligned or more distinct representations, and apply this insight to improve representational interventions for reducing sycophancy. Our dissociation method offers a general framework for studying the representational structure of complex model behaviors.

Language is not only a tool for communication but also a medium for human cognition and reasoning. If, as linguistic relativity suggests, the structure of language shapes cognitive patterns, then large language models (LLMs) trained on human language may also internalize the habitual logical structures embedded in different languages. To examine this hypothesis, we introduce BICAUSE, a structured bilingual dataset for causal reasoning, which includes semantically aligned Chinese and English samples in both forward and reversed causal forms. Our study reveals three key findings: (1) LLMs exhibit typologically aligned attention patterns, focusing more on causes and sentence-initial connectives in Chinese, while showing a more balanced distribution in English. (2) Models internalize language-specific preferences for causal word order and often rigidly apply them to atypical inputs, leading to degraded performance, especially in Chinese. (3) When causal reasoning succeeds, model representations converge toward semantically aligned abstractions across languages, indicating a shared understanding beyond surface form. Overall, these results suggest that LLMs not only mimic surface linguistic forms but also internalize the reasoning biases shaped by language. Rooted in cognitive linguistic theory, this phenomenon is for the first time empirically verified through structural analysis of model internals.

The human brain is autonomously active, being characterized by a self-sustained neural activity which would be present even in the absence of external sensory stimuli. Here we study the interrelation between the self-sustained activity in autonomously active recurrent neural nets and external sensory stimuli. There is no a priori semantical relation between the influx of external stimuli and the patterns generated internally by the autonomous and ongoing brain dynamics. The question then arises when and how are semantic correlations between internal and external dynamical processes learned and built up? We study this problem within the paradigm of transient state dynamics for the neural activity in recurrent neural nets, i.e. for an autonomous neural activity characterized by an infinite time-series of transiently stable attractor states. We propose that external stimuli will be relevant during the sensitive periods, {\it viz} the transition period between one transient state and the subsequent semi-stable attractor. A diffusive learning signal is generated unsupervised whenever the stimulus influences the internal dynamics qualitatively. For testing we have presented to the model system stimuli corresponding to the bars and stripes problem. We found that the system performs a non-linear independent component analysis on its own, being continuously and autonomously active. This emergent cognitive capability results here from a general principle for the neural dynamics, the competition between neural ensembles.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

A growing intuition in machine learning suggests a link between sparsity and interpretability. We introduce a novel self-ablation mechanism to investigate this connection ante-hoc in the context of language transformers. Our approach dynamically enforces a k-winner-takes-all constraint, forcing the model to demonstrate selective activation across neuron and attention units. Unlike post-hoc methods that analyze already-trained models, our approach integrates interpretability directly into model training, promoting feature localization from inception. Training small models on the TinyStories dataset and employing interpretability tests, we find that self-ablation leads to more localized circuits, concentrated feature representations, and increased neuron specialization without compromising language modelling performance. Surprisingly, our method also decreased overall sparsity, indicating that self-ablation promotes specialization rather than widespread inactivity. This reveals a complex interplay between sparsity and interpretability, where decreased global sparsity can coexist with increased local specialization, leading to enhanced interpretability. To facilitate reproducibility, we make our code available at https://github.com/keenanpepper/self-ablating-transformers.

Although Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made substantial progress, hallucination, where generated text is not grounded in the visual input, remains a challenge. As LVLMs become stronger, previously reported hallucination patterns, such as linguistic bias and overthinking phenomenon, become far less consistent, making the corresponding mitigation techniques substantially less effective. In this paper, we introduce an Internal self-Correction mechanism utilizing Layer Attention (ICLA) that operates directly on hidden states during generation. Each layer selectively retrieves information from all preceding layers through a diagonal cross-layer attention mechanism, enabling self-refinement without any external correction signals. With introducing and training only 0.2M and 0.1M additional parameters on LLaVA1.5-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B, \ours consistently improves visual grounding across multiple hallucination benchmarks, demonstrating its effectiveness for more advanced LVLMs.

Transformer architectures have revolutionized artificial intelligence (AI) through their attention mechanisms, yet the computational principles underlying their success remain opaque. We present a novel theoretical framework that reinterprets the core computation of attention as Pavlovian conditioning. Our model finds a direct mathematical analogue in linear attention, which simplifies the analysis of the underlying associative process. We demonstrate that attention's queries, keys, and values can be mapped to the three elements of classical conditioning: test stimuli that probe associations, conditional stimuli (CS) that serve as retrieval cues, and unconditional stimuli (US) that contain response information. Through this lens, we suggest that each attention operation constructs a transient associative memory via a Hebbian rule, where CS-US pairs form dynamic associations that test stimuli can later retrieve. Our framework yields several theoretical insights grounded in this linearized model: (1) a capacity theorem showing that attention heads can store O(d_k) associations before interference degrades retrieval; (2) an error propagation analysis revealing fundamental architectural trade-offs of balancing model depth, width, and head redundancy to maintain reliability; and (3) an understanding of how biologically plausible learning rules could enhance transformer architectures. By establishing this deep connection, we suggest that the success of modern AI may stem not from architectural novelty alone, but from implementing computational principles that biology optimized over millions of years of evolution.

Large language models have recently demonstrated remarkable abilities to self-correct their responses through iterative refinement, often referred to as self-consistency or self-reflection. However, the dynamics of this self-correction mechanism may differ substantially depending on whether the model is tasked with open-ended text generation or with selecting the most appropriate response from multiple predefined options. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of these two paradigms by comparing performance trends and error-correction behaviors across various natural language understanding and reasoning tasks, covering language models of different scales and families. Our experimental results reveal distinct patterns of improvement and failure modes: While open-ended generation often benefits from the flexibility of re-interpretation and compositional refinement, multiple-choice selection can leverage clearer solution boundaries but may be limited by the provided options. This contrast also reflects the dual demands faced by emerging agentic LLM applications: effective agents must not only generate and refine open-ended plans or explanations, but also make reliable discrete choices when operating within constrained action spaces. Our findings, therefore, highlight that the design of self-correction mechanisms should take into account the interaction between task structure and output space, with implications for both knowledge-intensive reasoning and decision-oriented applications of LLMs.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Analogical reasoning -- the capacity to identify and map structural relationships between different domains -- is fundamental to human cognition and learning. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) can sometimes match humans in analogical reasoning tasks, opening the possibility that analogical reasoning might emerge from domain-general processes. However, it is still debated whether these emergent capacities are largely superficial and limited to simple relations seen during training or whether they encompass the flexible representational and mapping capabilities which are the focus of leading cognitive models of analogy. In this study, we introduce novel analogical reasoning tasks that require participants to map between semantically contentful words and sequences of letters and other abstract characters. This task necessitates the ability to flexibly re-represent rich semantic information -- an ability which is known to be central to human analogy but which is thus far not well captured by existing cognitive theories and models. We assess the performance of both human participants and LLMs on tasks focusing on reasoning from semantic structure and semantic content, introducing variations that test the robustness of their analogical inferences. Advanced LLMs match human performance across several conditions, though humans and LLMs respond differently to certain task variations and semantic distractors. Our results thus provide new evidence that LLMs might offer a how-possibly explanation of human analogical reasoning in contexts that are not yet well modeled by existing theories, but that even today's best models are unlikely to yield how-actually explanations.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Symbol grounding (Harnad, 1990) describes how symbols such as words acquire their meanings by connecting to real-world sensorimotor experiences. Recent work has shown preliminary evidence that grounding may emerge in (vision-)language models trained at scale without using explicit grounding objectives. Yet, the specific loci of this emergence and the mechanisms that drive it remain largely unexplored. To address this problem, we introduce a controlled evaluation framework that systematically traces how symbol grounding arises within the internal computations through mechanistic and causal analysis. Our findings show that grounding concentrates in middle-layer computations and is implemented through the aggregate mechanism, where attention heads aggregate the environmental ground to support the prediction of linguistic forms. This phenomenon replicates in multimodal dialogue and across architectures (Transformers and state-space models), but not in unidirectional LSTMs. Our results provide behavioral and mechanistic evidence that symbol grounding can emerge in language models, with practical implications for predicting and potentially controlling the reliability of generation.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as an effective approach for activating latent capabilities in large language models (LLMs). We observe that CoT shares significant similarities with self-training in terms of their learning processes. Motivated by these parallels, this paper explores the underlying relationship between CoT and self-training, demonstrating how insights from self-training can enhance CoT performance. Specifically, our study first reveals that CoT, like self-training, follows the principle of semantic entropy minimization. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel CoT framework that incorporates two key components: (i) a task-specific prompt module designed to guide LLMs in generating high-quality initial reasoning processes, and (ii) an adaptive reasoning iteration module for progressively refining the reasoning process.

We introduce the concept of the self-referencing causal cycle (abbreviated RECALL) - a mechanism that enables large language models (LLMs) to bypass the limitations of unidirectional causality, which underlies a phenomenon known as the reversal curse. When an LLM is prompted with sequential data, it often fails to recall preceding context. For example, when we ask an LLM to recall the line preceding "O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave" in the U.S. National Anthem, it often fails to correctly return "Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there" - this is due to the reversal curse. It occurs because language models such as ChatGPT and Llama generate text based on preceding tokens, requiring facts to be learned and reproduced in a consistent token order. While the reversal curse is often viewed as a limitation, we offer evidence of an alternative view: it is not always an obstacle in practice. We find that RECALL is driven by what we designate as cycle tokens - sequences that connect different parts of the training data, enabling recall of preceding tokens from succeeding ones. Through rigorous probabilistic formalization and controlled experiments, we demonstrate how the cycles they induce influence a model's ability to reproduce information. To facilitate reproducibility, we provide our code and experimental details at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/remember-B0B8/.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

Transformers evaluated in a single, fixed-depth pass are provably limited in expressive power to the constant-depth circuit class TC0. Running a Transformer autoregressively removes that ceiling -- first in next-token prediction and, more recently, in chain-of-thought reasoning. Both regimes rely on feedback loops that decode internal states into tokens only to re-encode them in subsequent steps. While this "thinking aloud" mirrors human reasoning, biological brains iterate without externalising intermediate states as language. To boost the expressive power of encoder Transformers without resorting to token-level autoregression, we introduce the SELF-Transformer: an encoder layer that iteratively refines its own attention weights to a fixed point. Instead of producing -- in one pass -- the alignment matrix that remixes the input sequence, the SELF-Transformer iteratively updates that matrix internally, scaling test-time computation with input difficulty. This adaptivity yields up to 20\% accuracy gains on encoder-style benchmarks without increasing parameter count, demonstrating that input-adaptive alignment at test time offers substantial benefits for only a modest extra compute budget. Self-Transformers thus recover much of the expressive power of iterative reasoning while preserving the simplicity of pure encoder architectures.

We investigate the internal structure of language model computations using causal analysis and demonstrate two motifs: (1) a form of adaptive computation where ablations of one attention layer of a language model cause another layer to compensate (which we term the Hydra effect) and (2) a counterbalancing function of late MLP layers that act to downregulate the maximum-likelihood token. Our ablation studies demonstrate that language model layers are typically relatively loosely coupled (ablations to one layer only affect a small number of downstream layers). Surprisingly, these effects occur even in language models trained without any form of dropout. We analyse these effects in the context of factual recall and consider their implications for circuit-level attribution in language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities on not just language tasks, but also various tasks that are not linguistic in nature, such as logical reasoning and social inference. In the human brain, neuroscience has identified a core language system that selectively and causally supports language processing. We here ask whether similar specialization for language emerges in LLMs. We identify language-selective units within 18 popular LLMs, using the same localization approach that is used in neuroscience. We then establish the causal role of these units by demonstrating that ablating LLM language-selective units -- but not random units -- leads to drastic deficits in language tasks. Correspondingly, language-selective LLM units are more aligned to brain recordings from the human language system than random units. Finally, we investigate whether our localization method extends to other cognitive domains: while we find specialized networks in some LLMs for reasoning and social capabilities, there are substantial differences among models. These findings provide functional and causal evidence for specialization in large language models, and highlight parallels with the functional organization in the brain.

Large language models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning have achieved strong performance across diverse tasks, including mathematics, coding, and general reasoning. A distinctive ability of these reasoning models is self-reflection: the ability to review and revise previous reasoning steps. While self-reflection enhances reasoning performance, it also increases inference cost. In this work, we study self-reflection through the lens of representation engineering. We segment the model's reasoning into steps, identify the steps corresponding to reflection, and extract a reflection direction in the latent space that governs this behavior. Using this direction, we propose a stepwise steering method that can control reflection frequency. We call our framework ReflCtrl. Our experiments show that (1) in many cases reflections are redundant, especially in stronger models (in our experiments, we can save up to 33.6 percent of reasoning tokens while preserving performance), and (2) the model's reflection behavior is highly correlated with an internal uncertainty signal, implying self-reflection may be controlled by the model's uncertainty.

Attractor dynamics are a fundamental computational motif in neural circuits, supporting diverse cognitive functions through stable, self-sustaining patterns of neural activity. In these lecture notes, we review four key examples that demonstrate how autoassociative neural network models can elucidate the computational mechanisms underlying attractor-based information processing in biological neural systems performing cognitive functions. Drawing on empirical evidence, we explore hippocampal spatial representations, visual classification in the inferotemporal cortex, perceptual adaptation and priming, and working-memory biases shaped by sensory history. Across these domains, attractor network models reveal common computational principles and provide analytical insights into how experience shapes neural activity and behavior. Our synthesis underscores the value of attractor models as powerful tools for probing the neural basis of cognition and behavior.

We propose NEURONA, a neuro-symbolic framework for fMRI decoding and concept grounding in neural activity. Leveraging image- and video-based fMRI question-answering datasets, NEURONA learns to decode interacting concepts from visual stimuli based on patterns of fMRI responses, integrating symbolic reasoning and compositional execution with fMRI grounding across brain regions. We demonstrate that incorporating structural priors (e.g., compositional predicate-argument dependencies between concepts) into the decoding process significantly improves both decoding accuracy over precise queries, and notably, generalization to unseen queries at test time. With NEURONA, we highlight neuro-symbolic frameworks as promising tools for understanding neural activity.

We explore a method for improving the performance of large language models through self-reflection and reinforcement learning. By incentivizing the model to generate better self-reflections when it answers incorrectly, we demonstrate that a model's ability to solve complex, verifiable tasks can be enhanced even when generating synthetic data is infeasible and only binary feedback is available. Our framework operates in two stages: first, upon failing a given task, the model generates a self-reflective commentary analyzing its previous attempt; second, the model is given another attempt at the task with the self-reflection in context. If the subsequent attempt succeeds, the tokens generated during the self-reflection phase are rewarded. Our experimental results show substantial performance gains across a variety of model architectures, as high as 34.7% improvement at math equation writing and 18.1% improvement at function calling. Notably, smaller fine-tuned models (1.5 billion to 7 billion parameters) outperform models in the same family that are 10 times larger. Our novel paradigm is thus an exciting pathway to more useful and reliable language models that can self-improve on challenging tasks with limited external feedback.

Self-improvement has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of large vision-language models (LVLMs), where models explore and learn from successful trajectories iteratively. However, we identify a critical issue during this process: the model excels at generating high-quality trajectories for simple queries (i.e., head data) but struggles with more complex ones (i.e., tail data). This leads to an imbalanced optimization that drives the model to prioritize simple reasoning skills, while hindering its ability to tackle more complex reasoning tasks. Over iterations, this imbalance becomes increasingly pronounced--a dynamic we term the "Matthew effect"--which ultimately hinders further model improvement and leads to performance bottlenecks. To counteract this challenge, we introduce four efficient strategies from two perspectives: distribution-reshaping and trajectory-resampling, to achieve head-tail re-balancing during the exploration-and-learning self-improvement process. Extensive experiments on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and InternVL2.5-4B models across visual reasoning tasks demonstrate that our methods consistently improve visual reasoning capabilities, outperforming vanilla self-improvement by 3.86 points on average.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

The reasoning pattern of Large language models (LLMs) remains opaque, and Reinforcement learning (RL) typically applies uniform credit across an entire generation, blurring the distinction between pivotal and routine steps. This work positions attention as a privileged substrate that renders the internal logic of LLMs legible, not merely as a byproduct of computation, but as a mechanistic blueprint of reasoning itself. We first distinguish attention heads between locally and globally focused information processing and reveal that locally focused heads produce a sawtooth pattern near the diagonal indicating phrasal chunks, while globally focused heads expose tokens that exert broad downstream influence over future tokens. We formalize these with two metrics: 1) Windowed Average Attention Distance, which measures the extent of backward attention within a clipped window; 2) Future Attention Influence, which quantifies a token's global importance as the average attention it receives from subsequent tokens. Taken together, these signals reveal a recurring preplan-and-anchor mechanism, where the model first performs a long-range contextual reference to generate an introductory token, which is immediately followed by or coincides with a semantic anchor token that organizes subsequent reasoning. Leveraging these insights, we introduce three novel RL strategies that dynamically perform targeted credit assignment to critical nodes (preplan tokens, anchor tokens, and their temporal coupling) and show consistent performance gains across various reasoning tasks. By aligning optimization with the model's intrinsic reasoning rhythm, we aim to transform opaque optimization into an actionable structure-aware process, hoping to offer a potential step toward more transparent and effective optimization of LLM reasoning.

Contextual memory integration remains a high challenge in the development of language models, particularly in tasks that require maintaining coherence over extended sequences. Traditional approaches, such as self-attention mechanisms and memory-augmented architectures, often prioritize short-term dependencies, leading to fragmentation and inconsistency in long-range contextual understanding. Inspired by principles of synaptic plasticity observed in biological neural systems, a novel mechanism, Synaptic Resonance, is introduced to dynamically reinforce relevant memory pathways during training and inference. Unlike static memory representations, this mechanism continuously adjusts synaptic weight matrices based on contextual relevance, allowing for improved information retention without excessive computational overhead. Evaluations conducted on an open-source language model demonstrate reductions in perplexity, enhancements in contextual coherence, and increased robustness against input noise, highlighting the effectiveness of reinforcement-driven memory modulation. Comparative analysis against baseline models further reveals that the proposed approach achieves higher memory retention efficiency while maintaining computational feasibility. The architectural modifications integrate seamlessly into existing transformer-based frameworks, ensuring stable convergence and efficient inference without sacrificing scalability. Applications benefiting from improved long-term contextual consistency, such as dialogue systems and document summarization, stand to gain from this approach. Empirical findings suggest that dynamically reinforced memory pathways offer a promising alternative to conventional memory mechanisms, addressing longstanding limitations in extended sequence modeling.

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

Surprisal theory links human processing effort to the predictability of an upcoming linguistic unit, but empirical work often leaves the notion of a unit underspecified. In practice, experimental stimuli are segmented into linguistically motivated units (e.g., words), while pretrained language models assign probability mass to a fixed token alphabet that typically does not align with those units. As a result, surprisal-based predictors depend implicitly on ad hoc procedures that conflate two distinct modeling choices: the definition of the unit of analysis and the choice of regions of interest over which predictions are evaluated. In this paper, we disentangle these choices and give a unified framework for reasoning about surprisal over arbitrary unit inventories. We argue that surprisal-based analyses should make these choices explicit and treat tokenization as an implementation detail rather than a scientific primitive.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) mark a shift from non-thinking models to post-trained reasoning models capable of solving complex problems through thinking. However, whether such thinking mitigates hallucinations in multimodal perception and reasoning remains unclear. Self-reflective reasoning enhances robustness but introduces additional hallucinations, and subtle perceptual errors still result in incorrect or coincidentally correct answers. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on models before the emergence of reasoning MLLMs, neglecting the internal thinking process and failing to measure the hallucinations that occur during thinking. To address these challenges, we introduce MM-THEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing hallucinations of intermediate CoTs in reasoning MLLMs. MM-THEBench features a fine-grained taxonomy grounded in cognitive dimensions, diverse data with verified reasoning annotations, and a multi-level automated evaluation framework. Extensive experiments on mainstream reasoning MLLMs reveal insights into how thinking affects hallucination and reasoning capability in various multimodal tasks.

Subliminal learning describes a student language model inheriting a behavioral bias by fine-tuning on seemingly innocuous data generated by a biased teacher model. Prior work has begun to characterize this phenomenon but leaves open questions about the scope of signals it can transfer, the mechanisms that explain it, and the precision with which a bias can be encoded by seemingly unrelated data. We tackle all three problems by introducing subliminal steering, a variant of subliminal learning in which the teacher's bias is implemented not via a system prompt, as in prior work, but through a steering vector trained to maximize the likelihood of a set of target samples. First, we show that subliminal steering transfers complex multi-word biases, whereas prior work focused on single-word preferences, demonstrating a large scope of subliminally transferrable signals. Second, we provide mechanistic evidence that subliminal learning transfers not only the target behavioral bias, but also the steering vector itself, localized to the layers at which the teacher was steered. Finally, we show that the bias is encoded with surprising precision. We train a new steering vector directly on the subliminally-laden dataset and find that it attains high cosine similarity with the original vector.

Despite the recent progress in long-context language models, it remains elusive how transformer-based models exhibit the capability to retrieve relevant information from arbitrary locations within the long context. This paper aims to address this question. Our systematic investigation across a wide spectrum of models reveals that a special type of attention heads are largely responsible for retrieving information, which we dub retrieval heads. We identify intriguing properties of retrieval heads:(1) universal: all the explored models with long-context capability have a set of retrieval heads; (2) sparse: only a small portion (less than 5\%) of the attention heads are retrieval. (3) intrinsic: retrieval heads already exist in models pretrained with short context. When extending the context length by continual pretraining, it is still the same set of heads that perform information retrieval. (4) dynamically activated: take Llama-2 7B for example, 12 retrieval heads always attend to the required information no matter how the context is changed. The rest of the retrieval heads are activated in different contexts. (5) causal: completely pruning retrieval heads leads to failure in retrieving relevant information and results in hallucination, while pruning random non-retrieval heads does not affect the model's retrieval ability. We further show that retrieval heads strongly influence chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, where the model needs to frequently refer back the question and previously-generated context. Conversely, tasks where the model directly generates the answer using its intrinsic knowledge are less impacted by masking out retrieval heads. These observations collectively explain which internal part of the model seeks information from the input tokens. We believe our insights will foster future research on reducing hallucination, improving reasoning, and compressing the KV cache.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

The self-rationalising capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have been explored in restricted settings, using task/specific data sets. However, current LLMs do not (only) rely on specifically annotated data; nonetheless, they frequently explain their outputs. The properties of the generated explanations are influenced by the pre-training corpus and by the target data used for instruction fine-tuning. As the pre-training corpus includes a large amount of human-written explanations "in the wild", we hypothesise that LLMs adopt common properties of human explanations. By analysing the outputs for a multi-domain instruction fine-tuning data set, we find that generated explanations show selectivity and contain illustrative elements, but less frequently are subjective or misleading. We discuss reasons and consequences of the properties' presence or absence. In particular, we outline positive and negative implications depending on the goals and user groups of the self-rationalising system.

The Transformer architecture processes sequences by implementing a form of neural message-passing that consists of iterative information retrieval (attention), followed by local processing (position-wise MLP). Two types of information are essential under this general computational paradigm: "sensory" information about individual objects, and "relational" information describing the relationships between objects. Standard attention naturally encodes the former, but does not explicitly encode the latter. In this paper, we present an extension of Transformers where multi-head attention is augmented with two distinct types of attention heads, each routing information of a different type. The first type is the standard attention mechanism of Transformers, which captures object-level features, while the second type is a novel attention mechanism we propose to explicitly capture relational information. The two types of attention heads each possess different inductive biases, giving the resulting architecture greater efficiency and versatility. The promise of this approach is demonstrated empirically across a range of tasks.

A fundamental challenge for explainable and accountable language models is revealing how external information influences their answers. This paper examines whether models are self-attributive: that is, whether they indicate when -- and only when -- their responses to questions are influenced by information provided alongside the question. Furthermore, we explore how self-attribution can be improved through counterfactual training, which explicitly teaches models to distinguish between answers that do and do not depend on supplied information. We found that most of the eleven frontier models rarely attribute influential information in their answers, and the rest attribute non-influential information. Training acknowledgment into reasoning does not fix this: the acknowledgment does not reach the final answer. We introduce CREDIT, which directly supervises final-answer self-attribution with counterfactual labels, without the need for human annotation. CREDIT substantially improves attribution in four open models, including two distilled reasoning models, and outperforms reasoning-level fine-tuning and prompting baselines. Among answers that agree with a user's suggestion, CREDIT distinguishes those changed by the suggestion from those the model would have given anyway. Gains transfer partly to unseen information types and prompts containing sources that support conflicting answers.

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal concept circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate graph metrics to characterize circuit topology. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, consistent signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings provide a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and motivate concept-aware training strategies, such as Circuit-aware Experience Replay, which uses circuit topology to prioritize concepts vulnerable to forgetting.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) improve their performance through self-feedback on certain tasks while degrade on others. We discovered that such a contrary is due to LLM's bias in evaluating their own output. In this paper, we formally define LLM's self-bias - the tendency to favor its own generation - using two statistics. We analyze six LLMs (GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Gemini, LLaMA2, Mixtral and DeepSeek) on translation, constrained text generation, and mathematical reasoning tasks. We find that self-bias is prevalent in all examined LLMs across multiple languages and tasks. Our analysis reveals that while the self-refine pipeline improves the fluency and understandability of model outputs, it further amplifies self-bias. To mitigate such biases, we discover that larger model size and external feedback with accurate assessment can significantly reduce bias in the self-refine pipeline, leading to actual performance improvement in downstream tasks. The code and data are released at https://github.com/xu1998hz/llm_self_bias.

The abilities to perceive, learn, and use generalities, similarities, classes, i.e., semantic memory (SM), is central to cognition. Machine learning (ML), neural network, and AI research has been primarily driven by tasks requiring such abilities. However, another central facet of cognition, single-trial formation of permanent memories of experiences, i.e., episodic memory (EM), has had relatively little focus. Only recently has EM-like functionality been added to Deep Learning (DL) models, e.g., Neural Turing Machine, Memory Networks. However, in these cases: a) EM is implemented as a separate module, which entails substantial data movement (and so, time and power) between the DL net itself and EM; and b) individual items are stored localistically within the EM, precluding realizing the exponential representational efficiency of distributed over localist coding. We describe Sparsey, an unsupervised, hierarchical, spatial/spatiotemporal associative memory model differing fundamentally from mainstream ML models, most crucially, in its use of sparse distributed representations (SDRs), or, cell assemblies, which admits an extremely efficient, single-trial learning algorithm that maps input similarity into code space similarity (measured as intersection). SDRs of individual inputs are stored in superposition and because similarity is preserved, the patterns of intersections over the assigned codes reflect the similarity, i.e., statistical, structure, of all orders, not simply pairwise, over the inputs. Thus, SM, i.e., a generative model, is built as a computationally free side effect of the act of storing episodic memory traces of individual inputs, either spatial patterns or sequences. We report initial results on MNIST and on the Weizmann video event recognition benchmarks. While we have not yet attained SOTA class accuracy, learning takes only minutes on a single CPU.

Attention mechanisms have improved the performance of NLP tasks while allowing models to remain explainable. Self-attention is currently widely used, however interpretability is difficult due to the numerous attention distributions. Recent work has shown that model representations can benefit from label-specific information, while facilitating interpretation of predictions. We introduce the Label Attention Layer: a new form of self-attention where attention heads represent labels. We test our novel layer by running constituency and dependency parsing experiments and show our new model obtains new state-of-the-art results for both tasks on both the Penn Treebank (PTB) and Chinese Treebank. Additionally, our model requires fewer self-attention layers compared to existing work. Finally, we find that the Label Attention heads learn relations between syntactic categories and show pathways to analyze errors.

Large pre-trained neural networks such as BERT have had great recent success in NLP, motivating a growing body of research investigating what aspects of language they are able to learn from unlabeled data. Most recent analysis has focused on model outputs (e.g., language model surprisal) or internal vector representations (e.g., probing classifiers). Complementary to these works, we propose methods for analyzing the attention mechanisms of pre-trained models and apply them to BERT. BERT's attention heads exhibit patterns such as attending to delimiter tokens, specific positional offsets, or broadly attending over the whole sentence, with heads in the same layer often exhibiting similar behaviors. We further show that certain attention heads correspond well to linguistic notions of syntax and coreference. For example, we find heads that attend to the direct objects of verbs, determiners of nouns, objects of prepositions, and coreferent mentions with remarkably high accuracy. Lastly, we propose an attention-based probing classifier and use it to further demonstrate that substantial syntactic information is captured in BERT's attention.

Egocentric AI agents, such as smart glasses, rely on pointing gestures to resolve referential ambiguities in natural language commands. However, despite advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), current systems often fail to precisely ground the spatial semantics of pointing. Instead, they rely on spurious correlations with visual proximity or object saliency, a phenomenon we term "Referential Hallucination." To address this gap, we introduce EgoPoint-Bench, a comprehensive question-answering benchmark designed to evaluate and enhance multimodal pointing reasoning in egocentric views. Comprising over 11k high-fidelity simulated and real-world samples, the benchmark spans five evaluation dimensions and three levels of referential complexity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that while state-of-the-art proprietary and open-source models struggle with egocentric pointing, models fine-tuned on our synthetic data achieve significant performance gains and robust sim-to-real generalization. This work highlights the importance of spatially aware supervision and offers a scalable path toward precise egocentric AI assistants. Project page: https://guyyyug.github.io/EgoPoint-Bench/

Existing self-evolving memory systems mainly improve agent memory based on textual outputs, such as task trajectories and reflections. However, this text-based paradigm rarely incorporates internal mechanistic signals, leaving how retrieved memory is actually utilized during task execution underexplored. This limitation can lead to unreliable error attribution and hallucinated memory modifications. In this work, we show that retrieval-head attention provides a mechanistic signal for revealing segment-level memory utilization. By aggregating attention over memory segments and decision steps, we construct a context utilization matrix that exposes recurring memory-use patterns and indicates corresponding refinement strategies. Building on this observation, we propose Attention-Guided Memory Refinement (AGMR), a framework that uses utilization patterns revealed by attention to guide targeted segment-level memory updates. AGMR corrects or enhances memory for failed executions, simplifies memory for successful executions, and verifies each update through re-execution. Experiments on interactive decision-making benchmarks show that AGMR improves both task performance and memory efficiency over text-only memory refinement baselines. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AGMR_code-3262/

The weight matrix (WM) of a neural network (NN) is its program. The programs of many traditional NNs are learned through gradient descent in some error function, then remain fixed. The WM of a self-referential NN, however, can keep rapidly modifying all of itself during runtime. In principle, such NNs can meta-learn to learn, and meta-meta-learn to meta-learn to learn, and so on, in the sense of recursive self-improvement. While NN architectures potentially capable of implementing such behaviour have been proposed since the '90s, there have been few if any practical studies. Here we revisit such NNs, building upon recent successes of fast weight programmers and closely related linear Transformers. We propose a scalable self-referential WM (SRWM) that learns to use outer products and the delta update rule to modify itself. We evaluate our SRWM in supervised few-shot learning and in multi-task reinforcement learning with procedurally generated game environments. Our experiments demonstrate both practical applicability and competitive performance of the proposed SRWM. Our code is public.

Recent self-supervised learning (SSL) models trained on human-like egocentric visual inputs substantially underperform on image recognition tasks compared to humans. These models train on raw, uniform visual inputs collected from head-mounted cameras. This is different from humans, as the anatomical structure of the retina and visual cortex relatively amplifies the central visual information, i.e. around humans' gaze location. This selective amplification in humans likely aids in forming object-centered visual representations. Here, we investigate whether focusing on central visual information boosts egocentric visual object learning. We simulate 5-months of egocentric visual experience using the large-scale Ego4D dataset and generate gaze locations with a human gaze prediction model. To account for the importance of central vision in humans, we crop the visual area around the gaze location. Finally, we train a time-based SSL model on these modified inputs. Our experiments demonstrate that focusing on central vision leads to better object-centered representations. Our analysis shows that the SSL model leverages the temporal dynamics of the gaze movements to build stronger visual representations. Overall, our work marks a significant step toward bio-inspired learning of visual representations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly criticized for not understanding language. However, many critiques focus on cognitive abilities that, in humans, are distinct from language processing. Here, we instead study a kind of understanding tightly linked to language: inferring who did what to whom (thematic roles) in a sentence. Does the central training objective of LLMs-word prediction-result in sentence representations that capture thematic roles? In two experiments, we characterized sentence representations in four LLMs. In contrast to human similarity judgments, in LLMs the overall representational similarity of sentence pairs reflected syntactic similarity but not whether their agent and patient assignments were identical vs. reversed. Furthermore, we found little evidence that thematic role information was available in any subset of hidden units. However, some attention heads robustly captured thematic roles, independently of syntax. Therefore, LLMs can extract thematic roles but, relative to humans, this information influences their representations more weakly.

Self-awareness, i.e., the ability to assess and correct one's own generation, is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence, making its replication in large language models (LLMs) an important yet challenging task. Previous works tackle this by employing extensive reinforcement learning or rather relying on large external verifiers. In this work, we propose Refine via Intrinsic Self-Verification (ReVISE), an efficient and effective framework that enables LLMs to self-correct their outputs through self-verification. The core idea of ReVISE is to enable LLMs to verify their reasoning processes and continually rethink reasoning trajectories based on its verification. We introduce a structured curriculum based upon online preference learning to implement this efficiently. Specifically, as ReVISE involves two challenging tasks (i.e., self-verification and reasoning correction), we tackle each task sequentially using curriculum learning, collecting both failed and successful reasoning paths to construct preference pairs for efficient training. During inference, our approach enjoys natural test-time scaling by integrating self-verification and correction capabilities, further enhanced by our proposed confidence-aware decoding mechanism. Our experiments on various reasoning tasks demonstrate that ReVISE achieves efficient self-correction and significantly improves reasoning performance.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.